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FOREWORD
Stevedoring is a major link in the waterfront chain. Its performance can thus
have a significant impact on the efficiency of the traded goods sector and
ultimately affects the performance of the economy as a whole.
The ‘thinness’ and variability of Australian shipping trades creates a particular
need for flexible work arrangements at Australia’s ports. This study examines
selected work arrangements and assesses their implications for the performance
of container stevedoring workplaces. The effects on employees and users of
stevedoring services are also considered, and impediments to achieving
improved work arrangements are analysed.
The study has drawn on detailed information collected throughout 1997 from
consultations with industry participants, a public call for views and evidence,
discussions at selected workplaces, and workplace information requests. We are
grateful to all those who took part. It should be noted that the study does not
take account of developments in April 1998 involving Patrick Stevedores,
which occurred when it was being finalised.
This is the first in a series of research reports requested by the Government on
work arrangements in key industries. It was prepared in the Labour Market
Research Branch. It is complemented by the Productivity Commission’s report,
International Benchmarking of the Australian Waterfront, which benchmarks
port performance across container, bulk and break bulk trades, and cruise
shipping.
The Commission welcomes further feedback on both reports, consistent with its
objective to improve the information base on key issues affecting Australia’s











1 About this study 1
1.1 Approach 3
1.2 Report structure 9
2 Container stevedoring in Australia 11
2.1 Industry structure and operation 11
2.2 Employment in stevedoring 17
2.3 Reform of stevedoring services 28
3 Workplace culture 35
3.1 Brief history of employee and management relations in
stevedoring
36
3.2 Poor workplace culture 38
3.3 Sea-Land 45
3.4 Summary of findings 47
4 Rostering 49
4.1 Main features of roster systems 50
4.2 Constraints on roster systems 52WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
vi
4.3 Reducing the impact of constraints 64
4.4 Shiftwork and occupational health and safety 68
4.5 Summary of findings 68
5 Manning 71
5.1 Gang sizes 72
5.2 Manning levels 81
5.3 Summary of findings 86




6.4 Summary of findings 100
7 Remuneration 103
7.1 Remuneration schemes 104
7.2 Productivity schemes 109
7.3 The ‘aggregate wage’ approach to remuneration 111
7.4 Hours worked 114
7.5 Wage levels 116
7.6 Summary of findings 118
8 Paid non-working time 121
8.1 Leave arrangements 121
8.2 Shift breaks, delays and unplanned absences 126
8.3 Minimum payments 128
8.4 Summary of findings 130   CONTENTS
vii
9 Enabling change 133
9.1 Need for change 133
9.2 Workplace-level factors 136
9.3 Industry-level factors 137
9.4 Improved legislative framework 144
9.5 Summary of findings 152
Appendixes
A Participation and visits
B Research method
C Labour tasks and the container stevedoring process
D Employee characteristics
E Factors affecting the loading and unloading of ships
F Reforms in the stevedoring industry
G Occupational health and safety
H Disciplinary measures
I The New Zealand experience
J Workplace negotiations, awards and agreements
Referencesvii
ABBREVIATIONS
ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics
AIRC Australian Industrial Relations Commission
AMOU Australian Maritime Officers’ Union
AVT Australian vocational trainee
BHP Broken Hill Propriety Ltd
BIE Bureau of Industry Economics
BTCE Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics
CEPU Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information,
Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia
CTAL Container Terminals Australia Limited
IC Industry Commission
ISC Inter-State Commission
ITF International Transport Federation
MTIA Metal Trades Industry Association
MUA Maritime Union of Australia
PC Productivity Commission
P&O Pacific and Orient
TEU 20-foot equivalent unit
WIRA Waterfront Industry Reform Authority




An employee who is part of a national training
scheme (the Australian Vocational Training
System) administered by the Australian National
Training Authority. These trainees are employed
by stevedores under the Stevedoring Australian
Vocational Training System Award 1994
Break  bulk  cargo Non-bulk cargo that is not containerised. It can
include unitised cargoes as well as miscellaneous
goods in boxes, bales, cases or drums — for
example, assembled cars, steel coil and timber
Bulk cargo Cargo (such as coal, mineral ores, oil or wheat)
that is carried loose, taking up the shape of the
ship’s hold. It is handled by direct application of
conveyors, grabs, pumps, and elevators
Casual  employee An employee engaged on a daily basis without
any commitment by the employer on the period of
engagement
Clerks Operational employees who perform tasks
associated with tracking the movement of
containers into, within and out of the terminal and
other clerical tasks
Common  user Port facilities, including berths and equipment
such as straddle carriers and cranes, that can be
used by a number of stevedores that have a
contract with the port company
Container Standardised steel boxes (20 feet or 40 feet long
and 8 feet wide and high) used to carry cargo
Container  terminal The wharf and adjoining area where containers
are loaded and unloaded from vesselsWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Continuous work shift A work arrangement where equipment is operated
through rest breaks. Gang members are allotted to
staggered rest breaks so that at any time during
the shift there is always a sufficient number of
employees to continue operating the equipment
Double header Two consecutively worked shifts, usually worked
from day to evening shift
Down driver A driver not currently operating a crane or other
heavy equipment who may either be on a rest
break or performing other duties
Elapsed  rate The number of containers moved per ship per
elapsed hour. Elapsed time is the total hours over
which the ship is worked, measured from labour
on to labour off
Employee A person employed by a container stevedore,
including management, supervisors and
operational employees
Enterprise agreement An agreement at an individual workplace between
the employer and workers (usually represented by
their union) on terms and conditions of
employment
Enterprise employment An employment relationship between workers and
a stevedoring workplace
Failure  to  report When an employee does not report for the
commencement or resumption of a shift or shift
extension
Foreman An operational employee who, in consultation
with supervisors, supervises the work of other
operational employees in the working of ships and
receival and delivery operations
Guaranteed wage
employee
An employee engaged by a stevedoring firm on a
permanent part-time basis, but only guaranteed to
be paid for a minimum number of hours per week.
Guaranteed wage employees are entitled to other
conditions of service on a pro-rata basis   GLOSSARY
xi
Idle time payment Payment to operational employees for full shifts
during which they must be available but are not
required for work
Industrial  dispute A withdrawal from work by a number of
employees or a refusal by an employer or a
number of employers to permit some or all of
their employees to work
Internal  transfer  vehicle A truck with trailer which is used to transport
containers between the crane and the yard
Irregular shift That part of the roster where employees may be
assigned to any shift on a day-to-day basis
Lashing  duties Manoeuvring heavy 12-foot rods which lock
containers onto the ship’s deck to prevent
containers from dislodging while the ship is at sea
Maintenance  employee An operational employee who works in
maintenance operations at a stevedoring
workplace. Usually, the employee holds a
mechanical or electrical trade certificate
Management Managerial employees at the workplace,
excluding supervisory employees
Manning levels The number of persons employed at a stevedoring
workplace
Manning  scales The number of workers per gang required to
perform defined tasks (such as operating heavy
equipment or performing lashing duties)
Nick,  the The practice of employees leaving the terminal
before the end of the shift while still being paid
for the full shift
Nonmanagerial
employees
Supervisory employees and operational employees
Operational  employees All employees in grades 1 to 6 and Australian
vocational trainees. Excludes supervisors and
management. Operational employees are involved
in tasks including operating machinery, clerical
work, maintenance and lashingWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Order  of  engagement An arrangement which specifies the order in
which employees are engaged for a shift (also
known as the ‘order of pick’)
Permanent employee An employee engaged by a stevedoring firm on a
full-time continuing basis. They are entitled to an
average of 35 ordinary hours of work per week,
annual leave, sick leave, long service leave,
rostered time off and other conditions
Port  authority Public agency responsible for the control and
management of a port and its facilities
Productivity Employment
Programme
A productivity-based remuneration and
employment arrangement implemented at CTAL
Sydney
Quay crane A shore-based crane used to move containers on
and off ships
Reefer Refrigerated container
Rubber-tyred  gantry A mobile vehicle similar to a straddle carrier
which is used to move containers between road
and rail transport and yard storage areas
Shipper A person or enterprise having a commercial
arrangement with a shipping organisation for the
shipment of cargo. A shipper is the sender or final
receiver of cargo
Ship planner An employee primarily responsible for planning
the placement of containers on ships that need to
be loaded and unloaded
Ship turnaround time The time between a vessel mooring to labour off.
It may also be measured as the time between a
ship entering port and leaving port
Site  Committee A committee of Maritime Union of Australia
representatives at each workplace, elected by
employees
Smoko A rest break during a shift (usually 20 minutes in
duration)
Stevedore A company or terminal operator that engages in   GLOSSARY
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stevedoring
Stevedoring The loading and unloading of ships’ cargoes
Stevedoring  industry Includes bulk, break bulk and container
operations
Straddle carrier A vehicle used to move containers between yard
storage areas and the quay crane or land transport
Supervisor An employee who has overall responsibility for
the working of a ship
Supplementary employee An employee engaged by a stevedoring firm on a
non-permanent basis. Supplementary employees
are generally paid at the shift rate being worked,
plus 20 per cent
20-foot equivalent unit Container counting unit based on the International
Standards Organisation 20-foot by 8-foot
container
Variably  rostered  shift A shift where operational employees may be
assigned to one of two shift types
Wharfie Operational employee
Workplace A company-operated worksite where container
stevedoring functions are performed
Yard planner An employee primarily responsible for receiving
information from the truck booking system on
which containers are being delivered or picked up
by trucks or railxiiixiv
KEY FINDINGS
·  Flexibility in the allocation and use of labour is critical to stevedore
workplace performance, given the highly variable demand for stevedoring
services at Australian ports.
·  The container stevedoring industry is characterised by a system of complex,
inflexible and prescriptive work arrangements which constrain workplace
performance. They impede productivity, reduce timeliness and reliability,
and increase labour costs.
·  The most significant of these work arrangements are the order of
engagement (specifying the order in which different types of employees are
engaged for a shift), shift premiums and penalty rates, and redundancy
provisions.
·  The order of engagement, in combination with relatively high shift
premiums and penalty rates, add significantly to total labour costs for a
given level of activity. They detract from productivity by creating incentives
for permanent operational employees to seek overtime and lead to poor
timeliness and reliability. They can also have deleterious effects on the lives
of operational employees.
·  The high cost of redundancies restricts the ability of stevedores to adjust
manning levels of permanent employees. The redundancy agreements also
foster skill mismatches and reduce the ability of management to allocate the
best person for the job.
·  There are a number of factors which impede change, including an
adversarial workplace culture, strong union bargaining power, limited
competition in the labour market for operational stevedoring employees, and
limitations on competition in the industry.
·  The  Workplace Relations Act 1996 facilitates change by enabling work
arrangements to be determined primarily at the workplace level. Together
with the secondary boycott revisions to the Trade Practices Act, it has also
reduced some sources of union bargaining power.
·  Responsibility for better outcomes ultimately rests with managers and their
employees. Greater competition in container stevedoring would increase the








This study examines selected stevedoring work
arrangements and assesses their implications for
workplace performance. The impact on employees
and users of stevedoring services is also considered,




Work arrangements are defined broadly to include
the way in which stevedoring work is performed and
the conditions attached to that work. They include
arrangements specified in the Stevedoring Industry
Award 1991 and enterprise agreements, as well as
those that have evolved through custom and practice.





While the direct effects of some work arrangements
may be measurable, for others it is only possible to
assess the direction and broad magnitude of their
effects on workplace performance. Many other
factors also affect stevedore performance, including
throughput levels and difficult stows. Moreover, it is
difficult to quantify the effects of changing a single
work arrangement, because often it is the
combination of several work arrangements that
constrains workplace performance.
This study focuses on
container terminals
The scope of this study is confined to stevedoring
services in container terminal operations. Workplace
arrangements are discussed in terms of their effects
on productivity, reliability, timeliness and cost.
... and uses new
information.
This study, with its emphasis on understanding the
complexities of work arrangements and their
interactions at the workplace, differs from previous
studies of the Australian waterfront. It uses a
considerable amount of information not previously
collated and analysed. The study approach and scope
are outlined in box 1.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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The study is complemented by the Productivity
Commission’s report on International Benchmarking
of the Australian Waterfront, which benchmarks
performance across container, bulk and break bulk
trades, and cruise shipping. The report compares
charges and service quality for stevedoring, port
infrastructure and marine services.
Box 1: Scope and approach of the study
Scope
This study focuses on a range of work arrangements at selected container stevedoring
workplaces. Container stevedoring services account for around one third of waterfront
charges. Labour accounts for over half of the container stevedoring operating costs.
Data collection methods
A number of methods were used to collect qualitative and quantitative data from primary
sources including: initial consultations with industry participants (stevedores and unions)
and other parties; a public call for views and information; detailed discussions at
selected workplaces with managers, supervisors and site committees; and workplace
information requests.
Selection of work arrangements
The selection of particular work arrangements for closer analysis was iterative. Work
arrangements were first selected on the basis of initial consultations and analysis of the
Stevedoring Industry Award, enterprise agreements and secondary sources. Specific
work arrangements were finalised following the detailed discussions at the chosen
workplaces.
Selection of workplaces
Five Australian container workplaces were selected for detailed analysis:  Sea-Land
(Port Adelaide); CTAL (Port Botany, Sydney); P&O Ports (Port Melbourne); Patrick
(Port Melbourne); and Patrick (Fisherman Islands, Brisbane). Together they account for
around three quarters of the annual throughput handled by major container terminals.
Fergusson Terminal, Ports of Auckland, New Zealand was chosen for international
comparison because: its annual throughput falls within the range of that handled by the
Australian workplaces selected; New Zealand and Australia have broadly similar
cultures and living standards; extensive reforms have occurred in New Zealand; and
initial consultations indicated that work arrangements at New Zealand terminals differed
significantly from those at Australian terminals.   OVERVIEW
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Box 2: Some key terms
Manning levels The  number  of  persons  employed  at  a  stevedoring
workplace.
Manning scales The number of workers per gang required to perform
defined tasks (such as operating heavy equipment or
performing lashing duties).
Operational  employees All employees in grades 1 to 6 and Australian
vocational trainees. It excludes supervisors and
management. Operational employees are involved in
tasks including operating machinery, clerical work,
maintenance and lashing.
Permanent employees Employees engaged by a stevedoring firm on a full-
time continuing basis. They are entitled to an average
of 35 ordinary hours of work per week, annual leave,
sick leave, long service leave, rostered time off and
other conditions.
Guaranteed  wage  employees Employees engaged by a stevedoring firm on a
permanent part-time basis, but only guaranteed to be
paid for a minimum number of hours per week.
Guaranteed wage employees are entitled to other
conditions of service on a pro-rata basis.
Supplementary employees Employees engaged by a stevedoring firm on a non-
permanent basis. Supplementary employees are
generally paid at the shift rate being worked, plus
20 per cent.
Stevedoring and waterfront performance
Stevedoring is an
important part in the
waterfront chain.
The waterfront provides a critical link in the
distribution of traded goods internationally and
within Australia. Stevedoring, the loading and
unloading of cargo from ship to shore, is an





International benchmarking by the Productivity
Commission and other studies indicate that
performance of Australian container stevedores
remains significantly below that of many overseas
operations, despite having improved both during and





Poor performance in stevedoring imposes both direct
and indirect costs on users of stevedoring services
and the rest of the economy. Berthing delays, for
example, can cost shipping lines about $30 000 per
day for a ship with a 2000 TEU (20-foot equivalent
unit containers) capacity. Examples of indirect costs
include maintenance of higher than normal inventory
levels, loss of confidence by overseas buyers and
discouragement of investment throughout the
economy. Moreover, inefficiencies in stevedoring
weaken the capacity of other links in the distribution




Demand for stevedoring services and labour
requirements is highly variable, due to:
·  fluctuations in the number and type of ships
arriving at any one time;
·  variations in the number of containers to be
loaded and unloaded; and
·  unexpected factors, such as delayed arrivals and
difficult stows.
This variability is particularly pronounced at
Australian ports because of the ‘thinness’ of shipping
trades (low volumes over long distances) and the
need for ships to make multi-port calls.
These features mean
that labour flexibility is
critical to performance.
Given these characteristics, flexibility in the
allocation and use of labour is critical to stevedore
workplace performance in Australia.   OVERVIEW
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Impact of work arrangements





The container stevedoring industry is characterised
by a system of complex, inflexible and prescriptive
work arrangements which constrain workplace
performance. They reduce and distort incentives to
improve productivity, reduce timeliness and






The Stevedoring Industry Award provides the
structural base for the development of work
arrangements in enterprise agreements. However,
work arrangements negotiated during and since the
waterfront industry reform process have usually been
incorporated into enterprise agreements examined.
These agreements were made prior to the enactment
of the Workplace Relations Act 1996.
There have been some
improvements
As a result of enterprise bargaining and the
waterfront reform process there have been some
improvements in work arrangements, including some
use of supplementary employees at major ports,
lower manning scales, earnings equalised over longer
periods, and more efficient use of down drivers (a
driver not currently operating equipment).





However, many existing work arrangements provide
inappropriate incentive structures, inhibit workplace
flexibility and constrain the ability of workplaces to
adapt to changes in industry conditions. Three work
arrangements of particular significance are the order
of engagement, shift premiums and penalty rates, and
redundancy provisions.
... the order of
engagement;
The order of engagement (also known as the ‘order
of pick’) specifies the order in which different types
of employees are engaged for a shift. The order of
engagement is prescribed in enterprise agreements
(see box 3 for a typical example). There is littleWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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variation among the workplaces, with the exception
of CTAL Sydney.
Box 3: Weekday order of engagement, Patrick Melbourne, 1996
1st pick Regularly rostered permanent employees (evening, day)
2nd pick Variably rostered permanent employees (midnight/irregular, evening/day,
day/evening)
3rd  pick Irregularly rostered permanent employees (normal order of allocation:
midnight, evening, day)
4th pick Guaranteed wage employees to limit of guaranteea
5th  pick Permanent employees working double headersb (limited to two non-
consecutive days per week)
6th pick Guaranteed wage employees beyond guaranteea
7th pick Supplementary employees
8th pick Permanent employees working additional double headers
9th pick Guaranteed wage employees and supplementary employees working double
headers
a Guaranteed wage employees are guaranteed a minimum of 15 hours work a week.
b Two consecutively worked shifts.
Source:  Patrick Melbourne Enterprise Agreement (1996)
The order of engagement constrains management’s
ability to make the most effective use of the
workforce, thereby reducing productivity and, in
turn, timeliness and reliability.
In particular, at most workplaces, management
cannot use supplementary employees until permanent
employees have been given the option of working
‘double headers’ (two shifts worked consecutively).
This increases the access of permanent employees to
high levels of overtime. The resulting longer hours
can also adversely affect the health and safety of
employees. Stevedoring has the highest cost of work
related injuries per employee of all major industries.
Further, by restricting the amount of time that
supplementary employees are able to work, the order
of engagement limits their ability to increase their
skills and income. This arrangement also adds to the
administrative complexity of the rostering system.   OVERVIEW
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... shift premiums and
penalty rates;
Shift premiums and penalty rates are higher than for
employees under other relevant awards.1 For
example, the Stevedoring Industry Award specifies
that a weekday night shift must be paid at twice the
ordinary rate, whereas this shift is paid at a rate of
1.5 or 1.3 in other awards examined.
The order of engagement, in combination with
relatively high shift premiums and penalty rates, add
significantly to total labour costs. They also detract
from productivity by creating incentives for
permanent operational employees to seek overtime
and lead to poorer timeliness and reliability.
Australian Bureau of Statistics data indicate that, in
1996, stevedoring operational employees on average
were paid for 36 hours of ordinary time and nine
hours of overtime per week. However, the average
hours actually worked would be significantly lower
than paid hours because of payments made for idle
and call-up time and various forms of leave. These
averages also conceal considerable week to week
variation within a roster cycle — total hours of work
attended can vary from zero to 60 or more. Such
work patterns not only impact on labour productivity,
but can also have deleterious effects on the lives of
operational employees.
Average annual gross earnings of operational
employees at the Australian container stevedoring
workplaces examined were in the range of $60 000
to $100 000 in the last financial year, with overtime
contributing around 20 to 30 per cent. This places
these operational employees in the top 5 per cent of
Australian wage and salary earners.
                                             
1 National Building and Construction Award 1990, Transport Workers Award 1983, Storage




Retirement and redundancy agreements
(incorporating identical entitlements at the
workplaces examined) have the potential to impose
high redundancy costs on stevedores, particularly
when substantial numbers of surplus employees are
involved. Patrick The Australian Stevedore recently
estimated that the average redundancy payment was
$73 000 for Maritime Union of Australia members
and $190  000 for Australian Maritime Officers’
Union members. Redundancy payments are
substantial even for employees with short periods of
service. For example, an employee (any age under
60) with three years service would be entitled to 78
weeks pay.
Entitlements specified in the retirement and
redundancy agreements  markedly exceed those in
other awards examined.
The high cost of redundancies restricts the ability of
stevedores to adjust manning levels of permanent
employees. Industrial disputation is a significant
further deterrent to initiating redundancies. The cost
of redundancy and the possibility of industrial
disputation contribute to retention of surplus labour,
thus lowering productivity, and can also inhibit
recruitment.
The agreements also foster skill mismatches and
reduce the ability of management to allocate the best
person for the job. For example, management at
several workplaces noted that some clerks, when
made surplus by the introduction of the computerised
vehicle booking system, were retrained and
redeployed to perform other tasks such as straddle
carrier driving, because it was less costly than
offering them redundancy packages. However, in
terms of labour productivity, it may have been more
efficient if the clerks had been given redundancy
packages and people with the best skills and aptitude






There are several other work arrangements which
also impact on container stevedoring workplace




Workforce size and composition (that is, number by
grade and/or function) are prescribed in extensive
detail in the enterprise agreements examined in this
study. These highly prescriptive arrangements
constrain the ability of management to alter manning
levels and composition to meet operational
requirements, as well as contributing to higher
manning levels of permanent employees (see box 4
for a typical example).
Box 4: Workforce size and composition, P&O Ports Melbourne
The enterprise agreement of P&O Ports Melbourne prescribes the size and composition
of the permanent operational workforce. The following table shows the number of
permanent employees by grade and function in the operational area (excluding
maintenance). The agreement also prescribes the number of permanent maintenance
employees by grade and function (chapter 5).
Grade
3456 T o t a l
Foremen 16 18 34
Clerks 32 3 5 40
   Operations Head Clerks 5 5
   Operations Clerks 30 30
   Allocators 3 3
   Payroll Clerks 2 2
General 110 32 142
   Key Crane Operators 32 32
   Straddle Drivers 76 76
   General Duties etc 24 24
   Support Services etc 10 10
Reefer Attendants 10 10
Watchmen 5 5
Total Operational (excluding maintenance employees) 231
Source:  P&O Ports Melbourne Enterprise Agreement 1996WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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The enterprise agreements include provisions to
adjust workforce size and composition under certain




The objective of equalisation schemes is to equalise
earnings across permanent operational employees
within functional areas by ensuring they have equal
access to shifts which pay above the normal shift
rate. From the perspective of employees, by
equalising earnings opportunities, these schemes can
promote the morale and motivation of the permanent
workforce. However, depending on the length of the
period over which schemes are equalised, such
schemes can have a negative impact on productivity
and timeliness by restricting management’s ability to
allocate the appropriate employees to particular shifts
and tasks. The schemes may also diminish incentives
for permanent operational employees to improve
their individual work performance.
The practical application of such schemes has
improved in recent times, as the period over which
earnings are equalised has been extended. Several
workplaces now equalise over a period of 12 months,
although some still equalise over a considerably
shorter period.
Nevertheless, combined with equalisation schemes,
the order of engagement assures access by permanent
employees to overtime and reduces work allocated to
supplementary employees. This ultimately impacts
on productivity and costs.
... existing productivity
schemes;
The primary objective of productivity schemes, such
as bonuses based on the number of containers lifted,
is to increase incentives to work more efficiently. In
practice, these schemes do not appear to have been
very effective.
At the workplaces examined, productivity bonuses
are not targeted at individual employees. Instead,   OVERVIEW
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bonuses are equalised across the workforce. Thus
individual employees can have only a minor
influence on their productivity bonus.
In addition, for many operational employees the
potential earnings from overtime continue to
outweigh those from productivity bonuses. Although
there is some variation across workplaces, overtime
usually accounts for 20 to 30 per cent of gross
earnings, which can be several times greater than
earnings from productivity bonuses.
... aggregate wage
schemes;
Under aggregate wage schemes, yearly gross wages
are based on a prescribed set of ordinary, premium
and, in some cases, penalty hours. They are paid as
an average weekly wage. These schemes can reduce
incentives to undertake overtime but, in practice,
have served to lock in high labour costs.
... leave provisions; Leave provisions include annual leave, sick leave
and long service leave, as well as rostered weeks and
days off. Most of these provisions exceed those that
apply to workers under the other awards examined,
and can have a significant effect on labour costs. For
example, permanent operational employees receive
five weeks annual leave under the Stevedoring
Industry Award, compared with four weeks for
employees under other awards. Further, a loading of
27.5 per cent applies to long service leave for
permanent stevedoring employees, whereas no such
loading is payable in the other awards examined.
The existing leave provisions contribute to the need
to maintain a higher number of permanent
employees, given the prescribed composition of the
workforce and the order of engagement.
... limits on contracting
out;
Good management practice would normally involve
a case by case assessment of the viability of
contracting out, by comparing the benefits and costs
of alternative providers. However, provisions in the
enterprise agreements at the Australian workplaces
examined limit the extent of contracting out. SomeWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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also specify that contracting out should not reduce
the size of the permanent workforce. These
restrictions, by precluding access to potential
efficiencies, are likely to detract from workplace
performance.
There is limited contracting out at the Australian
stevedore workplaces examined. All workplaces
contract out building maintenance and major
linemarking work. Only a few also contract out
office cleaning, work area cleaning, refrigerated
container monitoring and the truck booking system.
Apart from occasional specialised outsourcing, there
is no regular use of contractors in the maintenance of
equipment.
Unlike Australian stevedoring workplaces, there are
no prescribed restrictions on contracting out at the
New Zealand stevedoring workplaces examined.
Management has the choice of contracting out if it
wishes. The ability to contract out increases pressure
on permanent employees to be competitive with
contractors, thereby improving workplace
performance.





Call-up payments are made to operational employees
for attending work to commence an allocated shift
for which they are then not required.
Idle time payments occur when permanent
operational employees are rostered on for a shift, but
are not allocated to undertake the shift and do not
attend the workplace. They are not available to
supplementary employees.
Such payments reduce uncertainty of earnings due to
the variable nature of containerised stevedoring.
However, call-up and idle time payments, when
combined with notification rules, can create








The broad effects of each of these work
arrangements on container stevedoring workplace
performance are depicted in summary form in
table 1. Many (such as the order of engagement, shift
premiums and penalty rates, and redundancy
provisions) are mutually reinforcing, interacting to
form a system which further constrains performance.
These work arrangements create both the opportunity
and the incentive for permanent employees to work
longer hours to obtain high levels of overtime. They
also constrain the ability of management to alter the
size and composition of the workforce and choose
the most appropriate employees for a particular task.
The outcome is reduced levels of productivity, poor
timeliness and reliability, and high labour costs.
... and they have wider
effects.
The impact of work arrangements on stevedore
performance is felt more widely than in the
stevedoring industry alone. Increased costs and
reduced service quality can lower output and
employment in other industries that rely on the
efficient distribution of their products, and ultimately
impact on national economic performance and
standards of living.
They are less flexible
than in New Zealand
where extensive reform
has occurred.
Work arrangements in New Zealand container
stevedoring workplaces are considerably more
flexible than in Australia. For example, rostering
arrangements and the ratio of permanent to casual
labour vary considerably across workplaces, whereas
they are relatively uniform across the Australian
container stevedoring workplaces examined.
New Zealand’s extensive port, labour market and
transport reforms over the past decade increased
competitive pressures within and between ports,
which, in turn, drove improvements in work
arrangements. These reforms have resulted in much
improved stevedore performance.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
xxviii
Table 1: Summary of the key direct














Constrains the use of supplementary
employees and the most appropriate
use of labour










Create large price differentials for
different shifts










Maintain higher manning levels











Reduces flexibility to alter the size and





Can decrease ability to allocate
appropriate labour to tasks
















Reduce incentives to undertake
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Increase the absence of permanent
operational employees from the




Reduce pressures on permanent





Can create extra costs when combined
with notification requirements on
weekends
– Ñ –
– Little or no effect;  Ò  Decrease;  Ñ  Increase;  ?  Direction uncertain.
a Direct effects exclude the effects that arise only from interactions with other work arrangements.






Responsibility for changing work arrangements
ultimately rests with stevedoring managers and
employees. Management and employees (represented
by unions) in container stevedoring have negotiated
and agreed to these arrangements. The outcomes
reflect the attitudes and abilities of the parties
involved, their relative bargaining power and the




There are a number of factors which impede change
to work arrangements, including an adversarial
workplace culture, strong union bargaining power
and limitations on competition in the industry.
... a workplace culture




Adversarial relations between management and
employees pervade most of the Australian container
stevedoring workplaces examined. The level of
industrial disputation remains high relative to other
industries. Stevedoring experienced the second
highest annual average number of days lost between
1992–97, after coal mining (figure 1).
... substantial employee
bargaining power;
An important source of employee bargaining power,
in addition to the extensive coverage of operational
employees by the Maritime Union of Australia, is the
high cost of berthing delays or stoppages. The
shipping lines exert pressure on stevedores to settle
disputes quickly, including through penalty clauses
and shifting business elsewhere. The Maritime Union
of Australia has used its power in this situation to
deliver favourable terms and conditions of
employment to its members.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Figure 1: Average level of industrial disputes in selected industries,










































a The number of working days lost is from ABS 1997a. Employment in 1992 and 1993 uses industry statistics
collected by the Waterfront Industry Reform Authority. Productivity Commission estimates of employment for
each year over the period 1994 to 1997 assumes a fixed intake per year to reach employment levels in 1997.
Estimates of employment in the stevedoring industry include full-time, part-time and supplementary employees
working in container, break bulk and bulk operations.
Sources:  ABS (1997a); BTCE (1995a); unpublished ABS data; workplace information requests
... limited competition in
the labour market for
operational stevedoring
employees;
The high cost of redundancy payments makes it
difficult to reduce the number of excess employees if
contracts are lost. These costs also make stevedores
reluctant to dismiss poorly performing employees, so
reducing competition for jobs and the incentive for
employees to improve their performance. Employee
turnover in container stevedoring remains very low




Container stevedoring is characterised by a high
concentration of ownership and considerable barriers
to entry. Constraints on competition enable the cost
of inefficiency to be more easily passed on to users
of stevedore services, such as shipping lines,
exporters and importers. The main barrier to entry is
the exclusive, long-term leasing arrangements that
stevedores currently have in place with Australian
port authorities (table 2).   OVERVIEW
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Additional years if option
to renew lease is taken up
Patrick Sydney 1978 40 yearsa 5 years
CTAL Sydney 1979 25 years 5 years
Patrick Melbourne 1993 21 years 21 years
P&O Ports Melbourne 1993 20 years 20 years
a Recently renegotiated and increased from 25 years by the stevedore — on the basis of additional capital
expenditure of approximately $100 million in the short term.
Sources:  Melbourne Ports Corporation; Sydney Ports Corporation
Stevedores in New Zealand face lower barriers to
entry, partly because common user facilities —
where wharf facilities can be used by a number of
stevedores — are available at several ports.
Australian interport competition is also limited by the
large distances between ports and by the relatively




The shipping lines are the only users of container
stevedoring services that have a direct contractual
relationship with the stevedore. Other users, such as
exporters, importers, road and rail transport
companies, have no direct market mechanisms with
which to influence stevedore performance. The
interest of the shipping lines is for ships to be loaded
and unloaded quickly. Shipping lines are less
concerned with other costs of delay in the movement
of cargo.






Enterprise agreements in the Australian workplaces
examined were negotiated in 1996, prior to the
enactment of the Workplace Relations Act.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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The major objective of




The main objective of the Workplace Relations Act
is to provide a framework for cooperative workplace
relations by, among other means, ensuring that the
primary responsibility for determining matters
affecting the relationship between employers and






There are several important parts of the Act that




Provisions in the Act require that a workplace
agreement not reduce the overall terms and
conditions of employees compared with the relevant
award. From July 1998, only allowable matters
(defined in the Workplace Relations Act) in awards
will be considered when the ‘no-disadvantage test’ is
applied to all agreements.
... award simplification; Some provisions of the Stevedoring Industry Award,
such as provisions for right-of-entry and stop work
meetings, appear to fall outside the scope of
allowable award matters under the Act. Moreover,
some work arrangements, such as the order of
engagement and equalisation, are not in the
Stevedoring Industry Award. As nonallowable
matters may still be included in workplace
agreements, the relative bargaining power of the two
parties will continue to influence the outcome.
... the role of third
parties;
The role of external parties has changed under the
Workplace Relations Act compared to the previous
industrial relations legislation. The scope of awards,
for example, has become limited to that of a safety
net, with additional matters to be determined at the
workplace. This effectively reduces the role of the
Australian Industrial Relations Commission in
workplace negotiations. The Act also makes
provision for individual workplace agreements.
However, the Maritime Union of Australia’s   OVERVIEW
xxxiii
extensive coverage of operational employees and its
strong preference for collective agreements had led
to only collective agreements being negotiated at the
workplaces examined.
... and dispute settlement
provisions.
The Workplace Relations Act and changes to the
Trade Practices Act 1974 introduced provisions that
allow for sanctions on employees and unions
engaging in certain types of industrial action. In
particular, the reintroduction of the secondary
boycott provisions (under the Trade Practices Act)








While the Workplace Relations Act facilitates
change to work arrangements, responsibility for
better outcomes ultimately rests with managers and
their employees. Greater competition in container
stevedoring would increase the pressures on both
sides to change work arrangements and improve
performance.1
1 ABOUT THIS STUDY
This study examines selected work arrangements in container stevedoring and
assesses their implications for workplace performance. The impact on
employees and users of stevedoring services is also considered, and
impediments to achieving improved work arrangements are analysed.
This is the first in a series requested by the Government on work arrangements
in key sectors of the economy. The study is complemented by an international
benchmarking study of the waterfront by the Productivity Commission
(PC 1998), which measures the performance of Australian waterfront industries
relative to that of other countries. The focus in that report is on the charges and
level of service to ship operators, exporters and importers, as well as
productivity performance.
Stevedoring is an important part of the waterfront chain of services. The
waterfront, the interface between sea and land transport, is critical to Australia’s
overseas and domestic trade. Three quarters of the value of Australia’s imports
and exports, and nearly one third of the domestic transport task,1 are carried by
sea (PC 1998; BIE 1995a). Thus, the efficiency with which the different parts of
the chain operate affects all parts of the economy, and ultimately community
living standards.
Stevedoring services are critical because they influence both the cost and
timeliness of the transport of imported and exported goods. Container
stevedoring services are a significant component of charges on the waterfront
(estimated to be around one third by the Bureau of Transport and
Communications Economics (BTCE)).2 Labour, in turn, accounts for over half
of the terminal operating costs of container stevedoring services.3
                                             
1  Measured in terms of net tonne kilometres.
2 This includes charges imposed for other waterfront services such as custom brokerage, pilotage,
harbour dues and road transport related services. The BTCE estimated that the average cost of
moving an import container across the waterfront in the first half of 1997 was about $655. The
average cost for an export container was about $595, reflecting a simpler clearance process for
exports (BIE 1995b, p. 15; BTCE 1997a, p. 9).
3  Terminal operating costs include labour costs, capital depreciation, rent and other property
costs, equipment maintenance and hire, electricity and management, administration and
marketing. Estimates based on data provided by the Australian stevedoring workplaces
examined in this study.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Cost is an important factor, but industry has also nominated reliability as an
important requirement for stevedoring services (for example, Metal Trades
Industry Association, response 9, p. 1; Australian Chamber of Manufactures,
response 8, p. 2). The direct costs of delays are substantial, estimated at about
$30 000 per day for a ship with a 2000 TEU4 capacity (BTCE 1995a). The
spectre of unreliable service may also mean that firms incur additional indirect
costs through, for example, the maintenance of higher than normal inventory
levels (which may require additional storage facilities) and that exporters may
suffer as overseas buyers lose confidence (PC 1998).
Overall, while productivity improvements in stevedoring are important, the
savings from improved reliability may be more significant in reducing costs to
users (PC 1998).
Recent studies of the performance of container stevedoring operations have
found that the performance of Australian stevedores lags that of overseas
operations. The Productivity Commission (1998) found that container
operations in Australia had higher terminal charges, lower rates of productivity
and less reliable service than comparable operations in several other countries
(box 1.1).
Box 1.1: Productivity Commission international benchmarking study
of the waterfront
A recent Productivity Commission study of waterfront performance found, after
allowing for disadvantages resulting from the scale of container stevedoring operations
in Australia, that:
·  container handling charges were, on average, higher than those at any of the
overseas terminals surveyed;
·  labour and capital productivity were lower than at overseas terminals; and
·  the reliability at Australian container terminals was relatively poor.
Source:  PC (1998)
The Commission also found that notwithstanding improvements in recent years,
there is significant scope to improve Australian container stevedoring
performance. Similar conclusions were drawn in the preceding benchmarking
study by the BIE (1995b).
                                             
4  TEU (20-foot equivalent unit containers). Containers are usually either 20 or 40 feet in
length.1   ABOUT THIS STUDY
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Flexibility in the allocation and use of labour are critical to stevedore workplace
performance. Flexibility is required to meet the highly variable demand for
stevedoring services generated by:
·  the number and type of ships arriving at any one time;
·  the number of containers to be loaded and unloaded; and
·  unexpected factors, such as delayed arrivals and difficult stows.
This variability is particularly pronounced at Australian ports because of the
‘thinness’ of shipping trades (low volumes over long distances) and the need for
ships to make multi-port calls.
In the container stevedoring industry, labour is an integral part of the
stevedoring process, so the direct cost of labour is relatively high. Work
arrangements are a major determinant of the cost of labour and the incentives
faced by managers and employees to improve performance. They also affect
productivity, timeliness and reliability.
1.1 Approach
The stevedoring industry adopted enterprise bargaining in the early 1990s to
replace the previous industry-wide labour arrangements. This provides a strong
rationale for shifting the focus of research on work arrangements to the
workplace level. Unlike previous research (for example, BTCE 1995a;
HRSCTCI 1992), this study focuses on one element of the waterfront chain of
services (stevedoring) and examines in detail a range of work arrangements in
selected container stevedoring workplaces. The advantage of this approach is
that it can reveal important insights into:
·  the nature and extent of work arrangements (for example, whether and
how they vary across workplaces);
·  interrelationships among work arrangements (for example, how rostering
arrangements affect manning levels);
·  links between work arrangements and workplace performance (for
example, how pay systems influence incentives and productivity); and
·  internal factors (such as workplace culture) and external factors (such as
the industry structure and industrial relations framework) which may be
inhibiting changes in work arrangements.
This study describes and analyses these issues, thereby providing a factual base
for further public policy debate. It identifies, describes and discusses a number
of work arrangements and their effects on workplace performance, but it doesWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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not make recommendations about any individual arrangements as this is outside
the scope of the study.
The Commission has consulted with a range of industry participants:
stevedoring employers, maritime unions (the Maritime Union of Australia and
the Australian Maritime Officers’ Union) and other parties, including
government departments and specialist academics (appendix  A). In addition,
public input was invited in response to a Research Issues Brief. This phase
assisted in:
·  defining the scope of the study and the likely set of issues; and
·  selecting the work arrangements and workplaces for analysis.
Scope
Only stevedoring services are examined in this study, particularly the core
functions of stevedores — the loading/unloading of ships and the
loading/unloading of freight of land transport operators servicing the wharf
(receival and delivery).
The focus is on container terminals, not bulk or break bulk terminals, in order to
facilitate comparability across workplaces.
Measurement of workplace performance
Work arrangements are one of many factors that affect workplace performance.
Others include:
·  the technology used by the workplace;
·  the institutional and competitive environment faced by the workplace;
·  level of throughput;
·  difficult stows;
·  the mix of container sizes; and
·  late delivery and receival (appendix E).
Given the variety of factors that influence workplace performance, it is difficult
to quantify the impact of changing any one work arrangement on workplace
performance.
While the direct effects of some work arrangements may be measurable, for
others it is only possible to assess the direction and perhaps broad magnitude of
their effects on workplace performance. For example, the direct and indirect
effects of redundancy costs on output and investment are not easily estimated.1   ABOUT THIS STUDY
5
Workplace arrangements are discussed in terms of their effects on:
·  productivity — the amount of output that can be produced from a given set
of inputs;
·  timeliness — which relates to the delivery of cargo on time;
·  reliability — which relates to the variability in the time taken to deliver
cargo; and
·  costs.
Productivity has important interactions with the other indicators of performance.
It has a direct relationship with workplace costs — when factor prices are
constant, the relationship between productivity and costs is strictly proportional.
Improvements in productivity also affect timeliness and reliability. For example,
higher net crane rates5 (a commonly used measure of productivity in
stevedoring) can result in quicker loading and unloading of ships. This can lead
to shorter ship turnaround times. If crane rates are consistently high, timeliness
and reliability can be improved.
Selection of work arrangements
Work arrangements are broadly defined to include the way in which work is
performed and the conditions attached to that work. They include arrangements
specified in the Stevedoring Industry Award 1991 and enterprise agreements, as
well as those which have evolved through custom and practice. Many of the
work arrangements are interconnected: they are negotiated as a package and
agreed by management and employees at the workplace.
The process of selecting work arrangements for detailed analysis in this research
was iterative. Work arrangements were initially selected on the basis of
preliminary consultations and a detailed analysis of the Stevedoring Industry
Award, enterprise agreements and secondary sources. This phase revealed a
complex set of highly prescriptive arrangements that could reduce performance.
The Research Issues Brief provided interested parties with the opportunity to
comment on the work arrangements initially selected. The list of specific work
arrangements was finalised following the detailed discussions with managers,
supervisors and site committees at the chosen workplaces (table 1.1).
                                             
5 Broadly defined as the average number of containers moved per net hour per crane. Net
time is equal to time from labour on to labour off minus time unable to work the ship due
to award shift breaks, ship’s fault, weather, awaiting cargo, industrial disputes, holidays, or
shifts not worked at the ship operator’s request.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Table 1.1: Work arrangements selected for analysis
Broad arrangement Specific arrangement





















Hours worked and wage levels






The study is concerned with container terminals. Five Australian workplaces
handling containers were selected for analysis:
·  Sea-Land (Port Adelaide);
·  CTAL (Port Botany, Sydney);6
·  P&O Ports (Port Melbourne);
·  Patrick (Port Melbourne); and
·  Patrick (Fisherman Islands, Brisbane).
                                             
6 P&O Ports has a major shareholding in the CTAL terminal and operates the terminal as
part of its national terminal operations.1   ABOUT THIS STUDY
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Throughput and employment at the stevedoring workplaces examined is given
in table 1.2. The terminals selected account for around three quarters of the
annual throughput handled at major container terminals in Australia. Selection
of the workplaces considered:
·  the scope to document variations in work arrangements;
·  the importance of including larger as well as smaller stevedoring
operations; and
·  the ability to compare the same stevedoring company in different cities and
to compare different stevedoring operations in the same city.
Table 1.2: Throughput and employment of operational employees,
stevedoring workplaces examined, 1996-97
Workplace Port Location Throughput Employmenta
’000 TEUsb no.
Sea-Land Port Adelaide Adelaide 87 129
CTAL Port Botany Sydney 351c 400
P&O Portsd Port Melbourne Melbourne 326c 345
Patrick Port Melbourne Melbourne 434 346
Patricke Fisherman Islands Brisbane 105 127
Fergusson Port of Auckland Auckland (NZ) 290 204f
a Operational employees, excluding supervisors. Estimates for Australian workplaces include permanent full-
time employees, guaranteed wage employees and supplementary employees. Australian vocational trainees are
counted as permanent employees.
b 20-foot equivalent unit.
c Calendar year 1996.
d West Swanson Container Division.
e Operational employees at Patrick Brisbane also carry out some break bulk operations.
f Includes a proportion of maintenance employees at the Ports of Auckland based on the ratio of TEU throughput
of Fergusson Terminal to TEU throughput of the Ports of Auckland. Does not include all clerical employees.
Includes permanent and casual employees.
Source:  Workplace information requests
Fergusson Terminal in New Zealand was chosen for an international
comparison for a number of reasons. First, New Zealand and Australia are
countries with broadly similar cultures and living standards. Second, the annual
throughput of Fergusson Terminal falls within the range of container throughput
handled by the selected Australian workplaces. Third, extensive reforms have
been undertaken in the New Zealand waterfront, transport sector and labour
market in the past decade (appendix I), which have led to significant increases
in productivity and lower costs. Finally, consultations suggested that workWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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arrangements in New Zealand differed significantly from work arrangements in
Australian terminals.
Fergusson Terminal is not necessarily representative of stevedoring operations
more generally in New Zealand, because there appears to be considerable
variability in work arrangements in stevedoring operations in that country
(appendix I). Thus, Fergusson Terminal has not been identified as a ‘model’
workplace, but as illustrative of alternative work arrangements.
Data collection
A number of methods were used to collect qualitative and quantitative data
from:
·  consultations with selected industry participants;
·  a public call for views and evidence;
·  detailed discussions at selected workplaces; and
·  workplace information requests.
Data were supplemented by information drawn from:
·  the Stevedoring Industry Award, enterprise agreements of the selected
Australian workplaces and any industry-specific and general industrial
relations legislation;
·  the awards of four other industries: the Transport Workers Award 1983,
the  Storage Services — General — Interim Award  1996, the Metal
Industry Award 1984 and the National Building and Construction Industry
Award 1990;
·  previous studies on the industry, including government inquiries and
reports; and
·  labour economics, industrial relations, occupational health and safety and
human resource management literature.
Further details about the information collection methods can be found in
appendix B, while a detailed analysis of awards and agreements appears in
appendix J.
1.2 Report structure
The next chapter describes the key features of the stevedoring industry, its
workforce characteristics and recent changes to work arrangements in the
industry. Aspects of the culture of Australia’s stevedoring workplaces are1   ABOUT THIS STUDY
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discussed in chapter 3. Culture influences how people respond to existing work
arrangements and how they develop new arrangements.
The subsequent five chapters consider work arrangements relating to rostering
(chapter 4), manning (chapter 5), recruitment, redundancy and contracting
(chapter 6), remuneration (chapter 7) and paid non-working time (chapter 8).
The impacts of selected work arrangements on workplace performance, along
with their benefits and costs to employees and users of stevedoring services, are
the focus in these chapters. These discussions are drawn together in chapter 9,
which highlights the links between these work arrangements, the main
beneficiaries and losers, and impediments to the introduction of performance-
enhancing work arrangements.11
2 CONTAINER STEVEDORING IN AUSTRALIA
There are only two major providers of container stevedoring
services in Australia, and throughput at Australian ports is low by
international standards. Flexibility in service provision is
important, given the unpredictable and variable nature of
demand. Major changes occurred in the industry under the
waterfront industry reform process during 1989–92, in a bid to
improve the sector’s performance. Enterprise agreements
negotiated since this time have tended to be complex and highly
prescriptive. The agreements incorporate most of the details of
the majority of work arrangements operating at the workplaces.
The Stevedoring Industry Award, however, still provides the
structural basis for the development of some work arrangements
in enterprise agreements.
This chapter outlines the structure and operation of the container stevedoring
industry and describes workforce characteristics — including the types of labour
employed by Australian container stevedores and their entitlements. The chapter
also summarises recent reform of stevedoring services and changes in work
arrangements.
2.1 Industry structure and operation
The core functions performed by stevedores on the waterfront are the loading
and unloading of cargo from ships, and the loading and unloading of cargo from
land transport operators servicing the wharf. Stevedoring services in Australia
and New Zealand are performed under contract with shipping lines; there is no
contractual link between stevedores and transport operators, importers or
exporters (PC 1998).
Containerisation is an important means of transporting cargo (box 2.1).
Container imports, for example, accounted for around two-thirds of the total
value of imports handled by the Australian waterfront in 1995-96 (PC 1998).WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
12
Box 2.1: Containers and their contents
Reusable containers for carrying cargo were first widely adopted in the late 1950s. The
International Standards Organisation reached agreement in 1966 on standard shipping
container sizes, based on an eight-foot square external end area with lengths varying in
multiples of 10 feet from 10 to 40 feet and incorporating standard fastening and lifting
points.
The 20-foot length (representing one TEU) is the most common container in use in
Australia. However, 40-foot containers (equal to two TEUs) are also used, particularly in
trade with North America.
Contents of import and export containers, Sydney, 1995-96
Major commodity exports
’000 
tonnes   Major commodity imports
’000 
tonnes
Non ferrous metals 484          Chemicals 578       
Chemicals 360          Paper and paper products 418       
Iron and steel 288          Machinery and electrical equipment 372       
Meat 203          Fruit and vegetables 140       
Cereals 203          Textiles, yarns and fabrics 125       
Cotton 164          Iron and steel 97         
Paper and paper products 161          Beverages and tobacco 91         
Wool 152          Non ferrous metals 79         
Machinery 89            Timber 51         
Beverages and tobacco 55            Fish and seafood 50         
Source:  Sydney Ports Corporation (1996, p. 20)
There are various types of containers based on these dimensions, such as open top, open
sides, ventilated and refrigerated. Refrigerated containers (known as ‘reefers’) are used
for the shipment of perishable goods such as meat, fruit and vegetables. Substantial
quantities of perishable goods are exported and imported in containers.
Reefers require monitoring on the wharf to ensure that the refrigeration system is in
operation.
Large quantities of chemicals are also imported and exported in containers. Containers
holding hazardous chemicals require special handling and storage procedures.
Source:  BTE (1986, pp. 10–12)
The Australian waterfront is characterised by the ‘thinness’ of shipping trades
(low volumes over long distances — box 2.2) and the need for ships to make
multi-port calls (PC 1998).2   CONTAINER STEVEDORING IN AUSTRALIA
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Box 2.2: Container traffic in overseas ports
The throughput of Australia’s container terminals is small compared with the volumes
handled by major ports in Asia, North America and Europe. The higher cost of container
operations in Australia is partly related to the lower levels of throughput.
Container traffic at selected ports, 1995-96














Data  source:  TCS (1997a)
Scale of throughput is also a determinant of the quantity and quality of equipment used at
container terminals.
An average of 37 600 containers was handled in Australian container terminals per quay
crane in 1995-96. In contrast, each quay crane in some terminals in Singapore and Pusan
handled an average of approximately 110 000 containers in the same period.
Higher levels of throughput reduce the unit capital costs of providing container stevedoring
services. This may allow operators in terminals with a high level of throughput to invest in
equipment that is capable of higher levels of performance (such as crane lifts per hour). If
similar equipment were used in terminals with relatively low levels of throughput, then unit
capital costs would be higher.
Source:  TCS (1997a)
Container handling in Australian ports is concentrated around mainland capital
city ports, with terminals in these ports accounting for about three quarters of
this work (table 2.1).WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Regional portsb 261 na
Total 2404 71c
a Includes major container terminals operated by P&O Ports, Patrick and Sea-Land.
b Other Australian ports including Hobart, Burnie and Darwin.
c Container terminal share of total port throughput.
na Not applicable.
Sources:  BTCE (1997a); Melbourne Port Corporation (1996); SCNPMGTE (1996)
Nearly all container handling services at the mainland capital city ports, are
supplied by two operators — P&O Ports and Patrick The Australian Stevedore.1
Adelaide has a single operator (Sea-Land (Australia) Terminals), but it accounts
for only around 4 per cent of the combined throughput of the major container
terminals (table 2.2).2
In New Zealand, the port of Auckland has four operators. One operator has
exclusive use of Fergusson Terminal and moves 70 per cent of the total port
container throughput. The other three operators share Bledisloe Terminal, a
common user facility suitable for container operations (table 2.2).3
There is some movement of contracts between stevedores at Australian ports,
but the shipping lines’ choice of stevedoring options is limited. Competition is
not as intense as in New Zealand where there is a greater number of stevedores
                                             
1 The company now known as Patrick is the result of several company mergers in the
stevedoring industry during the early 1990s. The most recent merger occurred between the
then Strang Patrick Stevedoring and National Terminals (Australia) in July 1992 to form
Australian Stevedores. In September 1994, Jamison Equity (now the Lang Corporation)
acquired the shares in Australian Stevedores held by Howard Smith and ANL.
2  Sea-Land recently announced that it intends to open a container terminal in Brisbane
(Daily Commercial News, 9 February 1998, p. 5).
3 Common user facilities enable any stevedore to use the container terminal facilities, such
as quay cranes and straddle carriers, on a short-term lease basis.2   CONTAINER STEVEDORING IN AUSTRALIA
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at most ports, contracts change hands more frequently and the cost of entry and
exit is lower (appendix I). Australian interport competition is further limited by
the large distances between ports and the high cost of transport by road or rail
relative to the cost of sea freight (chapter 9).




Annual  throughputa Cranes Straddles
no. ’000 TEUs no. no.
Sydneyb,c 2 587 10 28
Melbourneb 2 674 10 56
Brisbaneb 2 1 9 46d
Adelaide 1 66 2 12
Aucklande 4 405 7 36
a Estimates based on table 2.1.
b Number of cranes and straddles are for Patrick and P&O only.
c Includes 12 rubber tyred gantries used by one operator.
d Mix of equipment used, so unable to aggregate.
e Three operators use Bledisloe Terminal, a common user berth.
Sources:  BTCE (1997a); Ports of Auckland (1997); workplace information requests
Pattern of ship and cargo arrivals
Several characteristics of container stevedoring affect planning and labour
requirements, including:
·  terminal operating hours;
·  the variability and unpredictability of ship arrivals;
·  the variability in size of exchange;
·  interface with land transport; and
·  seasonal variability.
Container stevedoring can be a 24-hour, seven-days-a-week operation,
particularly at large mainland workplaces. This reflects the demands of shipping
lines which incur high daily fixed costs when a ship is tied up at a wharf —
estimated at $30 000 a day for a ship with a 2000 TEU capacity (BTCE 1995a).
Stevedores typically face highly variable demand for their services. This is
generated by variability in ship arrivals and the size of exchanges (the numberWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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of containers loaded and unloaded). An analysis of ship arrivals at Sydney
container terminals in 1995 found an almost random pattern of arrival times
(BTCE 1995a, p. 19). An earlier study of a sample of ship arrivals at the first
port of call in Australia found that approximately 50 per cent arrived on the day
which was specified two weeks earlier, the remainder were spread between
being three days early and five days late (BTCE 1993, p. 103).
Most stevedores attempting to accommodate variability in ship arrivals now try
to plan labour requirements based on arrival and departure time ‘windows’. If a
ship arrives within a certain time window, enough labour is allocated for ship
loading and unloading purposes to ensure the ship is ready to leave within its
departure time window. Pricing signals, through penalties and bonuses between
stevedores and shipping lines, encourage both parties to better adhere to
shipping windows.
However, substantial variability will remain as a result of several influences
outside the control of stevedores. Ship arrivals are affected by factors such as
weather conditions and delays in other ports. These introduce an element of
uncertainty into arrival times, and stevedores may have to respond to late or
early arrivals at short notice. The daily variation in ship arrivals is illustrated by
figure 2.1, which shows the number of ships being worked per shift at the
CTAL terminal, Sydney, over a 24-day period in 1995.4 An average of 2.4 ships
were worked per shift, but the number of ships worked ranged from zero to four
(full berth capacity for the terminal).
Such fluctuations in the demand that stevedores face for their services (from the
variability in ship arrivals and the number of containers loaded and unloaded),
mean that flexible work arrangements are critical to workplace performance.
Other factors that also contribute to this need include unexpected difficulties in
the lashing task (chapter 5), storage constraints related to receival and delivery
of containers, and seasonal variation.
There is limited storage available in waterfront areas. Therefore, the movement
of containers received from ships and delivered to land transport operators (and
vice-versa for outgoing containers) is related to the arrival of ships and
exchange sizes. Container stevedores generally deliver to, and receive
containers from, land transport operators between 7 am and 3 pm on weekdays
(the day shift) and as required by land transport operators at other times,
including weekends. Rail operations by stevedores are performed as required.
                                             
4 This period was considered by CTAL to be ‘representative’ of the operations of the
terminal (response 10, p. 12).2   CONTAINER STEVEDORING IN AUSTRALIA
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Source:  Response 10, p. 14
The type of cargo handled at each port affects the pattern of demand over the
year. Sydney, for example, generally has a larger share of import containers than
export containers. This results in greater demand for container stevedoring
services around October and November, when wholesale and retail firms build
up stock levels before the Christmas season.
In contrast, the higher proportion of export containers in Brisbane results in
significant seasonal variation related to the shipment of primary produce
(mainly cotton and meat) between June and October each year. The similar mix
of import and export containers in Melbourne means that the port is less
affected by seasonal patterns.
2.2 Employment in stevedoring
Employees in the stevedoring industry work in bulk and break bulk operations
as well as container operations. Workforce characteristics of these employees
are described in detail in appendix D. In summary, the typical stevedoring
employee is likely to be male, in his mid-40s, and Australian born. This
employee is likely to have relatively low levels of formal education, be involved
in a job with often long and variable hours, and be relatively highly paid.
The detailed discussions revealed that employee turnover in container
stevedoring is still very low relative to other industries — in some cases zero. In
comparison, almost 20 per cent of all Australian employees changed employers
between 1994 and 1996 (ABS 1997b).WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Employees are grouped into grades according to skill level. A description of the
tasks performed by operational employees5 in the container stevedoring process
is contained in appendix C and summarised in table 2.3. Tasks discussed in
detail include those performed by foremen, clerks, maintenance employees and
also those tasks of the machinery operators and general duties employees, such
as driving quay cranes and straddle carriers and performing lashing duties. The
mix of tasks indicates the need for a workforce comprising both skilled,
experienced and less skilled employees.
Stevedoring is a capital intensive industry. Given the nature of the work process,
individuals — for example, those operating expensive and sophisticated
equipment such as quay cranes — can have a significant impact on overall
workplace performance.
Improvements in work arrangements affecting individual efficiency can
translate into higher workplace productivity and reliability — for example,
improvements in work arrangements that provide the incentive for crane drivers
to work more efficiently can lead to higher crane rates and improved timeliness.
Other factors can also impact on workplace performance (chapter  1). These
include factors outside the stevedores’ control that specifically relate to the
loading and unloading of a ship (box 2.3 and appendix E).
Three main unions cover employees in the container stevedoring industry.
Supervisors and planners are members of the Australian Maritime Officers’
Union (AMOU). In some terminals, electricians are members of the
Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing
and Allied Services Union of Australia (CEPU) (table 2.3).6 Virtually all
operational employees, including clerks, machinery operators, general duties
and some maintenance employees, are members of the Maritime Union of
Australia (MUA).
                                             
5  All employees in grades 1 to 6 and Australian vocational trainees. Excludes supervisors
and management.
6 Approximately 25 CEPU members work in stevedoring maintenance positions nationally.2   CONTAINER STEVEDORING IN AUSTRALIA
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Table 2.3: Container stevedoring labour arrangements at a typical
workplace
a












Supervisors Working of the ship AMOU SIA,e EAsf
Ship and yard planners Determine where
containers are placed on




Foreman (typically grade 5 or 6) Coordinate/monitor
operational employees
MUA SIA, EAs




grade 3, 4, 5 or 6)
Work as crane driver,
straddle driver
MUA SIA, EAs
General duties employee (typically





electrician) (typically grade 4 or 5)


















a Simplified description of labour arrangements in a typical stevedore workplace. Some workplaces may have
other types of employees (including engineering service managers or commercial managers).
b For full list of grades based on skill levels, refer to table C.1.
c Australian Maritime Officers’ Union (AMOU); Maritime Union of Australia (MUA); Communications,
Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia (CEPU).
d Some operation managers may be members of the AMOU.
e Stevedoring Industry Award 1991.
f Supervisors and planners at Patrick terminals are covered by the same enterprise agreement (EA) across Patrick
workplaces as well as by the Stevedoring Industry Award. Supervisors and planners at P&O terminals are
covered by a separate EA at each workplace, the operational employee EAs and the Stevedoring Industry
Award.
Sources:  Stevedoring Industry Award; selected enterprise agreementsWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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The high level of union membership in the stevedoring industry is in contrast
with substantially lower levels of union membership — approximately 25 per
cent — in the private sector workforce as a whole. The level of union
membership in industries covered by awards used to compare employee
conditions in chapter 7 is approximately 40 per cent for manufacturing
industries, 50 per cent for the transport and storage industries and 30 per cent in
construction (ABS 1997c).7
Box 2.3: Some factors affecting container stevedores’ performance
in loading and unloading a ship
A number of factors act as constraints on the performance of Australian container
stevedores in loading and unloading a ship (see appendix E for a more detailed
discussion). These include:
Throughput. Large international hub ports discharge relatively large ships using four or
five cranes. In Australia, at most three cranes are used. As the Container Business
Manager from P&O Ports Victoria recently stated:
If we had 90 per cent transhipment instead of 10 per cent and vessels of 6000 TEU
capacity instead of 600 TEU, with single destination cargoes, and no late changes to
cargo stowage and lower safety standards, we would achieve over 30 containers per
crane on all vessels, all of the time. (MUA 1997a)
Difficult stows. Some stevedores, being either a first or last port of call, tend to have
more difficult stows. A number of containers may need to be moved (and later restowed)
to access the containers required. As Captain Andrews from Sea-Land explained:
Adelaide may only have half the container rate of some Sea-Land terminals, but all
our other terminals trade Sea-Land stowed ships. Stow is central to productivity. Sea-
Land ships are computer stowed. The boxes that come off first are stowed on the side
of the ship, not in the middle where you have to lift them four high to get them out.
(MUA 1997b, p. 46)
Mix of containers. The number of 40-foot containers versus 20-foot containers loaded
and unloaded affect productivity. The 20-foot containers are generally more difficult to
load and unload.
                                             
7 Several awards used for a comparison of award conditions in this report may cover
employees performing similar work in several industries. The Storage Services — General
— Interim Award 1996, for example, covers employees working in several industries
(including retail trade, wholesale trade and manufacturing).2   CONTAINER STEVEDORING IN AUSTRALIA
21
Types of stevedoring employment
There are four main types of operational labour employed by Australian
stevedores, each with a different set of employment conditions:
·  full-time permanent employees;
·  guaranteed wage employees;
·  supplementary employees; and
·  Australian vocational trainees.
Full-time permanent employees accounted for over half of employees in the
stevedoring industry in 1997 (table 2.4), but prescribed engagement
arrangements mean that they undertake the majority of the hours worked. Full-
time permanent employees are engaged on a full-time continuing basis and are
entitled to an average of 35 ordinary hours of work per week (see chapter 7 for a
detailed discussion of hours worked). They are also entitled to other conditions
of service such as annual leave, sick leave and long service leave.











Patrick 1440 70 .. 1260 2780
P&O Ports 1350 300 40 590 2280
BHP 210 25 .. 90 320
Sea-Land 90 20 10 10 130
Strang 30 10 .. 80 120
Otherc 200 .. .. 85 285
Total 3320 425 50 2115 5910
Per cent of industry totald 56 7 1 36 100
a Includes container, break bulk and bulk terminals. Employee numbers are rounded to nearest five.
b Indicates the approximate number of supplementary employees available to work for each stevedore. Actual use
of supplementary employees varies according to work arrangements at each workplace and the level of demand
for stevedoring services (chapter 5).
c Includes regional stevedores such as Northern Shipping and Stevedoring and Federated Stevedores and
operators in major ports such as Union Stevedoring and Brambles.
d Indicates the share of employees in each category.
.. Nil or rounded to zero.
Source:  Workplace information requests
The use of permanent employees in stevedoring dates back to the late 1960s.
Previously, all stevedoring employees were hired on a casual basis from anWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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industry-wide pool of labour. Technological changes in the 1960s, particularly
containerisation, and the need for a more highly skilled workforce led to the
introduction of permanent employment opportunities.
Guaranteed wage employees are also engaged on a permanent basis. They are
guaranteed pay for a minimum number of hours per week (two shifts at the
workplaces examined in this study). Additional work may be available as
required by the stevedore. These employees are also entitled to other conditions
of service such as annual leave on a pro-rata basis.8 They comprise around 7 per
cent of Australian stevedoring employees.
Supplementaries are employed on an ‘as and when required’ basis. They do not
receive additional entitlements such as sick leave or annual leave, but do receive
a 20 per cent premium over the shift rate (table 2.5). Supplementary employees
may work for more than one employer, and they receive a minimum payment of
one shift on any day when engaged by a stevedore.
Each employer maintains a pool of supplementary employees. The number of
new supplementary employees that can be recruited to the pool is prescribed in
some enterprise agreements. The shifts to which they can be allocated are
significantly restricted by the order of engagement (chapter 4). Thus, the
number of supplementary employees actually called on in any week is usually
less than the full size of the pool, and larger pools of supplementaries for some
companies do not necessarily equate with increased flexibility in labour supply.
Supplementary employees have mainly comprised former permanent employees
who left the industry under the redundancy program of the Waterfront Industry
Reform Authority (WIRA), although they are being progressively replaced. The
supplementary labour pool currently makes up about one third of stevedore
employees (table 2.4).
‘Casuals’ are typically a more significant part of the New Zealand stevedoring
workforce than are supplementary employees in Australia. In New Zealand,
casual labour may comprise from close to all of a workplace’s operational
stevedore workforce to less than 25 per cent. In those workplaces with lower
proportions of casual employees, permanent employees tend to have the more
skilled jobs, (for example, crane driving), while the casuals perform the less
skilled tasks (such as lashing).
                                             
8  However, notification provisions that apply for permanent employees do not generally
apply for guaranteed wage employees (or supplementaries) (chapter 4).2   CONTAINER STEVEDORING IN AUSTRALIA
23
Table 2.5: Stevedoring employee entitlements
Permanent employee Supplementary employee
Average 35 ordinarya hours work per week yes no
Shift premiums and penalty rates yes yesb
Holiday rates of payc yes yes
Redundancy payments yes no
Annual allowanced yes yese
Annual leave yes no
Sick leave yes no
Compassionate leave yes no
Jury leave yes no
Rostered time off yes no
a Ordinary hours are rostered shift hours.
b Supplementary employees receive a 20 per cent loading on pay rates to account for loss of other entitlements
common to permanent operational employees.
c The Stevedoring Industry Award specifies the rate of pay for employees working on any holiday.
d The allowance is paid in lieu of other payments covering items such as laundry, telephone and allowances for
certain work conditions, including working in oily and greasy conditions, and in wet weather.
e Supplementary employees are paid 1/250th of the annual allowance for each day worked.
Sources: Stevedoring Industry Award; selected enterprise agreements
Australian vocational trainees are part of a national training scheme (the
Australian Vocational Training System) administered by the Australian National
Training Authority. They are employed under the Stevedoring Australian
Vocational Training System Award 1994 and undergo a structured training
program (consisting of on-the-job and off-the-job training for a period of two
years). Training is based on defined industry competency standards. The scheme
does not guarantee employment on completion.
Recruitment of operational employees, supervisors and managers is discussed in
chapter 6.
Industrial disputation
Despite a significant reduction in 1996 and 1997 in the average total number of
working days lost per employee as a result of industrial action, the incidence of
industrial disputation in the stevedoring industry remains comparatively very
high, and is exceeded only by coal mining (table 2.6). This has important
implications for reliability of stevedoring services and its impact on service
users.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Table 2.6: Industrial disputation by industry, 1992–96 (working days lost
per ’000 employees)
Industry 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
six-year
average
Coal mining 3078 2915 5964 7707 7171 4206 5174
Stevedoringa 1729 1737 4598b 2472 836 609 1997
Construction 126 41 29 865 892 290 374
Other mining 840 254 323 128 73 19 273
Metal products/machinery
and equipment
309 426 117 153 146 180 222
Education/health and
community services
172 106 63 181 187 73 130
Other manufacturing 243 121 123 75 70 104 123
Transport and
storage/communication
192 37 137 53 43 101 94
Other industries 57 41 16 16 17 11 26
Average all industries 147 100 76 79 131 74 101
a The number of working days lost is from ABS 1997a. Employment data for 1992 and 1993 use industry
statistics collected by the Waterfront Industry Reform Authority. Productivity Commission estimates of
employment for each year over the period 1994–96 assume a fixed intake per year to reach employment levels
in 1997. Estimates of employment in the stevedoring industry include full-time, part-time and supplementary
employees working in container, break bulk and bulk operations.
b This figure is significantly inflated by disputation over proposed redundancies at Australian Stevedores (now
Patrick) Sydney (box 6.3).
Sources: ABS (1997a); BTCE (1995a); unpublished ABS data; workplace information requests
These Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) data tend to understate the extent
of time lost, because a dispute at an establishment is not included when the time
lost by all workers involved in the stoppage is less than 10 working days.9
ABS statistics also do not cover disputes which involve a part withdrawal of
labour, such as ‘go-slows’, work–to–rule and overtime bans. Authorised
stoppages, such as stop work meetings, are also excluded from the ABS data.10
To gauge the extent of time lost as a result of a wider range of industrial action,
the Productivity Commission obtained detailed data from a large stevedoring
workplace over the period 1994–97 (table 2.7). These data exclude disputes
                                             
9  Incident statistics may not include, for example, an hour-long stoppage involving up to 79
workers (which, assuming an eight hour day, would sum to less than 10 working days).
10 The Stevedoring Industry Award includes provisions for two paid and six unpaid stop
work meetings per year of up to four hours duration (clause 46).2   CONTAINER STEVEDORING IN AUSTRALIA
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which involved a part withdrawal of labour. Over the period, a dispute occurred
almost every month on average and resulted in a loss of work of approximately
150 working days. The pattern of working days lost at the terminal shows that a
small number of disputes involving large numbers of working days lost
accounted for a significant proportion of lost working time.
Table 2.7: Incidence and duration of disputation
a at an Australian
container terminal, 1994–97
Working days lost per dispute Number of disputes Total working days lost






More than 500 1 642
Total 33 4933
a Reasons for disputation include, among others, walk off under union direction; stop work; and walk off.
b Several disputes recorded did not result in any recorded time lost.
Source:  Workplace information request
The incidence of industrial disputation varies among the workplaces examined.
Smithwick (1995, p. 12) noted that amount of disruption at the CTAL terminal
caused by actions such as ‘go-slows’, was at least equal to that recorded in ABS
statistics. Some other stevedores indicated the incidence of disputes involving
part withdrawal of labour had been relatively minor in the last few years.
Occupational health and safety
Easson, McCann and Ronfeldt (1997) found that with respect to occupational
health and safety:
... the available statistical evidence suggests that the stevedoring industry is
performing very poorly in comparison to other sectors of the maritime industry
and other major industries in Australia. This is reflected in a high rate of work-
related fatalities, injuries and disease. For instance, the number of work-related
injuries and diseases per 1000 employees in stevedoring in 1994-95 was 169.9
whereas the next highest figure among major industries was 64.3 for the mining
industry. (p. 1)WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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It was also noted in the same study that the incidence of new cases of work-
related injury and disease in the stevedoring industry had risen dramatically over
the period 1991-92 to 1994-95. Easson, McCann and Ronfeldt hypothesised that
this rise may reflect increases in the intensity of work (given a smaller
workforce) having led employees and supervisors to ignore basic safety
standards, or an increased inclination on behalf of employees to make workers’
compensation claims, or a mixture of both factors. The study concluded that
many of the mechanisms of injury infliction11 reported (such as ‘body stressing’
and ‘falls, trips and slips’) could be relatively easily remedied using a more
systematic approach to occupational health and safety management and
regulation (appendix G).
This poor performance in occupational health and safety entails significant
costs. Workers and their families bear the costs of reduced income in the event
of long-term injury, as well as the personal costs of pain and inconvenience
associated with temporary or permanent disability. Employers bear the direct
cost of higher workers’ compensation premiums, as well as the indirect costs of
training new staff, downtime and the disruption that is often associated with an
injury in the workplace. There are also costs borne by the wider community,
such as medical expenses and sickness benefits that can be paid if a worker is
transferred from the workers’ compensation scheme to the general social
security system.
It is difficult to accurately quantify many of these costs. In 1995-96, workers’
compensation premiums for the stevedoring industry totalled $2.9  million.
Using the ratios between indirect to direct costs developed in the report Work,
Health and Safety (IC 1995), this would imply indirect costs of around
$8.7 million and total costs of around $11.6 million.
A key issue is the relations between management and workers on the waterfront
(chapter  3). Easson, McCann and Ronfeldt found that ‘innovation and
improvements in the area of OH&S [occupational health and safety] are being
frustrated by a combative industrial structure’ (1997, p. 48).
The Industry Commission has noted that best practice in occupational health and
safety is generally obtained by employers who have enterprise safety systems,
based on the principles of total quality management (1995, p. 83). However,
there may be some practical difficulties in applying such systems to stevedoring,
because stevedores have limited influence over the work environment aboard
ship. Safety standards can vary greatly from ship to ship.
                                             
11 ‘Mechanism’ refers to the means by which the injury or illness for which the employee
was compensated for was inflicted.2   CONTAINER STEVEDORING IN AUSTRALIA
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Wooden and Robertson (1997, p.  1) observed that job characteristics and
conditions can influence the incidence of work-related injuries. Stevedoring
operational employees undertake a variety of tasks — from driving vehicles to
lashing containers and operating computers. The degree of exposure to injury
risks is likely to vary according to different tasks and working environments
(box 2.4).
Box 2.4: Job characteristics and work conditions
Stevedoring employees can experience a variety of work conditions which can have
different injury risks. Down drivers, for example, may be required for lashing on
unfamiliar ships. Other workers, such as clerks, usually undertake desk-related duties in
a familiar office environment.
Unlike work in the office or straddle carrier, lashing duties are regularly undertaken in
unfamiliar conditions because each ship is a new environment. Older and smaller ships,
for example, may have less room for employees performing lashing duties to move
between container stacks, and other ships may not have decking rails to protect lashing
employees from falling.12 Weather conditions can also make tasks difficult.13 Ship and
container surfaces can become slippery from a mixture of rain and oil, and maintaining
balance on high exposed containers can be more difficult in strong winds. Employees on
lashing duties may have to deal with poorly maintained ships (and shipboard equipment).
Source:  Detailed discussions
It is beyond the scope of this study to determine the relative influence of each of
these on the poor occupational health and safety performance of the stevedoring
industry. However, examples of some of these factors are evident in the
stevedoring industry.
2.3 Reform of stevedoring services
The Inter-State Commission examined all aspects of operations on the
waterfront in an inquiry conducted between 1986 and 1989 (ISC 1989a).
Responding to the recommendations of that inquiry, the Commonwealth
Government established WIRA in 1989 to coordinate and monitor a three-year
                                             
12  For a description of lashing duties, see appendix C.
13 Work ceases under extreme weather conditions. All enterprise agreements incorporate
clauses that enable work to cease (for employees not operating in air-conditioned buildings
and equipment) once the temperature at the workplace exceeds a certain level, for example
(appendix J).WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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reform process (box 2.5 and appendix F). WIRA’s role included developing and
implementing an ‘in-principle’ reform agreement between the parties in the
industry.
An early retirement and redundancy program implemented as part of the reform
process led approximately 4500 workers to leave the industry between
September 1989 and October 1992. The program significantly changed the size
and age composition of the workforce. The total cost of the program over three
years was $419 million. The Commonwealth Government directly contributed
$165 million. The remaining $254 million was ultimately paid by users of the
stevedoring industry through a levy imposed on cargo (BTCE 1995a).
The WIRA reforms also involved a move from an industry-based labour force,
which could be transferred among employers, to enterprise employment. Some
aspects of work arrangements (which reflected the different requirements of
each workplace) were to be negotiated at a workplace level. Other issues
addressed included job structure, classification and training (box 2.5 and
appendix F).
Box 2.5: Summary of WIRA reforms
Several significant WIRA reforms included:
·  a move from an industry-based labour force to enterprise employment, whereby all
employees were directly employed by a firm. Industry-wide dispute resolution
processes were also abolished;
·  a retirement and redundancy program under which approximately 4500 employees
left the industry. The program was funded at a cost of $165 million to the
Commonwealth Government, and $254 million was paid by users of the industry;
and
·  the development of a single industry award which introduced new skill
classifications. The award left some conditions to be included in enterprise
agreements negotiated at the workplace level.
Source:  BTCE (1995a)
The average level of productivity in the major container terminals, measured in
TEUs, improved significantly between 1989 and 1997 (figure 2.2). (Productivity
in figure 2.2 is measured in terms of TEUs rather than container lifts because
time series data were available only in TEUs.) Much of this improvement
occurred during the reform process (1989–92) under WIRA, when new work
arrangements and conditions in enterprise agreements were implemented (see
below).2   CONTAINER STEVEDORING IN AUSTRALIA
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A deterioration in productivity in 1993-94 led some observers to question the
sustainability of the WIRA reforms (BIE 1995b, p. xvi). However, productivity
increased again between 1994 and 1997. Nevertheless, the crane rates presently
achieved in Australian terminals are generally below those of several overseas
ports (PC 1998).























a All measures in TEUs. A small part of the changes in TEU-based measures of performance may reflect changes
in the composition of the size of containers used in trade with Australia. One 40-foot container, for example, is
equal to two 20-foot containers (box 2.1). The net crane rate measures the number of TEUs moved per crane
per net hour. The net rate measures the number of TEUs moved per net hour for the ship (therefore dependent
on the number of cranes working a ship). The elapsed rate measures number of TEUs moved per ship per hour
based on elapsed time. Elapsed time is the total hours over which the ship is worked, measured from labour on
to labour off. Data were not collected for 1992-93. The crane rate and net rate for March and June 1997 are
provisional. Award shift breaks are included in the measure of time used to calculate net rates and crane rates to
the end of September quarter 1992, and excluded from the measure of time in later quarters. Elapsed rates and
net rates from March quarter 1997 are not directly comparable with earlier figures given changes in a terminal
operator’s information system.
b Five major mainland ports — Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, Fremantle and Adelaide.
Source:  BTCE (1998)
As discussed in chapter 1, timeliness and reliability are other key indicators of
stevedore performance. A survey by the Bureau of Industry Economics
indicated that liner shipping companies consider the timeliness and reliability of
stevedoring services to be more important than the price of the service
(BIE 1995b, p. xvi). Despite an improvement of around 400 per cent in the
length of ship delays over the period 1988–92 (BTCE 1995a, p.  89), the
Productivity Commission’s international benchmarking study found that the
reliability of Australian container terminals in 1997 compared poorly with thoseWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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of overseas terminals (PC 1998). About one fifth of ships calling at Australian
ports sampled for the Productivity Commission study experienced a delay, for
example, that resulted from a berth not being available, industrial disputation or
some other reason (PC 1998).
Changing work arrangements
The WIRA reform process saw significant changes in both the structure of the
workforce and workforce demographics. Formal enterprise agreements were
first developed in this industry under the WIRA reform process. Many
stevedores have since negotiated subsequent agreements, usually for a three-
year term.
The negotiation of work arrangements at the Australian stevedoring workplaces
examined in this study are influenced by specific workplace characteristics and
institutional factors (see appendix J for a detailed discussion).
Bargaining outcomes will also be influenced by the negotiating expertise of the
parties, the relative strength of the parties and the extent to which organisational
hierarchy (for both the stevedore and unions) brings broader organisational
strategy to bear on workplace bargaining.
The enterprise agreements are complex and prescriptive, incorporating
substantial detail on numerous work arrangements. These agreements are
important, but so too is the Stevedoring Industry Award (which provides the
structural basis for the development of detailed work arrangements in enterprise
agreements). The award provisions regarding shift length and starting times, for
example, form the basis of detailed roster systems negotiated at each workplace
and are incorporated in the relevant agreement (table 2.8 and appendix J). The
Australian Industrial Relations Commission also continues to use the award
when ratifying a new enterprise agreement (chapter 9).2   CONTAINER STEVEDORING IN AUSTRALIA
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Table 2.8: Summary of provisions in the Stevedoring Industry Award
that relate to selected work arrangements
a
Work arrangement Summary of provisions
Recruitment, redundancy Specifies job skill grades
Includes union preference clauseb
Rostering Defines day, evening and night shifts within time bands
Remuneration Defines base wage for a 35-hour week (averaging possible)
Defines shift premiums
Defines overtime penalty rates (including double headers)
Allows productivity schemes to be introduced
Paid non-working time Defines leave conditions
Defines minimum shift extension and ‘call-up’ payments
Defines minimum breaks
a This table is a simplified summary of the award provisions relating to the work arrangements examined in this
study. For details refer to table J.3 and the Stevedoring Industry Award. Caution should be applied to the
interpretation of this table, given the relationship between these provisions and the enterprise agreements
(appendix J).
b This provision can not be legally enforced as a result of the Workplace Relations Act 1996.
Source:  Stevedoring Industry Award
Since the introduction of enterprise bargaining, most new stevedoring work
arrangements have been incorporated in the agreements and prevail over those
in the award (to the extent of any inconsistency with the award). Provisions
relating to the order of engagement, roster schedules and remuneration schemes,
for example, are detailed in agreements (table 2.9 and appendix J). Many of
these work arrangements — for example, reduced manning scales for some
types of equipment — represent a substantial change from pre-WIRA work
arrangements.
Most provisions in the enterprise agreements at different workplaces are
remarkably similar — for example, the order of engagement and manning
scales. Only a small number of provisions vary between agreements — for
example, some workplaces have adopted an aggregate wage system while others
have retained a base wage plus overtime system of remuneration (appendix J).
The base provisions in the Stevedoring Industry Award were compared with
those in four other awards: National Building and Construction Industry Award
1990, Transport Workers Award 1983, Storage Services — General — Interim
Award 1990 and Metal Industry Award 1984. These awards were selected for a
variety of reasons (see appendix J). Workers covered by the Transport Workers
Award in the transport industry, for example, are involved in moving containers
and therefore undertake some similar tasks to those of stevedore workers.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Table 2.9: Summary of provisions specified in the majority of selected
enterprise agreements
a
Work arrangement Summary of provisions
Manning Describes manning levels for different types of operations
Redundancy Specifies redundancy entitlementsb
Contracting out Sets limits on contracting out
Rostering Explicitly sets the order in which different types of labour can be
engaged on a daily basis
Describes roster schedules for different operation areas
Describes hours of work for different shifts
Mentions equalisation schemes in passing but does not define their
operating rules
Remuneration Defines base weekly wages
Details penalties rates as defined in the Stevedoring Industry Award
Details productivity bonus schemes
Details aggregate annual allowance in excess of Stevedoring
Industry Award to all permanent employees
Describes principles or method of wage payments
Paid non-working time Specifies break lengths and timing
Specifies most minimum payments for call-up and shift extensions
Specifies various leave entitlements
a This table is a simplified summary of some provisions relating to work arrangements examined in this study, as
specified in the majority of enterprise agreements examined. Thus, the provisions listed may not be specified in
every agreement. For details see table J.3 and the agreements. Caution should be applied in the interpretation of
this table, given the relationship between these provisions and the Stevedoring Industry Award (appendix J).
b Specified in retirement and redundancy agreements which are annexed to most agreements.
Source:  Various enterprise agreements
While comparisons between award conditions in different industries should be
treated with caution, several of the base provisions in the Stevedoring Industry
Award relating to work arrangements examined in this study exceed those in the
other awards examined. Employees under the Stevedoring Industry Award are
entitled to an annual leave loading of 27.5 per cent, for example, compared with
17.5 per cent for employees under the other awards examined. Shift premiums
are also usually higher: for example, the shift premium for stevedore employees
for weekday nights is double ordinary time, compared with 1.5 or 1.3 times the
ordinary rate under most of the other awards examined (table J.4).
There are a number of factors which mean that a simplistic comparison of award
conditions applying to different industries may be misleading. Work
arrangements may vary in practice, for example, from the award provisions.
Furthermore, important links exist between award provisions, between
provisions in specific enterprise agreements, and between the award and an2   CONTAINER STEVEDORING IN AUSTRALIA
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agreement. Such links are illustrated by those between provisions relating to
shift premiums and penalty rates (in the Stevedoring Industry Award and
enterprise agreements) and the order of engagement (in enterprise agreements).
Thus, it is necessary to look beyond a simple comparison of award provisions to
understand the operation and effect of various work arrangements. Other
caveats are discussed in appendix J.35
3 WORKPLACE CULTURE
Workplace culture affects how people respond to current work
arrangements and how they develop future arrangements. It is a
major influence on the ability of the workplace to adapt to change,
thereby affecting performance. Adversarial relations between
management and employees pervade most of the Australian
container stevedoring workplaces examined. The culture is
characterised by high levels of industrial disputes, poor occupational
health and safety performance, limited internal communication and
information sharing, lack of allegiance to the employer relative to
the union, and concerns about management style and the
prescriptiveness of enterprise agreements. But workplace culture is
not uniformly poor at all workplaces.
Discussions at the workplaces examined indicated that workplace culture is a
major influence on the ability of organisations to adapt to changes in industry
conditions. But workplace culture is a difficult concept to define or measure.
Culture can be thought of as a system of shared meanings or beliefs that
distinguishes one group from another. It influences the group’s priorities, its
values and how these affect the behaviour of the group, including how it solves
problems (Trompenaars 1993). Hofstede (1991) has observed that aspects of
organisational culture, or people’s ‘shared mental software’, are slow to change.
Today’s stevedoring culture in Australia has been shaped by a long history of
antagonistic industrial relations on the waterfront dating from the late 1890s
(Beasley 1996). Some aspects of workplace culture in stevedoring may be
difficult to change, but there is evidence that other aspects of workplace culture
can be altered, and are even improving:
Communication between employees and the different levels of management has
improved considerably although there still is some sense of mistrust between
management and employees. To some extent there has been a cultural shift
whereby an individual employee is able to feel comfortable to approach the
appropriate management person on an issue of concern. (Manager)
Notwithstanding these developments, the culture at the Australian workplaces
examined in this study (with the exception of Sea-Land Adelaide) appears to beWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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still characterised by a high degree of mistrust between management and
employees. As discussed in this chapter, this mistrust is evidenced by:
·  high levels of industrial disputes;
·  poor occupational health and safety performance;
·  limited internal communication and information sharing; and
·  concerns about managerial style and the prescriptiveness of enterprise
agreements.
The culture of Australian container stevedoring workplaces and its development
are briefly examined in this chapter as a backdrop to the review of particular
work arrangements in subsequent chapters.
3.1 Brief history of employee and management relations in
stevedoring
Workplace culture in container stevedoring today reflects the history of
employee and management relations on the waterfront. According to Sheridan
(1994):
The history of waterfront labour relations had always been bitter. Only coal
mining had a more disputatious history. Major port closures occurred in 1890,
1917 and 1928, each ending in crushing defeat for the strikers. In 1917 a ‘scab’
union in Sydney obtained registration ... Although the scab union soon began to
wither on the vine, the 1930s were a bleak time for most wharfies. While men
laid off in other industries queued at the dock gates in hope of a half-day’s work,
the employers ruled the roost. (p. 260)
Prior to mechanisation, stevedoring employees were faced with difficult
workplace conditions. An industrial hygienist inspecting working conditions in
Brisbane in 1956, when 45 kilogram bags of sand were being loaded, noted that:
... [the bags] are carried on the back just below the neck and are pushed or
dropped into that position by a worker standing over the pile of bags onto the
pallet. The process is crude and awkward and lacks any definite pattern of energy
use and output but in spite of this the two tons are stacked [in] the hold in three
to four minutes ... It is hard enough to stoop and pick up a hundredweight of
sand. But on the pallets, workers have to have the bags dropped on their backs in
the early stages and in the later they have to do eternal knee-bends sitting on their
heels to get the bags on their backs and straighten up with a hundredweight of
sand ... (Beasley 1996, p. 195)
Until the late 1960s, all stevedoring employees were hired on a casual rather
than permanent basis. There was an industry-wide pool of labour which could
be transferred by labour coordinators between workplaces and companies at3   WORKPLACE CULTURE
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each port as required (appendix F). This method of employment, combined with
strong union loyalty and militancy, engendered low levels of loyalty to
stevedoring companies. It attracted employees who preferred irregular work and
the ability to stay away from work without affecting their employment
prospects.
Stevedoring managers, on the other hand, were usually former ships’ officers
who had ‘a tendency to assert authority through physical confrontation’,
according to Sheridan (1994).
The irregular nature of work was one of the main causes of high labour turnover
in the 1950s. Many local stoppages occurred during the 1950s and 1960s,
mainly for better pay and conditions. In 1954 and 1956, there were major
nationwide waterfront strikes. This resulted in legislative change, including
penal sanctions and fines aimed at curbing union power.
Technological change in the 1960s, particularly containerisation, led to large job
losses as work became more capital intensive. The requirement for a more
skilled workforce encouraged employers to support the introduction of
permanent employment — a policy of the Waterside Workers Federation of
Australia aimed at improving conditions. As described by Kierce (1996):
Permanent employment was introduced in 1967–69, following the National
Industry Stevedoring Conference (Woodward Conference 1967) with the
objective of achieving long term improvement in the conditions in the
stevedoring industry. However, permanent employment did not bring about the
industrial harmony contained in its objectives, in fact, the opposite may even be
argued. (p. 12)
Sheridan (1994) noted that while the union supported permanency, a large
minority of the union membership opposed the introduction of permanency out
of fear that their earnings would be cut and a suspicion of anything their
employers supported.
A key objective of the Waterfront Industry Reform Authority (WIRA) was to
encourage employee loyalty to their employer as a means of improving
productivity and innovation. Many claimed during the detailed workplace
discussions that strong employee loyalty to the union remains, despite the
WIRA process. The Port of Brisbane noted that this can affect workplace
performance:
The maritime unions actively foster commitment to the unions at the expense of
the employers. This leads to a lack of commitment to the organisation and a less
than ideal working environment. (response 14, p. 1)WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Discussions with management also revealed that they perceive that there is still
insufficient employee loyalty to the individual employer, although change has
been occurring:
There used to be no loyalty to the enterprise but this is changing. Changing that
culture is a long-term process, but it has changed enormously. ... The aim is to
continue to change this culture. (Manager)
Difficulties in establishing an appropriate workplace culture are not unique to
Australia. In New Zealand, there is also a long history of adversarial relations
between employers and employees. The reforms in New Zealand appear to be
changing this situation, but slowly (appendix I).
3.2 Poor workplace culture
The culture in most of the Australian stevedoring workplaces examined is
epitomised by a ‘them and us’ relationship between management and
operational employees. Bill Giddens, National Industrial Officer of the
Maritime Union of Australia (MUA), considered that the biggest problem in
stevedoring is that:
... we have management on one side demanding unfettered discretion to manage
and the employees on the other side resisting every change that management try
to make. ... The lack of communication and cooperation is one of the big
problems keeping productivity from reaching acceptable levels. ... I think
employees are very suspicious and I think there is not a high level of trust [of
management]. (cited in Kierce 1996, pp. 120–128)
Some appreciation of the nature of the culture in stevedoring can be gained by
briefly examining the nature and level of industrial disputes, occupational health
and safety performance, internal communication, and managerial style and the
prescriptiveness of enterprise agreements.
Causes of industrial disputes
Most stevedoring workplaces are characterised by high levels of industrial
disputes, which are a major source of ship delays at Australian ports (PC 1998).
The level of industrial disputation has fallen considerably over the past few
years, but it is still high and is exceeded only by coal mining (chapter 2 and
figure 3.1). Improved management and employee relations in stevedoring would
increase stevedore performance by reducing ship delays and turnaround times.3   WORKPLACE CULTURE
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Figure 3.1: Working days lost in stevedoring as result of industrial
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Source:  ABS, unpublished data from Industrial Disputes Australia, cat. no. 6321.0
Over the eight years to 1996, data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics1
indicate that ‘managerial policy’ was one of the main causes of disputes in the
stevedoring industry, accounting for a particularly large number of working
days lost per employee in 1991, 1993 and 1994 (figure 3.1).
Another major cause of working days lost was disputation over wages. The
number of working days lost in 1996 was considerably lower than during the
previous two years. The relatively high number of days lost in 1994 was mainly
a result of disputation over proposed redundancies at Patrick, Sydney (box 6.3).
Occupational health and safety
As discussed in chapter 2, stevedoring has the highest incidence of new cases of
work-related injuries and the highest cost of injury per employee of all major
industries in Australia (table 3.1). The average compensation per employee and
the incidence of new compensation cases in the stevedoring industry are both
significantly higher than in other industries.
                                             
1 Based on data obtained from employers and trade unions.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Table 3.1: Occupational health and safety indicators in stevedoring and










no. weeks $‘000 $
Stevedoring 148.6 9.2 7.0 1061
Mining 64.9 8.7 8.4 547
Manufacturing 46.6 10.0 7.7 359
Construction 47.6 12.2 9.3 443
Transport and storage 47.7 10.2 7.5 361
All industries 28.0 11.0 8.1 228
a Number of new compensation cases per thousand employees.
b Working weeks lost per occurrence.
Source:  Easson, McCann and Ronfeldt (1997)
Management has an important influence on occupational health and safety
performance. An Industry Commission (1995) report observed:
More than anything else ... risk management requires cultural change in the
workplace. This must be driven by top management that is sufficiently
committed to provide resources and hold line managers and work teams
responsible for outcomes. (p. xi)
Easson, McCann and Ronfeldt (1997) argued that many of the injuries in
stevedoring are avoidable and that a major contributor to poor occupational
health and safety performance is the poor state of management and employee
relations on the waterfront.
Internal communication
The MUA is the primary means of transferring information on strategic issues
between managers and employees in many of the Australian workplaces
examined. Almost all operational employees in container stevedoring are
members of the MUA (chapter 2).
Unions, by providing a collective voice, provide a mechanism that may increase
the flow of information between management and employees. Thus, employees
are less likely to express their dissatisfaction by quitting (Elliott 1991). This
suggests that in principle, unions may reduce recruitment and other associated
costs of employment.3   WORKPLACE CULTURE
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On the other hand, unions may not be able to fully reflect the sometimes diverse
views of their membership. Managers at several Australian workplaces
examined were concerned that information channelled through the union may be
limited and potentially unrepresentative of the views of all employees.
There is no formal requirement stipulating that the employer must communicate
via a union rather than directly with employees. The Stevedoring Industry
Award 1991 (clause 43) specifies that any major workplace change which has a
‘significant effect’ on employees must be discussed with ‘employees and/or
[emphasis added] their union/s’. Nevertheless, most but not all enterprise
agreements of the Australian stevedoring workplaces examined explicitly
provide a role for unions in information sharing. For example, both the CTAL
Sydney and P&O Ports Melbourne agreements stated that:
The parties shall provide on a regular basis accurate and comprehensive
information to employees on a range of operational, industrial, personnel and
organisational matters. Such information sharing shall be achieved through
formal and informal means, eg team briefing, annual report,
newsletters/magazines, day-to-day discussions and regular meetings with the
Union Committee. (CTAL Sydney, clause 7.2, p. 3; P&O Ports Melbourne,
clause 1.7, p. 5)
The enterprise agreement at Sea-Land is similar, but does not explicitly mention
consultation with the unions. Instead, it refers to employee representatives, but
these are typically union representatives:
The parties recognise that it is essential to achieve a spirit of trust and
cooperation between employer representatives and employee representatives, as
required within the overall objectives of enterprise-based employment. (Sea-
Land, clause 7a)
The parties shall provide on a regular and systematic basis accurate and
comprehensive information to employees on a range of operational, industrial,
personnel and organisational matters. Such information sharing shall be achieved
through formal and informal means, eg team briefing, the SLAT [Sea-Land
Australia Terminals] Communication Committee, annual report,
newsletters/magazines, day-to-day discussions and on-the-job discussions. (Sea-
Land, clause 7d)
The Patrick enterprise agreements were less focused on the processes:
It is the intent of this agreement to ... avoid division and conflict through grass
roots communication, by providing the opportunity for employees to make
contributions to decisions involving their work and their working environment
and by fostering a mutually supportive relationship between management, all
employees and the unions. (Patrick Melbourne and Brisbane, clause 6, p. 3)
The Patrick and Sea-Land enterprise agreements also prescribe the operation of
communication committees. The Patrick agreements note that these committeesWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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provide a forum for contribution to decision making relating to ‘the objectives
of the Company, the welfare of employees and levels of customer service
provided’ (Patrick agreements, clause 9, p. 4). The role of the committee is to
facilitate these objectives through ‘consultation, communication and
understanding’ (appendix J).  The composition of Patrick’s communication
committees is prescribed in the agreements as ‘management, supervisors,
operational employees and union representatives’.
The Sea-Land agreement specifies the objectives of the communication
committee as being ‘to increase employees’ contributions in the decision
making process and to ‘focus attention on the requirements of customers and the
needs of employees and to improve site productivity’. Sea-Land’s committee is
specified to comprise eight members: ‘six general members elected by fellow
employees’ and two management members (Sea-Land, annexure 1, p. 41).
P&O (CTAL Sydney and P&O Ports Melbourne) does not prescribe
communication committees in the agreements examined, although P&O Ports
Melbourne does have a Productivity Committee (which, while not specifically
noting communication as an objective, provides for the transfer of information
on performance). However, all agreements do prescribe an Occupational Health
and Safety Committee, comprising employee representatives and management,2
which provides a venue for communication on these issues.
The Stevedoring Industry Award contains a clause describing procedures which
should be followed in the event of a dispute. Specific roles for union
representatives are outlined. Unions and employers shall notify each other as
soon as possible if they feel that any industrial matter may result in a dispute. In
the event of a dispute at the workplace, the union delegate and supervisor must
confer without delay and attempt to resolve the matter. If agreement is not
reached, then there is facility for the dispute to be referred to a conciliator. The
container stevedoring enterprise agreements have replicated this clause, without
modification.
Various formal means of communication within the workplaces examined, such
as newsletters, noticeboards and grievance procedures, are summarised in table
3.2. Formal processes to facilitate the sharing of information are in place at each
workplace, but information on these processes does not indicate how these
processes are used at individual workplaces, nor their effectiveness.
                                             
2 The Patrick enterprise agreements examined do not prescribe the membership of the
committee. Indeed, the committee is recognised as being important in the agreements, but
its function is not detailed.3   WORKPLACE CULTURE
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Furthermore, the importance of informal communication should not be
overlooked.





















yes no no yes yes yes
– regularity monthly na na six-weekly monthly monthly
– direct participationc yes na na yes yes no
– union participation yes na na yes yes yes
OH&S committee yes yes yes yes yes yes
Workplace newsletter yes yes yes yes yes yes
Noticeboard yes yes yes yes yes yes
Grievance procedures yes yes yes yes yes yes
Information sharing
– financial yes no no some some nod
– performance yes yes yes yes yes yes
a Table structure adapted from Callus et al. (1991).
b Committee names vary between workplaces, but are essentially a forum for information sharing between
management and operational employees.
c Open to all employees, not just union delegates.
d Would like to share more financial information than they do now.
na Not applicable.
Source:  Workplace information requests
It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of formal communication processes
and, even more so, the extent of informal communication within the workplace.
The detailed discussions with managers, supervisors and site committee
representatives indicated that communication between employees and
management could be improved at most workplaces. The discussions also
suggested there were limited opportunities (except with Sea-Land Adelaide) for
direct participation by employees in decision making. The internal
communication processes at Sea-Land (considered in section 3.3) appear to be
atypical of the workplaces examined.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Managerial style and the prescriptiveness of enterprise agreements
The high degree of mistrust between stevedoring managers and employees may
be reflected in the preference by some managers for prescriptive enterprise
agreements (appendix J). Prescriptive agreements provide a means of reducing
day-to-day conflict with employees over work arrangements by reducing
uncertainty about the interpretation of rules operating at a particular workplace.
One manager commented:
... if unions claim an approach should be taken on any issue which does not
conform with what the agreement may say regarding that issue then management
will not accept it. (Manager)
But management, by agreeing to prescriptive agreements, has reduced its
flexibility to improve workplace performance by altering work arrangements.
Supervisors (who are members of the Australian Maritime Officers’ Union)
were not involved in the development of enterprise agreements between
management and the MUA at some workplaces. Supervisors considered that this
reduces their flexibility when planning operations. This also limited the
influence of supervisors over the development of work arrangements which
directly affect their ability to select and reward staff.
Several managers recognised the difficult position of supervisors. One
commented:
Supervisors are going through traumatic times and will tell you that they are the
meat in the sandwich. ... We need to address this. (Manager)
Several managers at the Australian workplaces examined expressed the view
that operational employees did not feel responsible for their performance and
that this was an important issue. Don Hughes, Manager, New South Wales
Southern Region of Patrick, for example, noted that:
We need accountability and responsibility in the workforce, now there is none of
this. ... There is not a great deal of support from the union to increase business or
improve the way we perform compared to the rest of the world. Shipping
companies never know when a ship will return from Australia. We have
industrial problems continually. (cited in Kierce 1996, p. 93)
But managers considered that it was extremely difficult in practice to dismiss
poorly performing employees. They viewed it as a costly and protracted
exercise, requiring detailed recording of an employee’s breaches of their
employment contract. This reduces the competition for jobs and the incentive
for employees to improve performance. Disciplinary procedures, including
dismissal procedures, are included in both the Stevedoring Industry Award and
most stevedoring agreements (appendix J).3   WORKPLACE CULTURE
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There also appears to be little incentive or reward for operational employees to
undertake additional responsibilities. The position of foreman is rotated among
gang members at some workplaces, for example, while operational employees at
other workplaces can be upgraded for the duration of a single shift if there is a
shortage of foremen.
The lack of effective rewards for improved performance and lack of effective
sanctions against poor performance may also encourage the reliance of
managers on prescriptive agreements.
3.3 Sea-Land
Sea-Land’s workplace culture stood out among the Australian stevedoring
workplaces examined. Sea-Land Adelaide is characterised by substantially more
positive management and employee relations and good communication, as
shown by one crane operator’s view:
I love my job. I take pride in my work. They put a lot of trust in us up there on a
$15 million piece of equipment ... We hear about the other ports and all the
arguments with management. We just don’t have that here. If we have a problem
we tell them and they listen. If we want something fixed they fix it. We work
very closely with the mechanics. (MUA 1997b, p. 47)
Before establishing in Adelaide in 1993, the company’s workplace culture was
apparently similar to other stevedoring workplaces examined. An operational
employee (MUA Branch Secretary) commented:
Before Sea-Land set up in Adelaide it was a disaster. Morale was low, distrust
was high and productivity was abysmal ... Management had no understanding.
(MUA 1997b, p. 46)
The MUA Branch Secretary went on to note that when Sea-Land took over
Adelaide’s container terminal:
... [the General Manager] brought the team together, he went out of his way to
get work for the terminal ... he instilled confidence in the workforce, there would
not be a week go by when he doesn’t walk into the smoko room to talk to people.
(MUA 1997b, p. 46)
The different culture at Sea-Land Adelaide may be attributed to three factors.
First, the degree of competition from Melbourne has increased since the
establishment of Patrick’s dedicated Melbourne–Adelaide rail link in 1997
(chapter 9). Supervisors at Sea-Land recognise that because Sea-Land is small
and isolated, it will lose contracts if it does not perform. If Sea-Land refused a
late container for loading, for example, then the exporter could easily send it by
rail to Melbourne.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Second, Sea-Land’s operations are small relative to stevedores at Sydney and
Melbourne. This could be expected to facilitate communication between
management and employees.
A third factor is the apparent difference in management style relative to the
other Australian workplaces examined, as shown by the following comments:
We took a different approach. We listened. Good communication is 50 per cent
listening. I had a lot to learn. Management is a learning process. You can’t go by
the book. But I’ve found if what you do is good for business it’s usually good for
everyone else too. (General Manager, Sea-Land, MUA 1997b, p. 46)
And:
The only reason we are doing well is because of the people we have working
here. ... Nothing is perfect and I say to everyone that, ‘we are not necessarily
doing everything right’. I tell the younger people that if they want a job for life
they need to make it. (Manager)
The greater level of information sharing and direct communication with
employees is illustrated by the functioning of the communication committee. All
employees are encouraged to attend meetings of this committee, and financial
issues and other information are openly discussed (see also box  3.1). The
approach of management to this committee is conveyed by the following
comment by the General Manager of Sea-Land during the detailed discussions:
At the end of meetings we have financial presentations of performance and
anyone can go along. It’s open to questions, scrutiny, costings, whatever. All the
rumours are thrown on the table.
The General Manager noted that the better workplace culture, compared with
other workplaces, was reflected in fewer sick days and industrial stoppages
because problems are more likely to be resolved before they become major
issues.
The example of Sea-Land suggests that certain aspects of waterfront culture are
affected by the environment in which stevedores operate. The degree of
competition and management style, particularly the extent of internal
communication, appear to have improved the workplace culture at Sea-Land.
Moreover, as Bill Giddens of the MUA has observed, cultural change at Sea-
Land was achieved with the existing employees:
It is interesting to note that a new player in the field in the last seven or eight
years, Sea-Land terminal in Adelaide, has the same employees that the previous
company Conaust had, but they seem to have a far better relationship. (Kierce
1996, p. 128)3   WORKPLACE CULTURE
47
Box 3.1: Sharing financial and other information — Sea-Land
At Sea-Land Adelaide, the General Manager and the accountant provide detailed
information on the costs, profits and rate of return of the container terminal at the
communication committee (Site Consultative Committee). Any employee may attend
these meetings and a range of grades of permanent employees attend, as do guaranteed
wage employees. At Sea-Land, employees who attended the meetings of the
communication committee have discussed matters such as:
·  the budget, including the profitability of the terminal;
·  the concept of return on investment. (For example, new straddles were not
purchased because it was found that the expected revenue from the straddles
would not justify their cost); and
·  reasons for stevedoring contracts being either won or lost by Sea-Land.
An example of the benefits of information sharing was the idea from crane maintenance
staff to change some of the constraints on cranes to make them operate faster.
Productivity for one crane went up three or four moves per hour using the same driver
and machinery.
Sources:  MUA (1997b); detailed discussions at Sea-Land Adelaide
3.4 Summary of findings
Workplace culture is a major influence on the ability of organisations to adapt to
changes in industry conditions. The ability of a workplace to adapt includes its
capacity to alter work arrangements in response to change. Some aspects of
workplace culture may be difficult to change, but there is evidence that the
workplace culture in container stevedoring can be improved.
Adversarial relations between management and employees pervade most of the
Australian container stevedoring workplaces examined. This is manifested in:
·  high levels of industrial disputes;
·  poor occupational health and safety performance;
·  limited internal communication and information sharing (with the union
being the primary means of transferring information between managers
and employees);
·  primary allegiance by employees to the union rather than the employer;
and
·  a managerial style based on prescriptive enterprise agreements.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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However, there is some evidence of improvement, such as better
communication between employees and managers, at most of the workplaces
examined.
In particular, Sea-Land Adelaide is characterised by more positive management
and employee relations. Several factors appear to have contributed to the
improved workplace culture, including the greater level of information sharing
and direct communication between employees and managers. Other factors have
also facilitated change, however, particularly the recent increase in competition
from the Port of Melbourne and the workplace’s small size compared with
operations in Sydney and Melbourne.49
4 ROSTERING
Roster systems are crucial to the performance of container
stevedoring workplaces. Irregular shifts, overtime shifts, guaranteed
wage employees and supplementary employees are used by
stevedores to meet variable demand. When allocating employees to
shifts, stevedores face constraints such as the order of engagement
and equalisation schemes. The order of engagement, in particular,
results in greater use of permanent employees and overtime than
might otherwise be the case, which leads to lower productivity and
higher labour costs. Stevedores have partly reduced the impact of
this constraint by complicated roster design.
Shiftwork in Australian container stevedoring workplaces is a response to
customer demands that a ship be worked ‘around the clock’ until the task of
loading and unloading the ship (that is, the exchange) has been completed. This
demand reflects the substantial daily costs associated with ships remaining in
berth or anchorage.
Roster systems are the mechanism which supply labour when required to
operate container terminals on a continuous basis — that is, 24 hours a day,
seven days a week. These systems need to provide enough flexibility to meet an
often variable and unpredictable workload — a particular characteristic of
Australian ports (chapter 2). The stevedore’s task is to match the available
labour and equipment to the variable workload. As noted by Robinson and
Everett:
The most critical issue in determining productivity levels for stevedoring firms in
container handling operations is how effectively the firm deals with, or manages,
variability in demand — how effectively it allocates its labour and capital inputs.
(response 10, p. 5)
However, stevedores face several constraints in allocating employees to shifts to
provide an appropriate supply of labour under such conditions.
This chapter examines the rostering arrangements applying to operational
employees at selected Australian container stevedoring workplaces.1 It covers:
the main features of roster systems; the key constraints on these systems; and
                                             
1 Some workplaces have separate rosters for maintenance employees. Several workplaces
also have separate rosters for gatekeepers, gear storemen, reefer attendants and allocators.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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ways in which stevedores can reduce the impact of these constraints. Shiftwork
and occupational health and safety issues are also addressed.
4.1 Main features of roster systems
As noted, stevedores need to be able to allocate their labour and capital
resources to meet fluctuations in demand. Permanent employees, who are
allocated to rosters, are used to meet normal workloads. Above-normal
workloads are met in two main ways: permanent employees working overtime;
and the use of guaranteed wage employees and supplementary employees. The
latter two groups of employees are not allocated to rosters.
The first step in roster design is to decide on the main elements of the roster
system. These include:
·  shift times and length (for example, eight-hour shifts);
·  types of shifts (such as regular, irregular and rostered-off shifts);
·  the length of the roster cycle (that is, the number of weeks before the roster
repeats itself); and
·  weekday and weekend coverage (for example, making weekend work a
rostered shift or a voluntary overtime shift).
The second step is to estimate the expected average daily labour requirements
for the workplace. To calculate labour requirements in terms of person shifts2
per day, the following information is needed:
·  the expected average daily level of demand for stevedoring services (that
is, container throughput);
·  the number of shifts per day and shift length;
·  the expected average crane productivity per shift (that is, the number of
containers moved per crane per shift);
·  the quantity and type of equipment (that is, the number of quay cranes,
straddle carriers or rubber-tyred gantries); and
·  typical manning scales on equipment and for other tasks.
The third step is to estimate the total number of operational employees required
to operate the workplace on a shiftwork basis. The total number of person shifts
                                             
2  A unit of measurement of labour input. For example, ten employees each working one shift
is equivalent to ten person shifts (or 80 person hours assuming a shift length of eight
hours).4   ROSTERING
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required is then distributed between permanent employees, guaranteed wage
employees and supplementary employees.
In the case of permanent employees, allowance must be made for the expected
take-up levels of leave entitlements (such as annual and sick leave) and rostered
time off. The availability of guaranteed wage employees is also affected by
leave entitlements. The level, mix and use of different types of employees are
determined at the individual workplace.
The final step in roster design is to assign permanent employees to different
shift types. The main shift types are day, evening, night, irregular, variably
rostered and rostered off. Permanent employees are divided into panels — one
for each week of the roster cycle. Each panel is usually assigned to a particular
shift type for the week. Panels rotate to a different shift type on a weekly basis
over the roster cycle. Employees on regular panels work their predetermined
shifts — for example, employees assigned to day shift will work day shifts over
that week. However, employees on irregular shifts may be assigned to the day,
evening or night shift depending on requirements. Employees on variably
rostered shifts may be assigned to one of two shift types (for example, evening
or day).
The proportions of regular, irregular and other shifts are negotiated at the
workplace level and are specified in enterprise agreements. For example, the
enterprise agreement at Sea-Land Adelaide specifies each shift type as a
proportion of total shifts for weekdays and weekends over the 15 week roster
cycle (table 4.1).
Table 4.1: Shift types over roster cycle, Sea-Land Adelaide (per cent)
a
Weekends
Shift type Weekdays Saturday Sunday
Day 20 .. ..
Evening 13 .. ..
Irregular 53 33 ..
Rostered off 13 67 100
a The number of shifts of a given type (for example, day shift) as a percentage of total shifts for weekdays and
weekends.
.. Nil.
Source:  Sea-Land Enterprise Agreement (1997)
A further consideration in allocating permanent employees to panels is the need
for the full range of skills required to perform stevedoring functions to be
available on any given day.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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If actual workplace variables, such as productivity or take-up rates of annual
leave or sick leave, differ significantly for a sustained period from the levels
expected, labour requirements (and possibly manning levels) may need to be
re-estimated. The roster may also need to be adjusted until it supplies a
sufficient amount of labour with an appropriate distribution of skills. For
example, if productivity is much lower than expected, then shortages of
permanent employees will arise because more person shifts are required than the
roster supplies.
Similarly, there would be insufficient permanent labour if employees’ take-up of
annual and sick leave increased substantially. Employee absenteeism can also
affect labour supply and workplace performance. For example, in detailed
discussions, management at one Australian workplace noted that a high level of
failures to report were occurring early in the week. This required a scaling back
in operations, because fewer drivers than expected are available to operate
equipment, and may also result in double headers.
If such changes are expected to be sustained, and in the absence of measures
that directly address the source of change, roster and manning adjustments may
be considered necessary. Provisions in enterprise agreements require that
management and the union consult and negotiate any changes to roster and
manning arrangements at the workplace level.
The roster system at Patrick Brisbane is outlined in box 4.1 to illustrate how
these elements come together.
4.2 Constraints on roster systems
The Stevedoring Industry Award 1991 contains provisions relating to shiftwork
and roster design: hours of work (clause 18); shiftwork (clause 20); rostering
(clause 21); overtime (clause  22); double headers (clause 23); annual leave
(clause 27); and sick leave (clause 28). These provisions are outlined in
appendix J.
The detail of roster systems is now determined at the workplace, but award
provisions continue to influence the design of roster systems. The enterprise
agreement at Patrick Melbourne, for example, refers to the award provisions for
a nine-hour break between the conclusion of overtime work on the evening shift4   ROSTERING
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Box 4.1: Roster arrangements at Patrick Brisbane
Machinery operators/general duties employees at Patrick Brisbane work an eight-week
roster cycle (table below). The shift length at Patrick Brisbane is eight hours on
weekdays and seven hours on weekends. To average 35 ordinary hours per week over the
roster cycle, employees are entitled to five rostered days off which are taken
consecutively in week 8. Employees are not permitted to work when rostered off in that
week.
Roster for operational employees, Patrick Brisbane
Week Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
1 E/D E/D E/D E/D E/D V V
2 D DDD D V V
3II I IIV V
4 D DDD D V V
5II I IIV V
6 D DDD D V V
7II I IIV V
8 Off Off Off Off Off V V
Notes: E = evening, D = day, I = irregular, Off = rostered off, V = voluntary overtime
Over the roster cycle, employees work a mix of regularly rostered day shifts and
irregularly rostered shifts as well as a week of variably rostered shifts. Machinery
operators/general duties employees are divided into eight ‘panels’, one for each week of
the roster. Each panel commences the roster cycle at a different point to equally
distribute employees over the roster. Each panel then rotates to a different shift type on a
weekly basis.
Regular day shifts are worked in weeks 2, 4 and 6. In week 1, a variably rostered
employee may be allocated either to the evening or day shift, but is normally allocated to
the evening shift if there are vacancies on that shift. Employees working in an irregular
roster week (weeks 3, 5 and 7) may be allocated to any shift each day (subject to having
an eight-and-a-half hour break between shifts). The normal order of allocation for
irregularly rostered employees is to fill available vacancies on night shift, then evening
shift and then day shift.
On any given weekday there will be about 38 per cent of machinery operators/general
duties employees rostered onto a day shift, about 13 per cent variably rostered to either a
day or evening shift, about 38 per cent rostered on an irregular basis and around 13 per
cent rostered off.
All weekend work by machinery operators/general duties employees at Patrick Brisbane
is performed on a voluntary basis and paid at overtime rates.
Source:  Patrick Brisbane Enterprise Agreement (1996)WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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and the start of work on the following day. As a result, shift times have been
structured to provide for a nine-hour break. Similarly, the award provision
prescribing the average weekly hours of work for permanent employees affects
rostered time-off arrangements.
The enterprise agreements of the Australian workplaces examined contain
several work arrangements that, as currently designed, constrain how
management can allocate employees to shifts on a daily basis. These include:
·  the order of engagement;
·  equalisation schemes;
·  notification requirements; and
·  rostered time off.
The way in which several of these arrangements currently operate result in
higher levels of permanent employees than would otherwise occur and limit the
use of supplementary employees. This can have the effect of increasing the
overall cost of labour and may be contributing to reduced productivity.
Order of engagement
The order of engagement specifies the order in which employees are engaged
for a shift. The order of engagement (also known as the ‘order of pick’) is
prescribed in the enterprise agreements of all the Australian workplaces
examined.
A typical order of engagement for weekdays is illustrated in table 4.2. Regularly
rostered permanent employees (1st pick) must be allocated first for any
particular shift. If no regularly rostered permanent employees are available, then
variably rostered permanent employees (2nd pick) are allocated. If no variably
rostered permanent employees are available, then irregularly rostered permanent
employees (3rd pick) are allocated. This allocation process continues down the
order of engagement until the shift has the required number of workers.
Importantly, the weekday order of engagement gives preference to permanent
employees working double headers (5th pick) before supplementaries (7th pick)
are engaged.
The order of engagement, as described above, applies at most of the Australian
workplaces examined. An exception is CTAL Sydney where the weekday order
of engagement allows the use of supplementary employees before permanent
employees are engaged to work double headers. This arrangement was
introduced at CTAL as part of the Productivity Employment Programme in
1996. However, the supplementary pool accounts for less than 10 per cent of the4   ROSTERING
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workforce at CTAL Sydney and recruitment of new supplementary employees
appears to be limited (chapter 5).
Table 4.2: Weekday order of engagement, Patrick Melbourne
1st pick Regularly rostered permanent employees (evening, day)
2nd pick Variably rostered permanent employees (midnight/irregular, evening/day,
day/evening)
3rd pick Irregularly rostered permanent employees (normal order of allocation: midnight,
evening, day)
4th pick Guaranteed wage employees to limit of guaranteea
5th pick Permanent employees working double headers (limit to two nonconsecutive)
6th pick Guaranteed wage employees beyond guaranteea
7th pick Supplementaries
8th pick Permanent employees working additional double headers
9th pick Guaranteed wage employees and supplementaries working double headers
a Guaranteed wage employees at Patrick Melbourne are guaranteed payment of 15 hours ordinary time (two
shifts) wages per week.
Source:  Patrick Melbourne Enterprise Agreement (1996)
Each Australian workplace examined has a separate order of engagement for
weekends. This usually gives preference to permanent employees working
additional shifts (beyond their rostered weekday shifts) before guaranteed wage
employees and supplementary employees are engaged.
The order of engagement primarily reflects the union’s preference for
maximising the work and earnings opportunities of permanent employees.
Robinson and Everett noted that:
Union policy has underlined the position that the Australian waterfront should be
manned by a permanent, fully-trained and responsible workforce; and that most,
if not all, work should be carried out by that group. The use of supplementary
labour ... is therefore seen to be undesirable. (Less formally, there is also a strong
view which sees [supplementaries] — often former waterfront labourers made
redundant — as ‘double-dipping’ and no longer requiring or deserving of
employment.) (response 10, p. 10)WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Given that the use of ex-industry employees3 as supplementaries is likely to
have generated resentment among permanent employees, the union may have
moved to limit the use of supplementary labour by negotiating the order of
engagement in the initial round of enterprise bargaining.
The order of engagement affects workplace performance by restricting the
flexibility with which labour can be used. In particular, the use (in terms of
shifts worked per week) of supplementary labour is limited by its low ranking in
the order of engagement. As a result, management is constrained from engaging
daily labour in the most cost-effective mix or the most appropriate skill mix to
meet organisational requirements.
The order of engagement, combined with high shift premiums and penalty rates,
substantially increases the cost of labour at most of the Australian workplaces
examined. This occurs because it accords permanent employees preference to
double headers and voluntary weekend overtime rather than using
supplementary employees who would not be paid the overtime rate on double
headers.
Using double headers (box  4.2) is more costly than engaging supplementary
employees — for example, a permanent employee working a double header into
a weekday evening shift is paid at two-and-a-half times the ordinary rate
compared with a supplementary employee being paid one-and-a-half times the
ordinary rate plus 20 per cent (see chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion).
Additional labour costs are also incurred by the stevedore through rostered time
off and leave entitlements for permanent employees. These arrangements, by
reducing the number of days for which a permanent employee is available to
work each year, inflate the number of permanent employees needed to meet
operational requirements (see chapter 5 for a discussion of manning levels).
The order of engagement limits the ‘on the job’ experience of supplementary
employees which in turn slows their skills development. In addition,
management may be prevented from selecting strongly performing employees
from the supplementary pool because work preference must be given to
permanent employees.
Double headers also involve higher levels of worker fatigue which can affect
productivity and employee health and safety (chapter 7). The work performance
and alertness of employees could normally be expected to decline in the second
                                             
3  This refers to former permanent employees who received redundancy packages under the
Waterfront Industry Reform Authority process.4   ROSTERING
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shift of a double header. Employees who work long hours are more likely to
experience fatigue and are said to be more prone to injury and ill-health.
Shift premiums and penalty rates may create the incentive for permanent
employees to work at a slower pace on rostered shifts to generate overtime
opportunities. This would result in reduced productivity and timeliness. Also,
the levels of rostered time off and leave increase the number of permanent
employees required to operate a terminal.
The working of overtime on a regular basis can have deleterious effects on the
lives of employees and their families and friends. According to the Maritime
Union of Australia, ‘working rotating shifts and double headers (two shifts in
one day) is taking its toll on the personal life of stevedoring workers ...’ (MUA
1994b, p. 10). Employees who consistently work overtime shifts spend more
Box 4.2: Double headers
Double headers, the working of two shifts consecutively (predominantly the day shift
followed by the evening shift), were included in the Stevedoring Industry Award. The
award (clause 23) limits the number of double headers to two per week and specifies that
these may not be worked on consecutive days. Double headers are worked at penalty
rates of up to three times the day shift rate, time off is given in lieu and provisions in the
award require the taking of a paid one hour meal break between shifts.
Double headers are one way for workplaces to meet labour requirements (in terms of
quantities as well as skills) in periods of high demand. The other option is to use
guaranteed wage employees and supplementary employees.
All enterprise agreements examined include provisions for double headers, generally
reflecting the provisions of the award. Depending on skill availability, operational
employees can be required to undertake up to two double headers in a week. However,
there are some variations from the award, for example:
·  under the enterprise agreements at Sea-Land Adelaide and P&O Ports Melbourne,
an employee working a double header shall not be required to operate heavy
equipment on both shifts of a double header (subject to skill availability); and
·  the enterprise agreements of P&O Ports Melbourne and CTAL Sydney may
require employees to work additional double headers (more than two per week) or
consecutive double headers to meet operational and skill requirements. The P&O
Ports Melbourne agreement also states that there shall be consultation between the
parties before additional or consecutive double headers are worked.
Sources:  Stevedoring Industry Award; enterprise agreements; workplace information requestsWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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time ‘on the job’ and therefore have less time to devote to other activities during
working weeks. The rotational roster system (that is, the weekly rotation of shift
types) means that, during certain weeks of the roster cycle, employees’ leisure
time may not coincide with that of their family members and friends.
At Fergusson Terminal in New Zealand, there is no formal order of
engagement. However, permanent employees are allocated five shifts per week
and are given preference over casual employees4 to work an additional three
shifts a week before casual employees are engaged. The stevedore is limited, by
agreement, to using casual employees to a maximum of 25 per cent of the
payroll.
One way in which Australian stevedores are reducing the impact of the order of
engagement is by changing the order of allocation of irregularly rostered
employees to particular shifts. Irregularly rostered employees at some
workplaces normally fill positions on the night shift in the first instance, then
the evening shift. Some of these workplaces also allocate a number of
irregularly rostered employees to the day shift to reduce the incidence of
employees working a double header into the evening shift (section 4.3). The
number of double headers could be further reduced if managers could allocate
irregularly rostered employees to any shift as required.
In summary, the order of engagement leads to higher labour costs and lower
productivity than would be the case in its absence, other things being equal. It
adds to labour costs by generating overtime shifts for permanent employees.
Labour costs are also increased through the combination of the order of
engagement, rostered time off and leave entitlements. These arrangements
combine to inflate the number of permanent employees needed to meet
operational requirements. Productivity is affected in other ways too. Relatively
high shift premiums and penalty rates (see chapter 7), combined with the order
of engagement, may create an incentive for employees to slow the work rate.
Double headers involve higher levels of worker fatigue, which can affect not
only productivity but also employee health and safety. The order of engagement
may also prevent workplaces from engaging the most appropriate mix of
employees and skills.
                                             
4  Casual employees at Fergusson Terminal are defined as workers employed for one shift
with no guarantee of any further work. All their entitlements are rolled into their wages.
Casual employees are paid NZ$12.50 per hour, compared with permanent employees who
are paid NZ$21.70 per hour.4   ROSTERING
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Equalisation schemes
The objective of equalisation schemes is to equalise earnings across permanent
operational employees within functional categories by ensuring that they have
equal access to shifts which pay above the ordinary rate of pay (day shift base
rate). These premium and penalty shifts include evening, night and overtime
shifts (double header and weekend shifts). Each shift is given a point weighting
according to its remunerative value. Shifts are allocated so employees within
functional categories have the same points — and hence the same earnings —
by the end of each assessment period. Permanent operational employees with
lower points generally have first access to the next premium or penalty shift.
Some workplaces limit variation in points between employees during the
equalisation period to be within specified bands. For example, the Patrick
Melbourne Enterprise Agreement 1996 states that ‘a tolerable range of 30 points
“either side” shall apply ...’ (clause 28).
When first introduced, such schemes provided for the equalisation of work
opportunities, earnings and location of work in stevedoring. Equalisation of
earnings became part of the stevedoring industry with the introduction of the
rotary gang system in 1944 under the casual labour system, and was retained
when permanent employment was introduced in 1967 (Beasley 1996).
Equalisation schemes continue to operate at several of the Australian
workplaces examined. The schemes are not part of the Stevedoring Industry
Award; some enterprise agreements refer to equalisation schemes but provide
few or no details on their operation. The schemes create an equality of earnings
between permanent operational employees in each functional category.5 In some
workplaces, there are also arrangements to equalise the earnings opportunities
of guaranteed wage employees and supplementary employees.
The aggregate wage scheme at Sea-Land Adelaide and the average weekly rate
paid at CTAL Sydney — like the equalisation schemes in the other workplaces
examined — also equalise earnings across permanent operational employees
within functional categories. The aggregate wage scheme at Sea-Land assumes
that a set amount of shifts — on which premiums and penalties are paid — are
worked within the year (chapter 7). Fergusson Terminal does not operate an
equalisation scheme, but there is an informal understanding that work will
generally be equalised.6
                                             
5  The main functional categories include: foremen, clerks, tradesmen and employees
operating equipment, performing lashing work and undertaking other duties.
6  If hours worked are generally equalised and the same hourly rates apply to all shifts, it
follows that earnings will also be equalised.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
60
From an employee perspective, equalisation schemes are intended to maintain
the morale and motivation of the permanent workforce by distributing earnings
opportunities in an equitable manner. The Maritime Union of Australia has also
stated that:
The pay equalisation scheme is not an impediment, there are some good reasons
for it. If you work the best drivers all the time you will burn them out and other
drivers don’t get enough hours and therefore lose their skills, so there are pros
and cons to the scheme. But I would prefer to have the fresh driver. By having
equal opportunity for everybody, everybody gets the hours and experience they
need to get better at it. If a driver sees other drivers getting more hours and
working overtime when he is not even working all his rostered time he will not
bother trying ... (Kierce 1996, p. 116)
Equalisation schemes may bolster the motivation of those employees who
support the notion of sharing work and earnings opportunities irrespective of
individual efficiency, and may serve to broaden the skill base. However,
equalisation schemes may also act as a disincentive for employees to improve
their work effort and quality because there is no pecuniary reward for doing so;
in which case, productivity would be below its potential.
Equalisation schemes can limit management’s ability to allocate the appropriate
labour to shifts and tasks — for example, the stevedore may not be able to ‘pick
up’ the most skilled and experienced drivers because they have high points. The
shift may proceed with less skilled and experienced employees, or the operation
may be scaled back (that is, less equipment and fewer employees). In either
case, productivity and timeliness would be adversely affected.
Factors that influence the binding effect of equalisation schemes include the
length of assessment periods, the extent of points variation allowed and
management prerogative.
Assessment periods vary among the Australian workplaces examined. Earnings
at Patrick Melbourne, for example, are generally equalised over a 15 week
period; the equalisation period is eight weeks at Patrick Brisbane. The enterprise
agreement of P&O Ports Melbourne states that:
WSCD [West Swanson Container Division] shall provide general equity of work
opportunities amongst permanent employees of the same category and skill levels
over the period of each financial year. (P&O Ports Melbourne Enterprise
Agreement 1996, clause 3.2.3)
The longer assessment periods mean that equalisation is less restrictive on
labour allocation.4   ROSTERING
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Most enterprise agreements emphasise that a degree of managerial prerogative
applies in allocating labour to tasks. For example, the Patrick Brisbane
enterprise agreement states that:
Equalisation of earning opportunities within functional categories shall be
attempted to the extent possible; however the Company reserves its right to
select employees outside the equalisation system for genuine circumstances after
consultation with the Union [emphasis in original document]. (Patrick Brisbane
Enterprise Agreement 1996, clause 27)
It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which managerial prerogative is applied
in practice. Several participants indicated that management does exercise its
prerogative in specific circumstances, such as when an exchange must be
finished quickly.
In detailed discussions, management indicated that equalisation schemes are less
of a constraint than in the past. This is because: equalisation occurs over longer
assessment periods than previously; some variation in points is permitted during
assessment periods; and there is a capacity to override equalisation in specific
situations. Despite these mitigating factors, equalisation schemes can still affect
management’s ability to allocate the most appropriate labour to particular shifts
and tasks.
Notification
Notification refers to when and how employees are notified about upcoming
work. The length of time between work notification and work commencement is
a matter for negotiation. A longer notification period requires greater forward
planning by management. However, the variable demand faced by stevedores
makes forward planning difficult. On the other hand, a short notification period
places a greater burden on employees (especially irregularly rostered
employees) and their families by increasing the difficulty of scheduling their
time away from work and the associated costs of uncertainty.
Notification arrangements for weekdays and weekends are contained in
enterprise agreements (table 4.3). There is little variation between the
notification provisions at the Australian workplaces examined. Supplementary
employees may be called at shorter notice (for example, on the day of
requirement) than that given to permanent employees to meet labour shortfalls.
Notification provisions at Fergusson Terminal provide employees with one
day’s notice of the shift they are required to work and there is no difference
between weekend and weekday notification arrangements.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Unexpected ship delays can result in a ‘walk-up start’ (that is, the required
labour is ready to work but the ship has not arrived) and idle time. In the case of
walk-up starts, employees receive call-up payments and may be reallocated to
the subsequent shift (chapter 8).
Table 4.3: Notification requirements at Australian workplaces examined
Type of work Notification provisions
Allocation to shift on
following weekday
Orders are generally posted by the end of the day shift, or by the end of
the shift being worked for allocation to shifts on the following day. All
stevedores have a call-in telephone service which employees are able to
use in the afternoon (after about 4.30 pm) to be advised of their shift and
place of work for the following day.
Shift extensions All stevedoring enterprise agreements provide for the extension of shifts
— sometimes up to 2.5 hours. Employees must be notified about the
extension of a shift between 2.9 and 3.8 hours before the shift ends.
Weekends Notification for work on weekends is generally advised on the Friday
afternoon shift between 2 pm and 4.30 pm, or by telephoning after that
time.
Double headers Employees are generally to be notified of double headers by the meal
break (in the day shift, this is about 12 pm) for the requirement to work
the next shift.
Source:  Enterprise agreements
The risk of walk-up starts and idle time is generally higher at smaller
workplaces and on weekends. Larger workplaces have a lower risk of walk-up
starts because they typically have a steadier flow of ships and work. The higher
risk of walk-up starts and idle time on weekends reflects the longer forward
planning period. Under weekday notification, stevedores generally requisition
labour by the end of the day shift for the three shifts on the following day.
Under weekend notification, stevedores must predict on Friday morning the
labour requirements for the shifts over the weekend and, in some cases, day and
evening shifts on Monday. That is, labour is requisitioned in advance for six to
eight shifts.
However, at the planning meetings on Friday morning, stevedores may have
little information on ship arrival times and container loads, but are still required
by the notification provisions to requisition labour. Management noted that this
can often result in substantial paid non-working time. In a response to the
Research Issues Brief, for example, Liner Shipping Services noted that:
... one member Line has expressed concern at one of the restrictions arising from
the roster system for labour on the waterfront whereby the ordering of labour by4   ROSTERING
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shipowners can result in idle time when the vessel is delayed by weather or slow
work in the previous port. (response 7, p. 3)
The costs of walk-up starts and idle time would be reduced if Tuesday to Friday
notification arrangements were also applied to weekend and Monday shifts.
Alternatively, these costs would be reduced by the use of more supplementary
labour.
Some Australian workplaces have gained limited flexibility in notification
provisions when a public holiday falls on a Monday. The enterprise agreements
of Patrick terminals in Brisbane and Sydney, for example, include provisions for
shift cancellations on Sunday afternoons in the case of ‘suspect vessels’ (those
ships not in port by the time of Friday’s allocation) on long weekends.
Rostered time off
The accumulation of rostered weeks off at the Australian workplaces examined
is related to:
·  the length of shifts and the ordinary hours of work; and
·  the working of rostered weekend shifts.
The Stevedoring Industry Award specifies that the ordinary hours of work shall
average 35 hours per week for a permanent employee (clause 18). In practice, a
permanent employee usually works more than 35 hours a week (chapter 7).
Most of the Australian workplaces examined operate shifts of seven-and-a-half
hours, so the time worked in excess of the standard seven-hour day (based on
the 35 hour week specified in the award) accumulates towards rostered weeks
off. Permanent employees at most of the workplaces also accrue time towards
rostered weeks off by working rostered weekend shifts (chapter 8). Hence, over
a seven-week period, permanent employees generally accumulate sufficient time
for a rostered week off. This is usually taken in every seventh or eighth week of
the roster cycle.
Additional employees are required to cover for those permanent employees
taking rostered time off or leave. This link is acknowledged by the Maritime
Union of Australia:
The more members who opt for time off under RTOs7, or pursuant to the award
provision for accumulating leave for the second double header, instead of
working excessive overtime, the more people will be recruited to the waterfront.
(MUA 1994a, p. 6)
                                             
7  Regulated time off was an optional ‘time away from work’ scheme adopted at Conaust,
White Bay, Sydney in 1994.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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While there are some rostered shifts on weekends, permanent employees at the
Australian workplaces examined are not rostered to work the majority of
weekend shifts. Instead, the workplaces rely mainly on voluntary overtime to
supply labour on weekends — that is, employees indicate whether they are
willing and available to work on the weekend. Allocation to weekend shifts is
subject to the order of engagement and equalisation schemes.
Time away from work (that is, guaranteed and allocated days off) is arranged
quite differently at Fergusson Terminal under the ‘five over seven’ roster
(box 4.3). Advantages of this system include higher employee availability and
greater flexibility to allocate labour than at the Australian workplaces examined.
Box 4.3: The ‘five over seven’ roster at Fergusson Terminal
Employees at Fergusson Terminal work to a ‘five over seven’ roster, working any five
days over a seven-day period. The roster runs over a four-week cycle. In each four-week
period, an employee is entitled to eight days off (four are ‘guaranteed’ days off and four
‘allocated’ days off).
Prior to a four-week period, an employee applies for four guaranteed days off over the
period. Guaranteed days off are taken as a maximum of two days in any week and are
approved subject to 80 per cent of the workforce being available on any weekday and
65 per  cent  being  available  for  weekends  and  public  holidays.  Once  approved,  the
guaranteed days off are not varied except at the employee’s request.
The stevedore selects the allocated days off. Employees are advised by 5 pm for the
following day. Wherever possible, the stevedore selects the day before or the day
following a guaranteed day off, according to the employee’s preference.
Source:  Workplace information request
4.3 Reducing the impact of constraints
Constraints on the design of roster systems were identified in the previous
section. In this section, various means of reducing the impact of these
constraints are discussed, including increased use of irregular shifts and
alternative shift lengths.
Irregular shifts
As noted earlier, employees on irregular shifts can be assigned to the day,
evening or night shift, depending on the expected requirements for the particular4   ROSTERING
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day. Increasing the use of irregular shifts can reduce the incidence of idle time
and overtime.
The mix of regular and irregular shifts varies between the workplaces examined
(figure 4.1). There are pronounced variations between:
·  smaller and larger Australian workplaces; and
·  the Australian workplaces and Fergusson Terminal, New Zealand.






























a ‘Irregular’ includes irregular shifts and variably rostered shifts.
Sources:  Enterprise agreements; workplace information requests
The shift mix appears to be related to the scale of container throughput. Average
exchanges (that is, the average number of containers loaded and unloaded per
ship) at the ports of Sydney and Melbourne are approximately double the
average exchange at smaller ports (BTCE 1997a). As a result, ships calling at
the larger workplaces examined generally require several consecutive shifts to
be worked to complete a ship. At the smaller workplaces examined, the average
exchange can usually be handled over two shifts (see figure 4.2 for an example).
Moreover, the probability that workplaces in the larger ports will have ships to
work is approximately double that of workplaces in smaller ports
(BTCE 1997a). Thus, larger workplaces — with a steadier stream of ships and
work — are able to use a higher proportion of regular shifts than at smaller
workplaces, with less possibility of paid non-working time occurring.
Importantly, the shift mix affects stevedores’ ability to allocate labour across the
day. Irregular shifts range from around 40 per cent to 65 per cent of ‘rosteredWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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on’ shifts across the Australian workplaces examined. In contrast, all rostered
on shifts are irregular at Fergusson Terminal. Thus, it has substantial additional
allocative flexibility compared with that of the Australian workplaces.
Figure 4.2: Example – shifts worked per ship, by workplace size, 1997
a
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Small
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a Shaded areas indicate when shifts were worked for each ship.
Source:  Workplace information requests
The latest round of enterprise agreements has increased the proportion of
irregular shifts — and allocative flexibility — at some of the Australian
workplaces examined. For example, the number of irregular shifts at Sea-Land
Adelaide has been increased by about 50 per cent over the roster cycle
(compared with the roster in its previous enterprise agreement). Irregular shifts
can be used in conjunction with guaranteed wage employees and supplementary
employees to reduce the incidence of overtime shifts. At one Australian
workplace examined, using more supplementary employees and irregularly
rostered employees on the day shift instead of the evening shift reduced the
number of day shift employees working a double header into the evening shift.
This arrangement would result in labour cost savings.
Although irregular shifts allow stevedores greater flexibility in allocating labour
over different parts of the day, these shifts can be disruptive for the lives of
employees and their families and friends. Given similar conditions, employees
generally prefer regular shifts which provide more scope for planning non-work
time.4   ROSTERING
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Shift length
Rosters for operational employees in the Australian workplaces examined have
similar shift times and lengths. These are specified in enterprise agreements.
The workplaces operate three shifts a day. The shift length at most workplaces
is seven-and-a-half hours. For example, on weekdays at Sea-Land Adelaide, the
day shift runs from 7.30  am to 3  pm, the evening shift runs from 3  pm to
10.30 pm, and the night shift runs from 10.30 pm to 6 am; the shift length on
weekends is seven hours. Patrick Brisbane operates eight-hour shifts on
weekdays and seven-hour shifts on weekends. Fergusson Terminal in New
Zealand operates eight-hour shifts.
There is flexibility at Australian workplaces to extend shifts when required. The
enterprise agreement at Patrick Melbourne, for example, states that management
can extend day shifts by up to two-and-a-half hours and evening and night shifts
by one-and-a-half hours for any reason. Employees working shift extensions are
paid at overtime rates (chapter 7). Similar arrangements apply at the other
Australian workplaces examined. None of the workplaces use shorter length
shifts (for example, four-hour shifts).
Alternative shift lengths are used by stevedores in overseas ports. The Port of
Wellington in New Zealand, for example, operates ‘just-in-time’ labour
requisitioning. Under this system, operational employees are notified by 3 pm of
the day before the job and may be hired for eight-, ten- or 12-hour shifts. By
using variable shift lengths, this system is likely to reduce the extent of paid
non-working time.
Management at one Australian workplace had considered moving to 12-hour
shifts. The Stevedoring Industry Award allows for 12-hour shifts, as stated in
clause 21g, ‘where work requirements fluctuate such as in small ports, it may be
appropriate to work twelve-hour shifts’. However, none of the Australian
workplaces examined have adopted this shift length.
For stevedores, there may be some benefits from 12-hour shifts. Fewer shifts per
day would reduce the number of shift changeovers and, as a result, less working
time would be lost. The ability to use 12-hour shifts when required could also
reduce the extent of paid non-working time (that is, balance of a shift not
worked) compared to using shift extensions or double headers under an eight-
hour shift system.
A disadvantage of the 12-hour shift is that productivity may decline over the
length of the shift as employees are affected by fatigue. However, when
employees work double headers they are at the terminal for 15–16 hours.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Twelve-hour shifts are used in a number of other industries (for example, coal
mining, emergency services and health services). Whether such shifts deliver
net performance gains would require detailed analysis by individual stevedoring
workplaces. More generally, there may be benefits for stevedores from having
flexibility to select shift lengths to more closely match estimated job duration.
4.4 Shiftwork and occupational health and safety
As noted earlier, stevedoring is an ‘around the clock’ industry. Stevedoring
workplaces use shiftwork to cope with the variability in the timing of ship
arrivals and workload. However, shiftwork is not unique to stevedoring. As
noted above, shiftwork arrangements are used also in other industries.
Some possible risks of shiftwork to the health and safety of employees could be
mitigated by alternative work arrangements. Permanent employees, for example,
have the option of working overtime at most workplaces before supplementary
employees are engaged. Overtime rates of pay create incentives to volunteer for
double header shifts, despite health and safety risks. Employers’ flexibility in
this respect is constrained by the order of engagement. Greater numbers of
permanent employees could also reduce risks to health and safety. However,
there are currently a number of disincentives for stevedores to take on more
permanent employees, such as high redundancy costs (chapter 6).
4.5 Summary of findings
Several work arrangements, as currently designed, constrain how management
allocates employees to shifts on a daily basis. These include the order of
engagement, equalisation schemes, notification requirements and rostered time
off.
The order of engagement affects workplace performance by restricting the
flexibility with which labour can be used. In particular, the use (in terms of
shifts worked per week) of supplementary labour is limited by its low ranking in
the order of engagement. As a result, management is constrained from engaging
daily labour in the most cost-effective mix or the most appropriate skill mix to
meet organisational requirements.
The order of engagement, combined with high shift premiums and penalty rates,
substantially increases the cost of labour. This occurs because the order of
engagement accords preference to overtime by permanent employees rather than
the use of supplementary employees (who would not be paid the overtime rate).4   ROSTERING
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The high shift premiums and penalty rates create an incentive for permanent
employees to seek overtime shifts, which can result in reduced productivity and
timeliness. Double headers involve higher levels of worker fatigue which can
affect not only productivity but also employee health and safety.
Labour costs for a given level of activity are also increased through the
combination of the order of engagement and the extent of rostered time off and
leave entitlements. These arrangements reduce the availability of permanent
labour, thus inflating the number of permanent employees required to meet
operational requirements.
Working overtime on a regular basis can have deleterious effects on the health
and safety, as well as the social and family lives of employees. Employees who
consistently work overtime shifts spend more time ‘on the job’ and therefore
have less time to devote to other activities during working weeks. The rotational
roster system means that, during certain weeks of the roster cycle, employees’
leisure time may not coincide with that of family members and friends.
Equalisation schemes, while supporting employees’ notions of fairness, can
have a negative impact on productivity and timeliness where they restrict
management’s ability to allocate the appropriate labour to particular shifts and
tasks. The schemes may also diminish incentives for permanent operational
employees to improve their work performance. Equalisation schemes are much
less of a constraint than in the past because of longer assessment periods; some
variation in points is permitted during assessment periods; and there is a
capacity to override equalisation in specific situations.
Under weekend notification, stevedores bear a significant risk of having to pay
for non-working time. These costs would be reduced if daily notification
arrangements were applied to weekend and Monday shifts and/or if more
supplementary employees were used.
Irregular shifts allow stevedores greater flexibility in allocating labour over
different parts of the day. At the same time, irregular shifts can be disruptive for
the lives of employees and their families and friends. Larger workplaces — with
a steadier stream of ships and work — are able to use a higher proportion of
regular shifts than at smaller workplaces, with less possibility of paid
non-working time occurring.
The risks of shiftwork to the health and safety of employees could be mitigated
by alternative rostering and leave arrangements. However, employers’ flexibility
in this respect is constrained by the order of engagement. Overtime rates of pay
create an incentive for permanent employees to volunteer for double headers.71
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There were marked reductions in gang sizes, manning scales and
manning levels in the Australian container stevedoring industry
during the Waterfront Industry Reform Authority (WIRA) process. All
the workplaces examined use continuous work shifts to achieve
higher elapsed rates and lower ship turnaround times. Down drivers
are being used more effectively than they were before the WIRA
process, contributing to a reduction in paid non-working time. Gang
sizes and manning scales for quay cranes and lashing are similar
across most of the workplaces examined, including Fergusson
Terminal in New Zealand. Constraints currently contributing to
higher manning levels of permanent employees include the
prescribed size and composition of workforces, the order of
engagement, the extent of leave and rostered time off, the costs and
difficulty of implementing redundancies, and restrictions on
contracting out.
Manning1 arrangements in selected Australian container stevedoring workplaces
are examined in this chapter. At the outset, it is important to distinguish between
manning scales and manning levels.
·  Manning scales specify the number of workers per gang required to
perform defined tasks such as operating heavy equipment (for example,
two drivers for one quay crane) or performing other duties such as lashing.
·  Manning levels refer to the total number of workers employed at a
workplace. They include permanent employees, guaranteed wage
employees and supplementary employees.
There is obviously a direct relationship between manning levels, gang size and
manning scales: an increase in manning scales translates into larger gangs and
higher manning levels (holding all other arrangements constant).
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Apart from manning scales (which, in principle, should be a function of
technology and health and safety considerations), the key determinants of
manning levels at any given container terminal include:
·  user demand for stevedoring services (that is, container throughput);
·  rostering and leave arrangements (such as rostered time off); and
·  the mix and use of permanent employees, guaranteed wage employees and
supplementary employees (which are largely based on the labour costs and
flexibility associated with each form of employment).
Changes in the demand and/or supply factors noted above create the impetus for
stevedoring workplaces to adjust manning levels. Inability or failure to adjust
manning levels when there are significant changes in these factors and work
arrangements will generally hinder workplace performance.
The appropriateness of current manning scales at container terminals in
Australia is a matter of contention. Several participants in this study claimed
that gang sizes are larger than necessary. In particular, some participants
commented that manning scales on heavy equipment could be further reduced.
However, management at some of the Australian workplaces examined
considered that manning scales had been reduced to minimum requirements in
the operational area.
Manning scales and gang sizes in selected Australian container terminals are
discussed in section 5.1. The main factors and work arrangements affecting
manning levels are discussed in section 5.2.
5.1 Gang sizes
The gang is the basic work unit at container terminals. There are generally
separate gangs for ship working, and for receival and delivery operations. In
ship working operations, each gang is assigned to a quay crane.
Work arrangements which affect gang size in ship working operations include:
·  whether there are continuous work shifts;
·  manning scales for heavy equipment; and
·  manning scales for other duties such as lashing.
Recent enterprise agreements at the Australian workplaces examined provide
scope for improved flexibility in manning scales. The enterprise agreements of
the Patrick workplaces state that ‘fixed manning scales shall not apply’. The
Patrick Brisbane enterprise agreement, for example, states that:5   MANNING
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Job mannings and work practices shall be relevant to the Company operations in
Fisherman Islands and aimed at progressing to comparable international best
practice. Fixed manning scales shall not apply. The parties have discussed,
agreed and recorded in an exchange of correspondence, indicative mannings for
various examples of stevedoring operations which will apply from the
commencement of the agreement. It is agreed that those mannings may be varied
from time to time to reflect changes consistent with safe work practices,
improved technology and new types of machinery or systems and to the levels of
productivity required by the Company and to the intent of the parties in Clause 6
of this Agreement [emphasis in original document]. (Patrick Brisbane Enterprise
Agreement 1996, clause 23)
In schedule 8 of the Patrick Brisbane agreement, indicative manning scales are
based on a ‘normal’ working situation. The agreement specifically states that
management can adjust manning scales upwards and downwards to meet
operational requirements. Indicative manning scales are provided for both
continuous and noncontinuous work shifts.
There are similar clauses formally allowing variation in manning scales in the
enterprise agreements of the other Australian workplaces examined
(appendix J). Such clauses signal the agreement of the parties to improve labour
flexibility compared with previous manning systems. However, the ease with
which management is able to adjust manning scales in practice to suit different
operational requirements is unclear.
Continuous work shifts
An important development in the past ten years has been the adoption of
continuous work shifts, which allow machinery to operate through rest breaks.2
This shift arrangement affects gang sizes and productivity in both ship working
and receival and delivery operations. All the workplaces examined, including
Fergusson Terminal in New Zealand, now operate continuous work shifts,
although noncontinuous work shifts are still used in some circumstances.
The main advantage of continuous work shifts is that ship and truck turnaround
times are reduced (improved timeliness). However, gang sizes are larger under
this shift arrangement. At one of the Australian workplaces examined, gangs on
this type of shift usually have an extra foreman and two extra general hands —
that is, an average gang size of 13 employees compared with 10 employees for
noncontinuous work shifts. Management at another Australian workplace also
noted that there is greater difficulty, under continuous work shifts, in efficiently
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orchestrating driver changeovers and assigning other duties to drivers for short
down periods. Continuous work shifts are described in greater detail in box 5.1.
For both continuous and noncontinuous work shifts, drivers of heavy equipment
are now expected to perform other duties during their down periods at all the
Australian workplaces examined. This is a significant improvement on the
arrangements existing before the WIRA process. Management at most of the
Australian workplaces examined confirmed that down drivers are being used
more effectively than in the past. This has reduced the extent of paid non-
working time compared with that prior to WIRA.
The enterprise agreements of Patrick Melbourne and Patrick Brisbane list
various activities that down drivers can perform. Straddle carrier down drivers
may perform a range of functions including lashing duties, plugging and
unplugging reefers, cleaning and washing duties, delivering vehicles to and
from the refuelling bay, and driving light equipment. Quay crane down drivers
do not normally perform lashing duties unless the exchange has been completed.
During down periods, quay crane drivers generally remain at the point of stow
and guide the crane.
At any given container terminal, gang sizes can vary from ‘ship to ship’
depending on a number of factors including: the type of shift arrangement
(continuous or noncontinuous); the number and type of equipment deployed;
and the difficulty and extent of the lashing task.
That said, typical gang sizes on continuous work shifts are broadly similar
across most of the workplaces examined, including Fergusson Terminal in New
Zealand (table  5.1). The number of drivers of heavy equipment (excluding
internal transfer vehicles) in a gang ranges from five to seven across the
workplaces, depending on equipment configuration. Patrick Brisbane usually
operates with two straddle carriers per gang. Unlike the other workplaces
examined, CTAL Sydney operates a different equipment configuration, using
rubber-tyred gantries and internal transfer vehicles instead of straddle carriers to
move containers around the yard.
Based on the typical gang compositions, Fergusson Terminal has fewer drivers
per gang than at Sea-Land Adelaide, P&O Ports Melbourne and Patrick
Melbourne which all have the same equipment configuration per gang (that is,
one quay crane and three straddle carriers). This reflects a lower manning scale
for straddle carriers at Fergusson Terminal. Down drivers at Fergusson
Terminal do not perform other duties during the shift. However, there is an
additional operational employee performing other duties for the entire shift.5   MANNING
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Box 5.1: Continuous and noncontinuous work shifts
The Australian workplaces examined use continuous work shifts which allow for
machinery to operate through rest breaks (that is, smoko and crib). On noncontinuous
work shifts, gang members stop for breaks at the same time. Management indicated that
a mix of continuous and noncontinuous work shifts were worked depending on the
availability of labour and the necessity to turn ships around quickly.
The number and length of breaks vary according to the length of shift worked. The
Stevedoring Industry Award 1991 prescribes paid rest periods totalling 45 minutes for
seven-hour shifts and 60 minutes for eight-hour shifts (clauses 25a and 25b). The most
common shift arrangement worked at the Australian workplaces examined is a shift of
seven-and-a-half hours with two rest periods. The first break is for 20 minutes and the
second is for 25 minutes.
Work may be organised to allow for the continuous working of equipment for the length
of a shift by staggering rest breaks (Stevedoring Industry Award, clause 25e).
Continuous work shifts normally require ‘hot seat’ changeovers — that is, a driver
continues working until the relief driver arrives. Drivers perform other duties during
their down periods. The figure below illustrates how work is typically organised to
operate one quay crane and three straddle carriers servicing the quay crane.
Continuous driving arrangements
Employee 1st period Smoko (20 minutes) 2nd period Crib (25 minutes) 3rd period
ENL ENL
1C r a n e x W W R G D x C r a n e
2G D x C r a n e x W W R G D
3 WWR x WWR x WWR
4 Str.1 x Str.3 x GD
5 Str.2 x GD x Str.1
6 Str.3 x GD x Str.2
7 GD x Str.1 x Str.3
8G D x S t r . 2 x G D
Notes:  Work breaks: E = early; N = normal;  L = late. WWR = work where required; Str. = straddle carrier;
GD = general duties; x = when the employee takes a break.
By working equipment continuously, stevedores are able to increase the use of
equipment during each shift. This leads to an increase in the number of containers moved
over each shift and reduces the time that a ship is worked at a terminal — that is, higher
elapsed rates (see glossary) and reduced ship turnaround times (improved timeliness).
Against these benefits are the costs of additional labour required for continuous working.
Sources:  Stevedoring Industry Award; enterprise agreements; detailed discussionsWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Table 5.1: Typical gang sizes per quay crane for continuous work














no. no. no. no. no. no.
Crane drivers 2 2 2 2 2 2
Straddle or
RTG driversc
53 5 4–5 3 4
General handsd 44 21 3 4
Foremen 1 2 3 2 2 2
Clerks 1 1 1 1–2 1–2 1
Total 13 12 13 10–12 11–12 13
a Stevedores indicated that gangs may be supplemented with additional employees to perform lashing duties
when the lashing job is large and/or difficult.
b Crane down driver works as a deck foreman.
c CTAL Sydney typically operates with two rubber-tyred gantries (RTGs) per quay crane and Patrick Brisbane
usually operates with two straddle carriers per quay crane. The other workplaces typically operate three straddle
carriers per quay crane.
d For CTAL Sydney, drivers of internal transfer vehicles are included in this category.
Source:  Workplace information requests
There have been reductions in gang sizes for continuous work shifts at most of
the Australian workplaces examined over the past ten years. Management at one
Australian workplace commented that gang sizes had been reduced
substantially. Smaller gang sizes primarily reflect reduced manning scales for
heavy equipment and other duties. The bulk of these reductions occurred as part
of the WIRA process (chapter 2).
The fact that gang sizes are similar across most of the Australian workplaces
examined could indicate, given current technology, that this is the most efficient
size. Alternatively, this result may reflect the presence of the same employee
bargaining agent at all the workplaces. Evidence that gang sizes at Fergusson
Terminal in New Zealand (which has recently undergone considerable reforms)
are equivalent to those at the Australian workplaces examined, supports the first
interpretation.
Manning scales for heavy equipment
Manning scales for heavy equipment indicate the number of drivers per gang
assigned to operate quay cranes, straddle carriers, rubber-tyred gantries and
internal transfer vehicles (see appendix C for a description of driving tasks).5   MANNING
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Overall, changes in driving arrangements have significantly contributed to
smaller gang sizes. Manning scales for quay cranes — two men for one crane —
remained unchanged during the WIRA process. However, manning scales
applying to straddle carriers, rubber-tyred gantries and internal transfer vehicles
were reduced from two operators for one machine to three operators for two
machines and five operators for three machines. This scale has been adopted by
all the Australian workplaces examined and represents a significant increase in
the ratio of machines to operators (table 5.2).








Type of heavy equipment
1 1 1.00 None –
1 2 0.50 Australian and
New Zealandb
Quay cranes
2 3 0.67 Australian Straddle carriers,
rubber-tyred gantries and
internal transfer vehicles
3 4 0.75 New Zealandb Straddle carriers
3 5 0.60 Australian Straddle carriers,
rubber-tyred gantries and
internal transfer vehicles
a Ratio of machines to operators.
b Fergusson Terminal.
Sources:  Enterprise agreements; workplace information requests
Current manning scales for quay cranes in Australia are equivalent to those at
Fergusson Terminal and several other overseas ports. Manning scales are one
man for one crane at some other international ports (table 5.3). In the case of
Singapore, where cranes are manned at one driver per crane, drivers have poorer
work conditions than do their Australian counterparts — in particular, they have
fewer and shorter rest breaks. The Metal Trades Industry Association response
to the Research Issues Brief noted that at the port of Singapore:
... crane drivers spent their whole eight hour shift alone in the crane, with not
even toilet breaks. They enjoy a fifteen minute break for lunch, which is sent up
to them in a bucket. (response 9, annexure E, p. 15)
Manning scales for other heavy equipment at Australian terminals are somewhat
greater than those at Fergusson Terminal. Straddle carriers are manned at the
rate of four operators for three machines at Fergusson Terminal, compared withWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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five  for  three manning at the Australian workplaces examined (table 5.2).3
Manning scales are not formally specified at Fergusson Terminal.
Table 5.3: Manning scales for quay cranes at selected Australian and
overseas ports, 1997
Port Country Manning scalea
Adelaideb Australia two for one
Aucklandc New Zealand two for one
Klang Malaysia one for one
Los Angeles United States two for one
Nagoya Japan two for one
Philadelphia United States two for one
Singapore Singapore one for one
Tilbury United Kingdom one for one
a The manning scale for each port (except for Adelaide and Auckland) was derived from the number of crane
drivers per gang and is based on the assumption of one crane per gang.
b Down driver works as a deck foreman.
c Fergusson Terminal.
Sources:  TCS (1997b); workplace information requests
There is apparently rarely any deviation from the manning scales on heavy
equipment specified in enterprise agreements. In detailed discussions,
management at the Australian workplaces examined indicated that this is
because the manning scales for heavy equipment are appropriate for most
operational circumstances.
One manager commented that the three for two manning system for heavy
equipment works most effectively during the day shift, when down drivers are
fully utilised, but during some evening and night shifts there may not be
sufficient work for down drivers to perform. Another manager noted that often
fewer employees are required during shift extensions, but typically the same
gang size is maintained during the extension (chapter 8).
                                             
3  As noted earlier, typical gang sizes are similar at Fergusson Terminal and the Australian
workplaces examined because an additional employee is allocated to the gang at Fergusson
Terminal to perform other duties.5   MANNING
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Manning scales for lashing duties
The typical manning scale for lashing duties at the Australian workplaces
examined is three or four employees (see appendix C for a description of the
lashing task). Enterprise agreements of the Patrick workplaces, for example,
specify that lashing duties will be performed by a minimum of three employees
under the general supervision of the foreman of the ship being lashed. At
Patrick Brisbane, a lashing team may comprise three employees including a
foreman.
There is formal flexibility to adjust the number of employees assigned to lashing
duties. For example, the Sea-Land Enterprise Agreement 1997 states that ‘the
number of employees required for lashing/unlashing shall be in accordance with
real operational requirements’ (clause 9z). And, the enterprise agreement for
Patrick Brisbane specifies that:
All other employees including the WWR [work where required], down drivers,
clerical and G5/G6 foremen will perform lashing duties as required. The
Company may supplement this activity with additional personnel as necessary.
(Patrick Brisbane Enterprise Agreement 1996, schedule 8a)
The Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) noted that if a stevedore requires more
people to perform lashing duties to finish an exchange, this is achievable under
the terms of the enterprise agreement. Similarly, management at a large
Australian terminal commented that if lashing on certain ships is difficult (as a
result of ship configuration and lashing gear)4, extra employees will perform
lashing duties. Some workplaces will assign yard employees to assist with
lashing.
However, several participants contended that sometimes an insufficient number
of employees were allocated to lashing duties. In detailed discussions, it was
claimed that more men, while needed for lashing duties on large exchanges to
increase crane productivity, were not always made available by management.
One reason for this apparent undermanning may be that management must take
into account labour costs as well as crane productivity when deciding the
number of employees performing lashing duties. Higher manning scales for
lashing duties may increase crane productivity, but they also add to labour costs.
The difficulty of the lashing task is often not known until the ship arrives at the
terminal, so management at the Australian workplaces examined generally
pre-allocates three or four employees to perform lashing duties. This is similar
to lashing arrangements at Fergusson Terminal. If the lashing task is deemed
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substantial and/or difficult once the ship arrives, management indicated that
they re-assign employees working elsewhere at the terminal to lashing duties.
The ‘nick’
Large gang sizes in ship working operations often used to lead to some workers
leaving work early without permission, while still being paid for the full shift.
This is one form of what is known as the ‘nick’ (box 5.2). It generally occurred
because there was insufficient work to fully occupy all gang members. The
likelihood of employees leaving work early without permission has generally
been higher on night and evening shifts, because there are fewer alternative
duties to perform and less supervision.
It is difficult to gather direct evidence on the current extent and frequency of
this practice. Management at most of the Australian workplaces examined noted
that several factors (such as reduced manning scales and greater supervision)
have combined to reduce its incidence. However, recent suspensions and
dismissals make it clear that it has not been completely eliminated. In late 1997,
for example, Patrick dismissed two employees5 in Fremantle for allegedly
‘nicking off’ and CTAL Sydney placed three employees on notice after they
were allegedly caught off the terminal (Farynski 1997a, p. 1).
The instant dismissal of a Patrick employee at Darling Harbour for allegedly
nicking off was considered by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission
(AIRC). The AIRC viewed Patrick’s policy on the nick as unduly harsh for a
first offence and recommended that the employee be re-instated. It also
recommended that Patrick amend its policy and that ‘in the case of repeated
breach, termination should be determined having regard to the circumstances of
each case’ (box 5.3).
In a recent media release, the MUA stated that it ‘does not condone its members
‘nicking’ off the job before the end of shift’ and that ‘the nick is not union
policy’ (MUA 1997c).
Nonetheless, to the extent that this practice has continued, it may indicate scope
for lower manning scales on certain shifts.
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5.2 Manning levels
Manning levels in stevedoring declined markedly as a result of the WIRA
process (appendix F). The estimated number of stevedoring employees for 1997
(chapter 2) indicates that manning levels have risen since WIRA, but are
Box 5.2: The ‘nick’
The nick is the term used to describe the situation whereby employees leave a shift early
while still being paid for the full shift. There are several forms of the nick. Employees
may leave their duties and the terminal:
·  without permission;
·  under the ‘job and finish’; or
·  under the ‘quota’.
Under the job and finish arrangement, employees in the gang may decide to increase
their work rate and finish the job (that is, the exchange) part way through the shift.
Under the quota arrangement, the supervisor sets a target level of output (that is, the
number of containers to be moved). Once this target has been met, the employees are
allowed to leave the terminal. In both cases, there is a tacit agreement between the
supervisor and the gang members.
The first form of the nick listed above may cause a loss in productivity in terms of the
time that employees are not at the workplace to perform their duties. The job and finish
and the ‘quota’ arrangements may be viewed as incentive tools which raise work rates
and crane productivity over the hours actually worked. However, if there are more
containers to be moved, other ships to be worked, or other duties that could be performed
during the balance of the shift, productivity is ultimately lost under these informal
practices. In both cases, the nick results in paid non-working time.
It is difficult to gather direct evidence on the incidence over time of employees leaving
work early without permission. According to most of the Australian workplaces
examined, its incidence has been reduced. Factors that appear to have contributed to the
decline include:
·  penalties for leaving the workplace without permission (such as the ‘docking of
pay’ and dismissal);
·  greater allocation of other duties for workers when there is a lack of activity in the
working of ships; and
·  a reduction in manning scales.
Despite the apparent fall in the incidence of the nick, detailed discussions with some
participants suggests that the practice has not been eliminated.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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significantly below pre-WIRA levels. This increase may reflect a number of
factors, including growth in international trade as well as the operation of work
arrangements.
Box 5.3: A recent alleged case of the ‘nick’
In September 1997, Patrick dismissed an employee at Darling Harbour who had
allegedly ‘nicked off’ (that is, leaving work early without permission). In the preceding
month, Patrick had issued a notice to all employees stating that ‘the company would not
tolerate the ‘nick’ any further’ and that ‘any person found to have nicked will not be
warned but be instantly dismissed’.
The dismissed employee alleged that the termination was unjust. The matter went before
the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) for resolution. Patrick argued
that the employee had nicked off whereas the employee contended that he had left the
workplace without permission owing to ‘pressing domestic circumstances’.
The AIRC ruled that the ‘implementation of a policy of instant dismissal in these
circumstances is harsh, particularly where mitigating circumstances exist such as those
in this case. The fact that employees were advised of this new policy does not render it
less harsh or unjust’.
The AIRC recommended the reinstatement of the dismissed employee. It also directed
Patrick to amend its policy regarding the nick to provide for the suspension of an
employee without pay for the first offence and for an employee to be warned in writing
that any further occurrence is likely to lead to termination.
Source:  AIRC (1997b)
Stevedores face a number of constraints in determining the level and mix of
labour to meet variable demand. A number of work arrangements (as currently
designed) are likely to contribute to high manning levels in terms of permanent
employees at the Australian workplaces examined. These include:
·  prescribed size and composition of labour;
·  the order of engagement;
·  the extent of leave and rostered time off;
·  the costs and difficulty of implementing redundancies; and
·  restrictions on contracting out.
These constraints result in higher levels of permanent labour and the underuse
of supplementary employees. In turn, they can lead to reduced productivity and
associated higher labour costs.5   MANNING
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The number of permanent employees by grade level and/or function are
prescribed in the enterprise agreements of the Australian workplaces examined
(see box 5.4 for a typical example). However,  the agreements also include
provisions to enable adjustment of the size and composition of the workforce
during the course of the agreement under certain circumstances. The Patrick
Melbourne enterprise agreement, for example, states:
It is agreed to review the agreement and/or the size and composition of the
workforce in the event of any loss of business or facilities or through the
introduction of change in accordance with clause 43 of the Award. (1996,
clause 8)
Box 5.4:   Workforce size and composition, P&O Ports Melbourne
The enterprise agreement of P&O Ports Melbourne prescribes the size and composition
of the permanent operational workforce. The following table shows the number of
permanent employees by grade and function in the operational area.
Grade
3456 T o t a l
Operations 231
Foremen 16 18 34
Clerks 32 3 5 40
   Operations Head Clerks 5 5
   Operations Clerks 30 30
   Allocators 3 3
   Payroll Clerks 2 2
General 110 32 142
   Key Crane Operators 32 32
   Straddle Drivers 76 76
   General Duties etc 24 24
   Support Services etc 10 10
Reefer Attendants 10 10
Watchmen 5 5
Maintenance 52
General 12 36 50
a
  Mechanical Leading Hand etc 22 22
  Electrical Leading Hand etc 14 14
  Trades Assistants 10 10
  Storemen 2 2
  Ungraded Apprentices 2
Clerks 2 2
Total Operational 283
a  Includes 48 graded employees and two ungraded employees.
Source:  P&O Ports Melbourne Enterprise Agreement (1996)WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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This provision potentially lessens the constraint placed on the ability of
workplaces to alter manning levels to meet changing operational requirements.
Nevertheless, consultation requirements (contained in clause 43 of the award)
can restrict or delay managerial responses to change.6
As noted in chapter 2, each stevedore maintains a pool of supplementary labour.
The number of new supplementary employees to be recruited is prescribed in
some enterprise agreements. The pool size ranges from 6 per cent to 18 per cent
of the workforces in the Australian workplaces examined (table 5.4). However,
as discussed in chapter 4, the order of engagement at most of the Australian
workplaces examined gives preference to using permanent employees for
overtime rather than using supplementary employees. This restricts the use of
supplementary employees in terms of the number of shifts worked per week.









Sea-Land Adelaide 80 6 14
CTAL Sydney 81 9 10
P&O Ports Melbourne 84 15 1
Patrick Melbourne 89 7 4
Patrick Brisbaned 77 18 5
a These percentages can be influenced by the size of the supplementary pool that each workplace chooses to
maintain — the size of the pool may not reflect the actual use of supplementary labour.
b Trainees are counted as permanent employees.
c Weekly use of supplementary employees (in terms of the number of shifts worked) may differ between
workplaces.
d Operational employees at Patrick Brisbane (Fisherman Islands) also carry out some break bulk operations.
Source:  Workplace information requests
Given the limited number of shifts that can be allocated to supplementary
employees, management at one Australian workplace noted that it was
preferable to distribute these shifts to a smaller pool of supplementary
employees so they have an incentive to remain with the enterprise. This also
allows the supplementary employees to build up more skills and experience
compared with employees in a larger supplementary pool.
                                             
6  The Workplace Relations Act enables the AIRC to make orders in cases where the
employer fails to consult the union about terminating the employment of 15 or more
employees for reasons of an economic, technological, structural or similar nature.
(s.170GA).5   MANNING
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In New Zealand, there is considerable variation in the mix of permanent and
casual employees at different stevedoring workplaces. Casual employees
comprise almost 100 per cent of the workforce at International Stevedoring
Operations in Tauranga, but only around 10 per cent of the workforce at
Fergusson Terminal in Auckland.7
As noted in chapter 8, the extent of leave and rostered time off means that
permanent employees at the Australian workplaces examined are not available
to work a significant number of shifts. This has generally added to manning
levels, because additional employees are required to cover the periods when
permanent employees are not available. Employee availability is lower at the
Australian workplaces examined (52–56 per cent) than at Fergusson Terminal
(62 per cent) as a result of these provisions (table 5.5).





P&O Ports Melbourne 56
Patrick Melbourne 56
Patrick Brisbane 52
Fergusson Terminal Auckland 62
a The number of days per year (calculated as a percentage) that an employee is required to work, taking account
of annual leave, sick leave, rostered days off, rostered weeks off and accrued days. The measure does not
account for working days lost as a result of industrial action (which would also affect employee availability).
Sources:  Enterprise agreements; workplace information requests
Recent changes in market share among stevedoring companies have given rise
to surplus labour and the requirement for redundancies at some Australian
workplaces. P&O Ports in Brisbane, for example, has lost business to Patrick
(MUA 1997d, p.  16). This has resulted in excess labour at the P&O Ports
terminal. P&O Ports reached agreement with the various maritime unions for
28 employees to be made redundant during 1997. Similarly, surplus labour has
emerged at Patrick Melbourne, reflecting reduced business; the AIRC noted that
                                             
7  The workforce estimate for Fergusson Terminal includes a proportion of maintenance
employees at the Ports of Auckland but does not include all clerical employees. The
estimate is based on the ratio of TEU throughput of Fergusson Terminal to TEU
throughput of the Ports of Auckland.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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‘it was common ground between the parties that more than 100 of the current
employees are surplus to requirements’ (Farynski 1997b, p. 1).
As discussed in detail in chapter 6, the ability of stevedores to retrench
permanent employees is heavily constrained by redundancy costs and the
possibility of industrial action. As a result, employees who are surplus to
requirements in one area of operations are often retained by the company in
another capacity. Computerisation of vehicle booking systems, for example, has
reduced the number of clerks required at workplaces. In many cases, these
clerks have been retrained to perform other tasks such as operating heavy
equipment.
Stevedores are also limited in their use of contracting out. The enterprise
agreements of all the Australian workplaces examined do not permit the use of
contractors where their use will reduce the number of permanent tradesmen.
Several managers noted the potential for further cost savings from contracting
out activities such as ancillary and maintenance services (chapter 6). If more
extensive use of contracting out were possible, this would be likely to reduce
manning levels of permanent employees as well as reducing labour costs.
5.3 Summary of findings
There were marked reductions in gang sizes, manning scales and manning levels
in the Australian container stevedoring industry during the WIRA process.
All the Australian workplaces examined have adopted continuous work shifts in
ship working and receival and delivery operations, to achieve higher elapsed
rates and lower ship and truck turnaround times — that is, improved timeliness.
However, against these benefits are the costs of additional labour (that is, larger
gang sizes) which is required for continuous working.
Down drivers are being used more effectively than in the past. These employees
now perform a wider range of duties, reducing the extent of paid non-working
time compared with that existing before the WIRA process.
Typical gang sizes in Australian container terminals are comparable to those at
Fergusson Terminal in New Zealand. Manning scales for quay cranes and other
heavy equipment are the same across the Australian workplaces examined and
broadly similar to those at Fergusson Terminal. Manning scales for lashing are
similar across the workplaces examined.
Enterprise agreements at the Australian workplaces examined formally provide
for flexibility in manning scales. However, the ease with which management is
able to adjust manning scales in practice to suit different operational5   MANNING
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requirements is unclear. At any rate, it appears that manning scales, as currently
applied, are appropriate for most operational situations.
The constraints that are likely to contribute to high manning levels of permanent
employees at the Australian workplaces examined include: the prescribed size
and composition of workforces; the order of engagement; the extent of leave
and rostered time off; the cost and difficulty of implementing redundancies; and
restrictions on contracting out. In particular, the high cost of redundancies has
reduced stevedores’ ability to adjust manning levels and acted as a disincentive
to recruiting permanent labour. It could also undermine permanent employees’
incentives to perform. Progress has been made in reducing overmanning in
stevedoring over the past decade, but these constraints still contribute to higher
overall labour costs and reduced labour productivity.89
6 RECRUITMENT, REDUNDANCY AND
CONTRACTING
Union membership among operational employees remains
comprehensive in the Australian container stevedoring workplaces
examined. Since the adoption of enterprise bargaining, union
involvement in the recruitment process has diminished.
The high cost of redundancies restricts the ability of stevedores to
adjust manning levels of permanent employees. Industrial disputation
is a significant further deterrent to initiating redundancies. The cost
of redundancy and the possibility of industrial disputation contribute
to retention of surplus labour. This lowers productivity and inhibits
recruitment. Some ancillary services are contracted out, but the
extent of contracting is limited by provisions in enterprise
agreements as well as constraints on downsizing the number of
permanent employees.
The size of the permanent workforce can be adjusted through the use of
recruitment and redundancy measures and contracting. These measures can be
used separately or in tandem to change the number of people employed, as well
as to change workforce composition in terms of skills, age and attitudes.
Arrangements at the Australian container stevedoring workplaces examined
relating to recruitment, redundancy and contracting and their impacts are
discussed in this chapter.
6.1 Recruitment
Recruitment may occur to meet expanding demand, to fill skill gaps and to
replace employee retirements or resignations. As noted in chapter 2, workplaces
can recruit several different types of labour, including permanent employees,
guaranteed wage employees, trainee stevedoring employees and supplementary
employees.
The Stevedoring Industry Award 1991 gives employment preference to union
members or workers who agreed to become members on commencingWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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employment. Several of the enterprise agreements (for example, Sea-Land
Adelaide and P&O Ports Melbourne) state that recruitment preference will
apply in accordance with the award. However, as a result of the Workplace
Relations Act 1996, union preference cannot legally be enforced. Nevertheless,
union membership among operational employees at the Australian workplaces
examined continues to be comprehensive. There have been aborted attempts to
employ non-union labour at ports in Fremantle, Portland and Cairns in recent
years. The attempt to use non-union labour on the Cairns waterfront was halted
by the possibility of industrial action in overseas ports (box 6.1).
Box 6.1: International union links
From 10 September 1997, International Purveyors undertook to do its own stevedoring at
the port of Cairns for the ship Java Sea. The company employed two staff, one
supervisor and a consultant to do the work previously done by nine members of the
Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) who were employed by Northern Shipping
Stevedoring.
International Purveyors is a subsidiary of Freeport Indonesia, a US-owned mining
company in Irian Jaya. Freeport ships all of its supplies from Australia through Cairns.
The MUA responded by establishing picket lines at Cairns, and contacted the
International Transport Federation (ITF), of which the MUA is a member. The ITF
pressured the Java Sea not to berth in Cairns, or risk ITF bans on the ship owner’s larger
international operations. International Purveyors subsequently lifted the redundancy
orders on the seven full-time employees and negotiated with the MUA about changing its
work arrangements.
Sources:  Sharp (1997); Ramsey (1997); Norington (1997); Trinca (1997)
During the Waterfront Industry Reform Authority (WIRA) process, recruitment
levels were low (appendix  F), although recruitment has increased in recent
times. Time series data on recruitment at the workplace and industry levels are
not readily available. However, around 300 new employees were reported to
have been recruited to the stevedoring industry in 1994 (MUA 1994a, p. 5).
These included permanent employees, guaranteed wage employees and trainee
stevedoring employees. In addition, the permanent workforces at two of the
Australian workplaces examined increased between 1994 and 1997 (table 6.1).
Sea-Land Adelaide and CTAL Sydney have also recruited new guaranteed wage
employees and supplementary employees in recent years.6   RECRUITMENT, REDUNDANCY AND CONTRACTING
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Sea-Land Adelaide 68 93
CTAL Sydney 273 323
a Permanent employees.
Sources:  Workplace information requests; enterprise agreements
Apart from enforcing the union preference clause, maritime unions had
substantial input into the recruitment of labour before the WIRA process
(appendix F). Since the adoption of enterprise bargaining in the early 1990s,
union involvement in recruitment has greatly diminished. The MUA noted in
the detailed discussions that, as a result of the WIRA process, it no longer has
any involvement in recruitment. Management at several of the Australian
workplaces examined also noted that the recruitment process is generally free
from union involvement, although the MUA can and does make representations
to management.
The Australian workplaces examined have implemented competitive, merit
based recruitment and promotion systems. The enterprise agreement at P&O
Ports Melbourne, for example, states that:
Employees shall have the opportunity to compete for employment and career
advancement on the basis of their skills, ability and knowledge, i.e., the merit
principle. (P&O Ports Melbourne Enterprise Agreement 1996, clause 1.8)
Recently, candidates for operational positions at Patrick workplaces were
screened by a contracted employment agency and subjected to aptitude, medical
and fitness tests. The Australian workplaces examined use internal and/or
external advertising of vacant positions followed by shortlisting, interviews,
selection and appointment. New operational employees are sourced from the
general labour market and need not possess previous experience in the
stevedoring industry. Guaranteed wage employees and supplementary
employees are often successful applicants for full-time permanent positions
because they have skills and experience immediately applicable to the industry.
Management recruitment is conducted in a similar manner to executive selection
in other industries, being sourced from competitor stevedores, other industries
or supervisory employees. Supervisors are generally sourced from seagoing
personnel, transfers from other terminals, internal operational employees
(primarily foremen) or direct recruitment.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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6.2 Redundancy
Manning levels may need to be adjusted by stevedores from time to time for a
variety of reasons — for example, varying demand as a result of contracts
changing hands, changing technology or company amalgamations. This section
considers the ability of stevedores to reduce the manning levels of permanent
employees through redundancy.
Provisions relating to the redundancy process for all stevedores are specified in
retirement and redundancy agreements. These agreements set out the procedures
and the scale of entitlements for redundancies. They were negotiated on a
company by company basis with the unions in 1992 following the final report of
WIRA. The agreements replaced the special early retirement and redundancy
package which applied over the three years to 31 October 1992.
Retirement and redundancy agreements are contained within the Patrick and
Sea-Land enterprise agreements. The Conaust/CTAL Retirement and
Redundancy Agreement 1992 is a separate document which applies to both
P&O Ports Melbourne and CTAL Sydney.
The agreements specify that volunteers must be called for a redundancy
declaration if redundancies are being offered. The stevedore can declare the
skill mix required for redundancies — for example, five crane drivers, three
clerks and so on — however, individuals cannot be nominated. Redundancies
are voluntary, so it would be coincidental if the stevedore’s skill requirements
matched those of the workforce following the processing of employee
redundancy applications. Under the agreement, the stevedore has the right to
turn down redundancy applications on the grounds of maintaining the necessary
levels of skills within the workplace. However, any change to the skill mix of
nominated redundancies must be by consent between management and
employees (represented by the relevant union) and is likely to involve the AIRC.
The outcome may be voluntary redundancies (with entitlements specified in
table 6.2) or retrenchments, with the same entitlements as redundancies.
The agreements are prescriptive (box 6.2), time consuming and difficult for
stevedores to implement, unless they are willing to accept skill imbalances,
which must impact adversely on workplace performance.
Under WIRA, 4479 stevedoring employees accepted the retirement and
redundancy package offered. There have been few redundancies since the
introduction of the retirement and redundancy agreements. P&O Ports recently6   RECRUITMENT, REDUNDANCY AND CONTRACTING
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More recently, Patrick Melbourne declared 100 employees surplus to
requirements as a result of a downturn in demand (Farynski 1997b, p. 1). Patrick
                                             
1  Australian Stevedores was renamed Patrick The Australian Stevedore in early 1995.
Box 6.2: Retirement and redundancy agreements
The retirement and redundancy agreements are prescriptive in nature and several pages
in length. The following is an excerpt from the agreement applying at P&O Ports
Melbourne and CTAL Sydney, but is typical of agreements at the Australian workplaces
examined.
REDUNDANCY SITUATIONS
Upon the declaration of a redundancy situation by the company, volunteers for 
retirement/redundancy shall be sought from employees in the redundant positions in the 
following order and scale of entitlements:
a) for employees aged 58 years or more with 15 years or more service, the entitlement 
shall be 57% of the remaining weeks to age 65 years with a maximum entitlement of 
148 weeks payment at the award rate of pay;
b) for employees aged 45 years or more with 8 years or more service the entitlement shall 
be 50% of the remaining weeks to age 65 with a maximum entitlement of 130 weeks 
payment at the award rate of pay;
c) for employees aged 35 years or more with 4 years or more service the entitlement shall 
be 45% of the remaining weeks to age 65 with a maximum entitlement of 104 weeks 
payment at the award rate of pay; and
d) for employees aged under 35 years or for other employees with less than 4 years 
service the entitlement shall be 40% of the remaining weeks to age 65 with a 
maximum entitlement of 78 weeks payment at the award rate of pay.
The application of the above procedures and acceptance of volunteers by the company shall 
be conditional upon maintaining the necessary level of skills required within the company.
In the event that sufficient volunteers are not forthcoming as a result of the application of the 
above procedures, the companies, the unions and employees shall confer prior to the 
companies exercising any intended necessary retrenchments.
This is only part of the retirement and redundancy agreement. There are also sections on
early retirement, and vacancies and redeployment.
Source: Conaust/CTAL Retirement and Redundancy Agreement (1992)
made 28 employees in Brisbane redundant. Australian Stevedores1 encountered
significant difficulties in implementing redundancies (either voluntary or
involuntary) under the retirement and redundancy agreement. This is highlighted
by the ‘case of 55’ (box 6.3). This and other cases involving the potential
redundancy of permanent labour indicate a strong likelihood of industrial
disputation over this issue. Industrial disputation is a significant potential cost of
initiating redundancies.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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will also have surplus labour at its Sydney terminal, resulting from a change to
less labour-intensive technology. But Patrick, and any other stevedore wanting
to implement a large number of redundancies, must consider the other costs,
apart from the possibility of industrial disputation.
Redundancy entitlements specified in the retirement and redundancy agreements
are related to age and/or years of service (table 6.2). The scale of entitlements is
identical across the workplaces examined. There is a payment rate for each
age/years service category, which is applied to the number of weeks between the
employee’s current age and age  65 years. The weeks calculated under this
formula cannot exceed the specified maximum. Each week is paid at the award
rate. However, for each category, the maximum entitlement would apply in all
cases except where employees are aged in their early 60s.
The retirement and redundancy agreements apply to both MUA members
(operational employees, grades 1–6) and Australian Maritime Officers Union
(AMOU) members (supervisors). Patrick estimated that across all its Australian
workplaces, the average redundancy payment would be $73  000 for MUA
members and $190  000 for AMOU members.2 The maximum payouts were
                                             
2  Estimates at June 1997.
Box 6.3: Stevedoring redundancies — the case of 55
Australian Stevedores attempted to make 55 employees redundant in 1994 following the
merger of several stevedoring companies. This led to substantial industrial disputation
(table 2.6). Mr Peter Evans (who was the chairman of the Waterfront Industry Reform
Authority, 1989-92) reported on the dispute to the then Minister for Transport and
Industrial Relations. Mr Evans found that consultation between the employer, union and
employees prior to commencing retrenchments — as required by the retirement and
redundancy agreement — did not occur.
The matter went before the AIRC for resolution. The AIRC directed the company to
re-instate the employees and directed the union to lift all bans and limitations on work
and take no further industrial action while the matter was being resolved (AIRC 1994a).
In a subsequent decision, the AIRC stated that it appeared ‘all parties now acknowledge
that the figure of 55 is correct as being surplus to the company’s requirements in
Sydney’. The AIRC then set out the procedure to be followed for redundancies in this
case (AIRC 1994b). Under the amended procedure, 36  employees ultimately took
redundancies and six employees were transferred to another workplace.
Sources:  AIRC (1994a, 1994b); Evans (1994); workplace information request6   RECRUITMENT, REDUNDANCY AND CONTRACTING
95
estimated at $110  000 and $230  000 for MUA and AMOU members
respectively.
Table 6.2: Redundancy payments in the stevedoring industry
Age and years’ service Payment ratea Maximum payment
% weeks
Aged less than 35 years, or less than four years’
service
40 78
Aged 35 years or more with four or more years’
service
45 104
Aged 45 years or more with eight or more years’
service
50 130
Aged 58 years or more with 15 or more years’
service
57 148
a The redundancy payment (in terms of weeks of award pay) is calculated as the relevant payment rate multiplied
by the number of weeks remaining before the employee reaches age 65 years.
Source:  Retirement and redundancy agreements
The costs to the stevedore of making an employee redundant are high. For
example, an employee aged 58 years with 15 years service would be entitled to a
redundancy payment equivalent to 148 weeks pay. Redundancy payments are
substantial even for employees with short periods of service. For example, an
employee (any age under 60) with three years service would be entitled to
78  weeks pay (table 6.2). A large number of redundancies could therefore
impose a heavy financial burden on the stevedore.
In addition, employees are also entitled to accumulated sick leave, annual leave
(with loading), long service leave (with loading) and superannuation
entitlements.
Thus, while Australian Stevedores was prepared to trade these costs in favour of
reducing the surplus of permanent employees in 1994, Patrick faces a
substantially higher redundancy cost today because the number of potential
surplus employees is much higher.
The stevedoring redundancy entitlement markedly exceeds that for employees
under the National Building and Construction Industry Award 1990, the
Transport Workers Award 1983, the Storage Services — General — Interim
Award 1990 and the Metal Industry Award 1984. These awards specify a
maximum of eight weeks pay in total — compared to 148 weeks in stevedoring
— for four or more years of service (table 6.3). The redundancy entitlements inWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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these awards are based on an AIRC test case (Termination, Change and
Redundancy case (1984) 8 IR 34).




National Building and Construction Industry
Award 1990
Maximum eight weeks for four years or more
service
Transport Workers Award 1983 Maximum eight weeks for four years or more
service
Storage Services — General — Interim
Award 1990
Maximum eight weeks for four years or more
service
Metal Industry Award 1984 Maximum eight weeks for four years or more
service
a For more detail see appendix J and the awards.
b Enterprise agreements are generally more favourable, providing for at least two weeks for each year of service
up to a specified or negotiated maximum.
Sources:  Various awards; enterprise agreements
However, in the industries in table 6.3, redundancy entitlements specified in
enterprise agreements (or negotiated when redundancy situations arise) are
usually more favourable than those specified in their respective awards.
Enterprise agreements normally provide for at least two weeks base pay for each
year of service, often limited to a specified maximum. If an employee was
entitled to two weeks pay for each year of service, with no cap, and had 40 years
of service, he or she would receive 80 weeks pay. Only certain combinations of
weeks pay per year of service, length of service and maximum payouts would
result in redundancy payments approaching the maximum payouts potentially
available to stevedoring employees. For example, this could occur where an
enterprise agreement specified four weeks base pay for each year of service;
eligible employees had 37  years of service; and no maximum applied to
redundancy entitlements below 148 weeks.
The high costs of redundancy in stevedoring not only restrict the ability to
reduce the levels of permanent employees, but also limit the opportunities of
those outside the stevedoring industry to enter by reducing the willingness of
stevedores to increase the number of permanent employees. Management at one
Australian workplace indicated reluctance to recruit more permanent labour
given its obligations under the retirement and redundancy agreement. The
company would prefer to employ supplementary employees, but hiring and use
of supplementary employees is restricted under enterprise agreements
(chapter 5). According to management at another Australian workplace:6   RECRUITMENT, REDUNDANCY AND CONTRACTING
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The Retirement and Redundancy Agreement has onerous redundancy clauses. It
is the biggest deterrent to making employees permanent. The liabilities are huge.
The retirement and redundancy agreements also limit the stevedores’ ability to
allocate the best person to the job. Management at several workplaces noted that
some clerks, when made surplus by the introduction of the computerised vehicle
booking system, were retrained and redeployed to perform other tasks such as
straddle carrier driving. This is because it was less costly than offering them
redundancy packages. However, in terms of labour productivity, it may have
been more efficient if the clerks had been given redundancy packages and
people with the best skills and aptitude for operational areas were employed
instead (appendix C).
Stevedores cannot nominate specific employees for redundancy, so the outcome
may be that some of the most productive employees accept redundancy
packages while less productive employees remain. However, this can also occur
in unionised workplaces in other industries: few employers have absolute
discretion in determining which specific employees will be made redundant.
The retirement and redundancy agreements are due to expire in late 1999. If
such provisions remain, workplace performance will continue to be impeded.
6.3 Contracting
Provisions in enterprise agreements relating to the use of contractors and the
current extent of contracting in the Australian container stevedoring workplaces
examined are discussed in this section.
An overview of the general issues associated with contracting and an analysis of
the costs and benefits in a number of case studies can be found in IC (1996).
For the Australian stevedoring workplaces examined, an important issue is
whether management is able to outsource activities where it is deemed to be
more efficient than in-house provision.
There is a general absence of provisions in enterprise agreements which either
allow or preclude the contracting of functions except in the case of
maintenance. Most agreements specifically allow the use of contractors for
maintenance activities when the in-house skills, equipment and number of
workers are insufficient to meet requirements (appendix J). The enterprise
agreement at Patrick Brisbane states that contractors may be used when
‘equipment or skills are not available to perform the required task’ or when ‘a
heavy short term work load arises which is beyond the normal capacity of theWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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maintenance garage’ (schedule 2). The P&O Ports Melbourne and CTAL
Sydney agreements have similar provisions.
Most enterprise agreements generally allow the contracting of non-equipment
maintenance services, except where existing activities are currently performed
by terminal employees. Non-equipment maintenance covers the repair and
maintenance of buildings, fences, paving, underground services and other
facilities.
Some enterprise agreements also specify that contracting should not reduce the
number of permanent tradesmen employed by the company. The enterprise
agreement at P&O Ports Melbourne states that:
WSCD [West Swanson Container Division] undertakes that the agreement
reached as to the number of permanent tradesmen and their conditions of
employment will not be diminished by the use of contract labour. The use of such
contracting for the repair and maintenance of terminal equipment and facilities is
not designed to replace permanent employees. (P&O Ports Melbourne Enterprise
Agreement 1996, clause 3.8)
Provisions which formally preclude contracting where it would reduce the
permanent workforce limit management’s ability to outsource functions. Even
for enterprise agreements without these provisions — where contracting out
certain functions requires redundancies — the costs and difficulties associated
with implementing such measures may constrain stevedores from proceeding.
While such provisions may restrict the scope to reduce permanent workforce
numbers, they are less likely to constrain stevedores from using contractors to
provide new rather than existing services. For example, Patrick Melbourne uses
external contractors to operate its computerised truck booking system.
Previously, when there was no booking system, trucks were loaded and
unloaded on a ‘first come, first served’ basis, resulting in long and costly (to the
exporter or importer) truck queues (ISC 1989a).
There is contracting out of some services such as building maintenance, major
line marking work, office cleaning and security services at the Australian
workplaces examined (table 6.4). Apart from occasional outsourcing of large
specialised maintenance work, there is no regular use of contractors in the
maintenance3 of equipment. And there is no contracting out of stevedoring
functions such as the driving of heavy equipment and lashing duties.
                                             
3 Includes preventive and breakdown maintenance.6   RECRUITMENT, REDUNDANCY AND CONTRACTING
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Office cleaning yes no no yes yes yes
Work area cleaning no no no yesa no yes
Security nob no yes no no yes
Maintenance:
– buildings yes yes yes yes yes yes
– quay cranes noc no noc no no no
– other heavy
   equipment
noc no noc no no no
– other vehicles noc no noc noc no no
L a s h i n g n o n o n on on on o
Truck booking
system
na no no yes na no
Reefer monitoring yes no no no no no
Line marking
(major)
yes yes yes yes yes yes
a Some outsourcing occurs.
b Service outsourced when no other employees are working onsite.
c On occasions large specialised work is outsourced.
na Not applicable.
Source:  Workplace information requests
Apart from difficulties due to union resistance, managers indicated that there
were also other reasons for the continued in-house provision of some services,
including:
·  additional duties may be required so that down drivers and other gang
members are fully occupied through the shift; and
·  ancillary services such as cleaning and security may be used to assist in
rehabilitating injured employees.
Detailed discussions nevertheless indicated significant further scope to contract
out services at the Australian workplaces examined. Some managers
commented that cost savings could be achieved from the contracting of ancillary
and equipment maintenance services. One manager did not view cleaning and
security as ‘core’ functions of operational employees and suggested the
company would contract these functions if not for likely union opposition.
Another manager pointed to the relatively high cost of in-house maintenanceWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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services, noting that it was cheaper to buy a new diesel engine than to have one
repaired in-house.
More generally, the use of contractors instead of in-house employees is a
potential means of increasing productivity, reducing labour costs and potentially
improving reliability and timeliness at the Australian workplaces. A manager
noted that if shift premiums and penalty rates could be avoided by contracting
out services, the cost savings would be considerable. But the quality of the
service provided by contractors would need to meet stevedores’ requirements.
Good management practice would normally involve a case by case assessment
of the viability of contracting out, by comparing the benefits and costs of
alternative providers. However, provisions in the relevant enterprise agreements
limit the extent of contracting out. These restrictions, by precluding access to
potential efficiencies, are likely to detract from workplace performance. The
ability to contract out would increase pressures on permanent employees to be
competitive.
Detailed discussions with management at the Ports of Auckland (which includes
Fergusson Terminal) in New Zealand, indicated that there were no restrictions
on contracting. The Ports of Auckland decided during the reform period to
compare the costs of all their services with the cost of contracting out. These
outside comparisons were used to benchmark the company’s objectives.
Despite the absence of restrictions on contracting at the Ports of Auckland, the
extent of contracting is similar to that at the Australian workplaces examined.
At the Ports of Auckland, ancillary services such as cleaning and security
services are contracted, while equipment maintenance services are provided in-
house (table 6.4). However, maintenance is outsourced at Wellington
Stevedoring Services and, while the Port of Wellington performs its own
maintenance, it has the ability to undertake maintenance for other workplaces.
The extent of contracting at the Ports of Auckland may have been influenced by
reforms which improved the cost competitiveness of in-house employees. The
introduction of flat hourly rates, in particular, may have reduced the cost
differential between in-house and external provision of services.
6.4 Summary of findings
The Stevedoring Industry Award and some enterprise agreements give
employment preference to union members. However, as a result of the
Workplace Relations Act, union preference cannot be enforced. Nevertheless,6   RECRUITMENT, REDUNDANCY AND CONTRACTING
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so far, union membership among operational employees at the Australian
workplaces examined continues to be comprehensive.
Since the adoption of enterprise bargaining in the early 1990s, union
involvement in the recruitment process has substantially diminished.
The retirement and redundancy agreements, introduced in 1992, are prescriptive
and impose high redundancy costs on stevedoring companies. The high costs of
industrial disputation to employers is a significant deterrent to stevedores’
initiating redundancies. These costs restrict the ability of stevedores to reduce
manning levels for permanent employees, which can lead to the retention of
surplus labour. The retirement and redundancy agreements also foster skill
mismatches, inhibit the recruitment of permanent labour, restrict the productive
use of labour and reduce the ability of stevedores to allocate the best person to
the job.
Redundancy entitlements for stevedoring employees are significantly more
favourable than for employees under other awards examined. Enterprise
agreements covering employees under these other awards generally specify
redundancy entitlements above the levels in their respective awards. But in most
cases the entitlements would still be considerably below those potentially
available to stevedoring employees.
There have been few redundancies of permanent labour since the introduction
of the retirement and redundancy agreements in 1992.
Good management practice would normally involve a case by case assessment
of the viability of contracting out, by comparing the benefits and costs of
alternative providers. However, provisions in the relevant enterprise agreements
limit the extent of contracting out. These restrictions, by precluding access to
potential efficiencies, are likely to detract from workplace performance.103
7 REMUNERATION
Container stevedoring remuneration schemes are characterised by
high shift premiums and penalties that reward time spent at work
rather than the efficiency with which the work is undertaken. New
remuneration schemes that annualise wages reduce incentives for
permanent operational employees to undertake overtime, thus
potentially improving productivity. But these schemes can lock in
relatively high labour costs.
Although operational employees are on average paid for 45 hours
per week, the actual hours that they attend work can vary greatly
from week to week. The order of engagement and equalisation
schemes facilitate equal access by permanent employees to high
overtime, and reduce work able to be allocated to supplementary
employees. This contributes to stevedoring operational employees
earning relatively high wages compared to the average
nonmanagerial employee in other industries.
Responses to the Research Issues Brief and detailed discussions at workplaces
revealed that the primary concerns of many participants about the effects of the
current remuneration schemes on container stevedoring workplace performance
are that:
·  premiums and penalties for shifts are relatively high;
·  combined with other arrangements, such as the order of engagement, they
provide incentives to ‘create’ overtime at high costs to workplaces;
·  productivity bonus schemes, as currently designed and operated, do not
eliminate the incentive to undertake overtime;
·  while new aggregate wage systems — which have been introduced at two
workplaces and are supported by the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA)
for other workplaces — reduce incentives to undertake overtime, they can
lock in relatively high labour costs;
·  the hours worked are long and unsociable; and
·  wages are relatively high and contribute to high service costs on the
Australian waterfront.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
104
These concerns are investigated in this chapter, along with the effects of
remuneration arrangements on performance measures such as costs, productivity
and reliability. Issues related to leave provisions are investigated in chapter 8.
7.1 Remuneration schemes
Permanent operational employees are paid weekly either a ‘base plus’ wage or
an average (aggregate) wage. The base plus system operates at all of the
selected container stevedoring workplaces except Sea-Land and CTAL, which
operate aggregate wage systems. Guaranteed wage employees are paid a base
plus wage and are guaranteed a specified number of hours of work per week.
Supplementary employees are usually paid a base plus wage which includes a
20 per cent loading — because they do not receive normal benefits of
permanent employees such as annual leave. They are not rostered nor
guaranteed a minimum number of hours.
The base plus system
Under the base plus system, operational employees are paid an ordinary rate of
pay1 on which premiums and penalties are applied for different shifts2, as well
as a productivity bonus, based on the average performance of the workplace
over the week (box 7.1).
Box 7.1: Key components of remuneration
Ordinary rate 
 (base weekly wage 
divided by 35 hour 
week)
Shift premium  

















(based on average 
weekly crane rate)
For most of the workplaces, weekly base wages range from $480.68 for a
grade  1 operational employee, through to $700.54 for a grade  6 operational
                                             
1 The ordinary rate of pay is determined by dividing the base weekly wage as specified in
the enterprise agreements by the average 35 hour week (ordinary hours).
2 And possibly by the hours for which they are available but not required for work.7   REMUNERATION
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employee.3 These convert into hourly ordinary rates of $13.70 and $20.02,
respectively.
Detailed discussions indicate that:
·  approximately 50 per cent of gross wages are made up of the ordinary rate
of pay on rostered shifts;
·  overtime tends to be 20 to 30 per cent of gross wages, with around 15 per
cent of gross wages being from shift premiums on rostered shifts;
·  the productivity bonus can comprise 5 to 15 per cent of gross wages; and
·  overtime and productivity bonus earnings can vary across workplaces.
However, the share of these components in gross wages can vary across
workplaces and operational employees.
In comparison, all permanent operational employees at Fergusson Terminal in
New Zealand received a flat rate of pay of NZ$21.70 per hour. Casuals are paid
around half this rate — at NZ$12.50 per hour — and forego benefits common to
permanent employment such as annual leave. Another New Zealand stevedore
had a base pay of NZ$18.50 per hour, an overtime rate of NZ$21.40 per hour
and a casual rate of NZ$16.00 per hour.
Operational employees at Fergusson Terminal are not classified into job grades
at the terminal. Moreover, they do not receive premiums or penalties (except for
an extra NZ$30.00 for the midnight shift) or productivity bonuses for any shifts.
Total earnings of crane drivers and foremen are typically around NZ$65 000 per
year. This puts New Zealand stevedore operational employees in the national
upper earnings quintile in New Zealand (appendix I).
Shift premiums
The Stevedoring Industry Award 1991 specifies that weekday evening shifts are
paid at 1.5 times the base rate, while weekday night shifts are paid at twice the
base rate. Distinctions are also made between rates payable for shifts between
Friday night and Sunday night. Employees on these shifts can earn hourly wages
between two and two-and-a-half times the ordinary rate.
The shift premiums for stevedore operational employees are higher than for
employees under other awards examined in this study (table 7.1 and appendix J).
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Table 7.1: Comparison of shift premium provisions in selected awards
(multiples of ordinary rate of pay)
Weekdaya Weekend
Day Evening Night Saturday Sunday
Stevedoring Industry
Award 1991




1 1.5 1.5  np np
Transport Workers
Award 1983
1 1.175 1.3  1.5 2
Storage Services –
General – Interim Award
1990
1b b  b 2
Metal Industry Award
1984
1 1.15 1.5  1.5 np
a Timings of day, afternoon (evening) and night shifts can vary slightly between awards, but they are broadly
comparable.
b Work undertaken outside the hours of 7 am to 5.30 pm — or more than eight hours in a day — is paid at 1.5
times the ordinary rate for first two hours, then double time for remaining hours worked.
np No provision.
Source: Various awards
It would be expected in principle that different wage rates should apply to
different shifts because employees typically prefer some shifts to others. One
would expect wage rates for night shifts to be higher than for day shifts, for
example. Similarly, higher wages may emerge for irregular shifts, to
compensate for the inconvenience and disruption to non-working life caused by
such shifts. However, if the wage rate for less preferred shifts more than
compensates workers for this preference, then there will be an incentive for
them to direct work away from day shifts to night shifts. If anything, community
acceptance of work outside of standard hours has been rising, which may imply
the need for lower premiums for these shifts.
Penalties
Penalty rates of pay are specified in the Stevedoring Industry Award and are
paid on most shifts undertaken as overtime (table 7.2).4 These penalties,
                                             
4 Voluntary overtime on rostered days off is paid at the premium rates but does not attract
penalties.7   REMUNERATION
107
combined with the shift premiums, create overtime rates of pay that are well
above other awards examined in this study (appendix J).
Table 7.2: Penalty rates for double headers and shift extensions
Type of overtime Hourly shift penalty
Double headers on Monday to Friday Ordinary rate plus the rate for the shift worked
Double headers on Saturdays, Sundays and
public holidays
Half the ordinary rate plus the rate for shift workeda
Shift extensions Ordinary rate plus rate of the shift extended intoa, b
a Note that shifts on weekends receive premiums of between two and two-and-a-half times the ordinary rate.
Therefore weekend double header shifts, despite receiving half the ordinary penalty rate, are more expensive
than a double header on a weekday shift.
b Except at Sea-Land shift where extensions are paid at the ordinary rate plus the rate of the previous shift.
Source:  Stevedoring Industry Award
Double headers are generally worked following the day shift. For Monday to
Friday, double headers are paid at the ordinary rate plus the rate appropriate for
the additional shift. On Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays, time is paid at
half the ordinary rate in addition to the rate appropriate to the additional shift.
The minimum rate payable for a double header shift is two-and-a-half times the
ordinary rate and the maximum payable is three times the ordinary rate (on
weekends).
The incidence of double headers, shift extensions and voluntary overtime varies
between workplaces. Operational employees at Patrick Brisbane, for example,
undertake relatively few shift extensions, while 14 per cent of weekday labour is
undertaken as a double header. Similarly, Sea-Land’s aggregate wage
calculations indicate that workers are expected to undertake almost five times
the amount of overtime as double headers rather than shift extensions. In
comparison, operational employees at P&O Ports Melbourne undertook almost
one-third more overtime through shift extensions than through double headers.
The other workplaces placed more emphasis on double headers.
There are some constraints on the amount of overtime undertaken during a
roster cycle. First, the Stevedoring Industry Award specifies that operational
employees are only obliged (if requested) to undertake two double headers per
week. Second, on rostered weeks off, operational employees are ineligible to
attend work.
However, as noted in chapter 4, the order of engagement can also influence the
eligibility of operational employees to undertake overtime. At most of the
Australian workplaces examined, permanent employees are given access toWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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double header shifts (to a limit of two) before supplementary employees are
engaged.5 This is more costly than engaging supplementaries, because a
supplementary would not be undertaking the shift as overtime and therefore
would not be paid the penalty rate.
Moreover, on unrostered weekend shifts, permanent employees are granted
voluntary overtime before supplementary employees are used. Equalisation
schemes provide permanent employees with the opportunity to share these
earnings (chapter 4).
Apart from the labour cost, high levels of overtime can have other performance
consequences, such as lower productivity and a higher risk of accidents
resulting from fatigue (chapter 3). The MUA, for example, acknowledged:
It was only natural that productivity levels would begin to fall when workers
were doing up to 60 to 70 hours per week ... You can’t expect people to stay alert
on the job and do their best when they have been labouring 16 hours a day. It
does nothing for efficiency or job safety. (MUA 1995, p. 10)
The MUA has sought to reduce overtime though the introduction of rostered
time off provisions (chapter 8) and the recruitment of workers — such as
guaranteed wage employees — on different contracts of employment
(MUA 1994b, pp. 9–11).6
In addition, the number of double headers that can be required by management
in a week has been restricted to two. The safety implications of high levels of
overtime were also emphasised in detailed discussions in New Zealand, where a
maximum number of hours per week has been introduced at some workplaces
(appendix I).
7.2 Productivity schemes
Relatively high premiums and penalties can create incentives for employees to
work less quickly, so that work in higher premium and penalty shifts is
available. Moreover, the order of engagement at most Australian container
stevedoring workplaces guarantees permanent operational employees preferred
                                             
5 As part of the Productivity Employment Program scheme package at CTAL,
supplementary employees are engaged before operational employees undertake double
headers. This is discussed in further detail in section 7.5.
6 Anecdotal evidence and Australian Bureau of Statistics unpublished data suggest that
overtime rose during the Waterfront Industry Reform Authority process. Overtime levels
appear to have since declined to pre reform levels.7   REMUNERATION
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access to any overtime shifts before other employees.7 In combination, this
creates a perverse incentive system which rewards employees for time spent at
work, rather than for the efficiency with which they undertake the work.
The MUA has suggested that ‘a big percentage of the so called eighty thousand
dollars that these people earn comes out of their productivity bonus’ (Coombs
1997, p. 4). Whether productivity bonuses are substantial enough to offset the
incentive to seek premiums and penalty rates is investigated in this section.
Productivity schemes operate at each Australian workplace examined. They are
specified in the enterprise agreements, and reward operational employees with
bonus payments for the average number of container lifts achieved each week.8
At some workplaces, these payments are supplemented with bonuses for the
average number of containers moved by road vehicles in the week. Their
objective is to encourage operational employees to work more quickly (more
container moves per hour) and thereby improve timeliness and reduce overtime
costs.
There is an inherent conflict between the base-plus pay systems that reward
operational employees for hours spent on the job, and the productivity bonus
schemes that reward them for quicker work. Given a fixed volume of work, an
increase in productivity means less hours are needed to complete a task.
Operational employees must weigh the benefits of generating more income
through the productivity scheme, by working more efficiently and effectively,
against the extra income gained by working longer hours through overtime and
foregoing leisure time. Robinson and Everett, in a review of existing
productivity scheme incentives, concluded that:
any substantial or sustainable increase in stevedoring productivity at container
terminals will only result, under present industrial relations conditions, from
major reformulation of Enterprise Agreements in such a way as to ensure that
productivity is more highly rewarded than time spent on the job. (response 10,
p. 32)
                                             
7 The CTAL Sydney agreement allows supplementary employees to be engaged before
permanent employees on double header shifts.
8 Productivity payments are mainly determined by the crane rate. A sliding scale bonus is
paid on all crane lifts above a threshold to create a bonus pool. The bonus is paid on all
lifts in the week based on the average crane rate for the week. The payable lift average
ranges from 15 to 30 lifts per hour over the course of the week. At some workplaces a
similar style of bonus system operates for the ‘road rate’ (container moves by road
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While productivity bonus payments can vary between workplaces (for example,
$5000 per person per year at Sea-Land to $11 000 at CTAL),9 they represent a
relatively small proportion of gross wages.10 Overtime and shift extensions at
P&O Ports Melbourne, for example, represent 30 per cent of the wages bill,
while productivity bonuses represent 13 per cent. Similarly, in both the CTAL
Sydney and Sea-Land agreements, productivity payments can be estimated to
represent about 8 per cent of total wages. Consequently, productivity bonuses
only account for a small proportion of the total wages bill to work a ship.
Crane rates can vary substantially between ships at the same workplace for a
variety of reasons (appendix E). Some operational employees considered that
productivity bonus schemes could be adjusted to account for the degree of
difficulty associated with working particular ships.
Productivity schemes are pooled at the workplaces examined. Under such
schemes, the workplace earnings pool is distributed equally among the
permanent workforce. At some workplaces this occurs regardless of whether
employees performed work in the week or not (including operational employees
on leave).11
There can be ‘free rider’ problems with the pooled productivity schemes which
sacrifice penalty payments in exchange for higher productivity bonuses.
Individual operational employees, and indeed gangs, may have an incentive not
to participate actively in achieving the productivity levels encouraged under the
scheme, but simply to share in the dividends of the schemes. The incentive to
free ride will be high when employees undertake tasks they feel have no direct
impact on the level of productivity. Employees who are likely to see a direct
effect of their work on productivity are crane operators, and straddle drivers
moving containers from the crane.
Careful design of productivity schemes is needed to ensure that unintended
outcomes do not occur. Both objective or quantitative measures of productivity,
such as crane and road rates,12 and subjective measures, such as those relating to
quality, are important. Work can be efficient in that it produces more with less
                                             
9 Based on operational employees achieving productivity targets projected in the respective
enterprise agreements.
10 Given that workplaces divide the bonus pool among the permanent workforce, weekly
payments to individuals between workplaces are likely to vary considerably.
11 At P&O Ports Melbourne, operational employees on Workcare are excluded from the pool
division.
12 The road rate is based on the container moves by machinery from the quay crane to the
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(for example, more crane lifts in fewer hours), but it may not necessarily be of a
sufficient quality. Detailed discussions at CTAL highlighted difficulties
experienced with the Productivity Employment Program scheme’s design of
crane rate and road rate bonus contributions to the productivity bonus pool. It
appears that operational employees realised that it was easier to achieve the
productivity bonus under the road rate bonus than under crane rate bonus. This
resulted in containers being stowed in incorrect locations and time was wasted
looking for lost containers. Performance suffered accordingly.
The fact that — in practice — the earnings from overtime continue to outweigh
those from productivity bonuses, indicates that the incentives in the current
schemes to work more efficiently and reduce the incidence of overtime may not
be of a sufficient magnitude or design.
7.3 The ‘aggregate wage’ approach to remuneration
Aggregate wage schemes are recent developments in container stevedoring.
However, they are not uncommon in other industries. Under these schemes,
annual gross wages are based on a prescribed set of shifts on which ordinary,
premium — and in some cases — penalty rates are paid as an average weekly
wage. Sea-Land and CTAL currently operate forms of aggregate wage systems.
Under the Sea-Land system, operational employees are paid an aggregation of
their previous year’s salary based on an average working week. The scheme
assumes that a set amount of shifts — on which premiums and penalties are paid
— are worked within the year. The aggregate wage includes:
... all award nominated rates which cover the base rate, overtime, public holidays,
shift penalties, consolidated allowances, meal monies, annual leave loading,
productivity scheme payments. (Sea-Land Enterprise Agreement 1997)
Permanent operational employees have to undertake the prescribed average
hours of overtime or the equivalent of single hours. A weekday night shift is
equivalent to two weekday day shifts, for example.
The Sea-Land aggregate wage is estimated to range in 1997 from around
$58 760 for a grade 2 operational employee, through to $74 780 for a grade 6.
These wages convert to average weekly wages of around $1130 and $1440
respectively — well above the base weekly wage. Earnings can be higher
because there is the opportunity for operational employees to undertake extra
overtime.
Permanent operational employees at CTAL receive an average weekly wage
which is calculated on a higher hourly rate than the existing rates at workplacesWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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using base plus wages systems. Also under the new wage structure, the existing
six Stevedoring Industry Award grade levels have been converted into four skill
levels. Excluding productivity payments, grade  1 operational employees can
earn approximately $47  000 per year while grade  6 equivalent operational
employees can earn around $59  000 per year.13 Permanent employees can
undertake overtime on weekend shifts for which they are not rostered before
supplementary employees. However, the order of engagement has been changed
to allow supplementaries to undertake work before double headers on weekdays
and weekends, so that overtime can be reduced.
A feature of the CTAL agreement is higher productivity payments than provided
by Sea-Land if productivity targets are met. CTAL employees can earn around
$11 000 in productivity bonuses, whereas Sea-Land employees can earn $5000.
The aggregate wage systems examined reduce some of the incentive to
undertake overtime, but they also have resulted in other additional labour costs.
Apart from the higher wage payments for rostered shifts, the high average
weekly wage leads to higher annual and sick leave payments and higher rostered
time off payments than under the previous wage scheme. Importantly too, the
aggregate wage systems include higher employer contributions to
superannuation. All CTAL and nearly all Sea-Land operational employees are
superannuated at around $710 per week under the aggregate wage systems.
Previously, the figure was the base weekly wage for each grade classification.
The MUA’s policy is to introduce an aggregate wage at all other container
stevedoring workplaces (MUA 1997e, p. 9). This reflects a national trend in
enterprise agreements to convert wages plus overtime earnings into salaries
(Sloan and Robertson 1997, p. 9).
One advantage of the aggregate wage for operational employees is the reduction
in downward wage uncertainty. Employees know that they will receive the
hours of work required to maintain a certain minimum level of wages. This
appears to have reduced the amount of overtime that is being undertaken by
operational employees at Sea-Land. In detailed discussions, management at Sea-
Land considered that the aggregate wage has had a positive impact:
The aggregate wage has increased the stability in employee’s lives. Before, there
were big weekly fluctuations in income. It has taken away the drive for the
almighty dollar, that is the need to work overtime. This has led to a big cultural
change.
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Another positive effect from the operational employees’ perspective is that they
are able to budget personal finances with more certainty. One employee noted
that banks were more willing to grant him a housing loan based on his aggregate
wage than under the base plus system. However, operational employees can still
undertake overtime above that specified by the aggregate wage. This is possible
because the order of engagement at Sea-Land still places permanents working
double headers above supplementaries.
The difference in the order of engagement at Sea-Land and CTAL needs to be
considered in light of the mix of permanent employees and supplementary
employees at each workplace. Sea-Land retains an order of engagement which
gives preference to permanent employees on double headers over the use of
supplementary employees, although it has recently employed more permanent
employees through the Australian Vocational Training program, thereby
reducing the opportunity to undertake double headers. CTAL, in comparison,
has an order of engagement which gives preference to supplementary employees
over permanent employees working double headers. However, the
supplementary labour pool accounts for less than 10 per cent of the workforce at
CTAL (table 5.5) and the recruitment of new supplementary employees appears
to be limited (chapter 5). Further, double headers can still be required for shifts
when there are insufficient supplementaries to meet demand.
In aggregate wage schemes, shift premiums and penalties are not directly linked
to the wages received in any particular week. Averaging means that operational
employees are paid the same for all shifts. Premiums and penalties become
partly ‘hidden’. This should mean that operational employees become
indifferent (from an income perspective) to different shifts. However, shift
premiums and penalties still exist at Sea-Land in the sense that operational
employees need to complete an aggregate number of hours. By working more
premium and penalty shifts, operational employees can complete their hours
more quickly, because two weekday day shifts are still equivalent to one
weekday night shift.
Maggs, Testi and Rimmer (1996, p. 8) noted that when incorporating wage
components such as premiums and penalties into a single rate, they are less
vulnerable to attempts to erode established entitlements. The protection of these
rates appears to be a key feature of the MUA aggregate wage policy:
The policy is in response to a hostile political environment. The Howard
Government is moving to dismantle awards to members and with them overtime
and shift penalties, leave loadings and extra rates. An aggregate wage
incorporated in all enterprise agreements can protect these hard won conditions.
(MUA 1997e, p. 9)WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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John Coombs, National Secretary of the Maritime Union of Australia, was more
explicit, observing that ‘... the aggregate wage defends our shift loadings, by
locking them into a set wage’ (MUA 1997e, p. 9). High wages remain built into
the schemes. The Government’s new industrial legislation is one factor driving
the Maritime Union of Australia policy:
The threat to collapse award conditions in the new legislation and the collapse of
the comprehensive awards into 20 allowable basic provisions, combined with the
pressure to reduce them into so called community standards by July 1998 creates
an urgent need to protect award conditions and introduce aggregate wages in all
industries covered by the union. (MUA 1997e, p. 9)
7.4 Hours worked
Stevedoring operational employees are paid hourly rates for time spent at work
or being available for work. The MUA accepts that its members are relatively
highly paid, but emphasises that operational employees undertake long hours of
work:
Stevedoring workers employed in the big container terminals can average around
$70  000-$80  000 per annum by working day and night, anything from 50-80
hours a week and being paid penalty rates, allowances etc. (MUA 1997a, p. 6)
According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, in 1996 — within a particular
pay period — stevedoring operational employees were paid for 36.1 hours of
ordinary time on average (table 7.3). They were also paid for nine hours of
overtime per week, giving a total paid average of 45 hours per week. Average
paid hours of work are likely to be higher than the average actual hours
operational employees attend work, because of payments made for idle and call
up time, various forms of leave and rostered time off.
In stevedoring, overtime occurs when operational employees undertake extra
shifts or shift extensions above those prescribed in the roster. Overtime can
consist of double header shifts, shifts worked on rostered days off and public
holidays and the extension (by up to three hours) of rostered shifts. As discussed
in chapter 4, the order of engagement — by giving permanent employees
preference to overtime above supplementary employees — is a driver of
relatively high levels of overtime.
Given the variable nature of container stevedoring demand, the design of rosters
and order of engagement rules, actual hours of work attended within specific
weeks of a roster may vary considerably.14 Shift lengths at workplaces range
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between seven and eight hours, for example. The number of days rostered on in
any one week can vary, as can the number of rostered days off. In some weeks,
permanent operational employees may attend work for five consecutive seven
and a half hour evening shifts (that is, 37.5 hours). In other weeks, they may
work six consecutive seven and a half hour day shifts (45 hours per week).
Permanent operational employees undertaking two double headers in such a
week could attend work for approximately 60 hours during the week. On the
other hand, they may also be rostered off for seven consecutive days (meaning
no hours of attendance that week) at certain times in a roster (chapter 8).







a Ordinary hours refers to award, standard or agreed hours of work paid at the base rate, including shift premiums
in specified awards.
b Based on a survey of operational employees’ actual hours worked in a particular pay period. Data may not
include some operational employees on leave and rostered time off.
c Includes container, break bulk and some bulk operations. Coal and wheat terminals are excluded from the ABS
definition.
Source:  ABS unpublished statistics
It has been suggested that stevedore employees work excessively long hours —
up to 80 hours per week. To work 80 hours per week, operational workers
would have to attend (over and above their rostered shifts) more than two
double headers, voluntary overtime on weekend shifts and shift extensions.
Detailed discussions indicated that the occurrence of such a work sequence is
rare.
When the hours worked are long and variable, they can have deleterious effects
on the social and family lives of operational employees. For example, Jim
Donovan, Assistant Secretary of the Maritime Union of Australia, observed that
when employees worked long hours:
their wives and families barely saw them. And when they did get home they were
far too tired to show much affection or lead a normal married life. Divorces on
the waterfront were becoming all too common. (MUA 1994b, p.10)WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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7.5 Wage levels
The relatively high premiums and penalties, provisions which ensure
preferential access to overtime, and productivity schemes which lead to some
bonuses, together result in permanent container stevedoring operational
employees in Australia being relatively highly paid.
Average total earnings15 of grades range from $62 000 to $101 000 per year at
the workplaces examined (table 7.4). Grade 6 employees (such as foremen) are
the most highly paid among operational employees. Most permanent operational
employees are either grade 4 or 5, with earnings in the range shown in table 7.4.
Higher grade employees tend to undertake more skilled tasks with greater
responsibilities. Entry skill levels are minimal, with most higher grade skills
being gained through on-the-job training and experience (table 7.4).
Table 7.4: Average annual earnings
a, permanent operational
employees, Australian workplaces examined, 1996-97
Grade Main responsibilities Earnings range
6 Supervisory tasks $75 000 to $101 000
4-5 Operation of heavy and complex equipment; clerical duties;
liaison with supervisory employees
$65 000 to $92 000
3
b Operation of heavy equipment; general clerical duties under
supervision
$62 000 to $80 800
a Includes all ordinary, premium and penalty payments, bonuses and allowances.
b Australian vocational trainees and other trainees are generally classified as grade 3.
Sources:  Workplace information requests; Stevedoring Industry Award; enterprise agreements
Management salary packages are detailed in employment contracts which are
confidential.
Variations in earnings between permanent operational employees within grades
at individual workplaces are limited by equalisation schemes (chapter 4). These
schemes aim to ensure that permanent operational employees within the same
grades at individual workplaces have the same access to higher premium and
penalty shifts or equivalent base rate shifts — and therefore similar earnings
potential — regardless of individual work performance. For example, Patrick
Melbourne has a clause in its enterprise agreement which states that equalisation
points will be ‘kept within a tolerable range of 30 points either side’ (that is, 60
hours).
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In 1996, operational employees in the stevedoring industry16 on average earned
around $1390 per week ($72 000 per year) — placing them in the top 5 per cent
of wage and salary earners in Australia — and more than double the average
(around $660 per week or $34 000 per year) for employees in other industries
(ABS 1996a). Similarly, stevedoring managerial employees earned around $930
per week, which was more than the $870 per week earned by the average
managerial employee in other industries.17
Individual enterprise agreements contain a wage indexation clause that can raise
base wages in some circumstances by up to 4 per cent annually. Some
agreements specify that if the consumer price index exceeds this figure the
parties will confer to determine an appropriate increase in wage rates, while
other agreements specify that if the consumer price index exceeds 4 per cent,
then the base weekly wage rates shall be increased by the index figure.
However, the consumer price index rose by less than 3 per cent between 1996
and 1997 (ABS 1997d). In detailed discussions, one workplace reported that a
pay rise of 6 per cent occurred in 1996 as a result of agreement negotiations.
In detailed discussions, permanent operational employees drew attention to the
high incidence of workplace accidents. Stevedoring workplaces have a higher
incidence of compensated accidents than all other industries (appendix G).
Higher earnings may partially reflect the premium placed on working in this
more dangerous environment (see Miller, Mulvey and Norris 1997, p.  363).
However, overtime is a significant proportion of earnings and, as acknowledged
by the Maritime Union of Australia, may be a contributor to poorer workplace
safety. In principle, if a premium is to be paid to reflect more dangerous
conditions, it should be priced such that inappropriate incentive structures do
not emerge.
7.6 Summary of findings
Shift premiums and penalty rates are higher in the Stevedoring Industry Award
than other awards examined in this study. They reward time spent at work rather
than the efficiency with which the work is undertaken. The order of engagement
and equalisation schemes facilitate permanent operational employees’ access to
high levels of overtime. This is more costly than engaging supplementary
                                             
16 Includes container, break bulk and some bulk operations. Coal and wheat terminals are
excluded from the ABS definition.
17 Information on individual salary packages of managers at the workplaces examined were
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employees, because they would not be undertaking the shift as overtime and
therefore would not be paid the penalty rate. Shift premiums, penalties and the
order of engagement can create disincentives for permanent operational
employees to work efficiently and effectively and complete work in a timely
manner.
Earnings from overtime continue to outweigh those from productivity bonuses.
Therefore, the incentives provided by the productivity bonus schemes to work
more efficiently and reduce the incidence of overtime may not be sufficient. The
pool based design of productivity schemes do not create a strong incentive for
individual operational employees to work more efficiently and effectively.
An aggregate wage has been introduced at two of the workplaces examined. It
has introduced some wage certainty for permanent operational employees and
reduced the incentive to seek overtime. However, at Sea-Land overtime is still
factored into the aggregate wage and the order of engagement ensures access to
it. At CTAL the aggregate wage schemes allows for supplementary employees
to be used before double headers; however, the number of supplementaries that
can be engaged remains limited. The schemes negotiated thus far can create
additional labour costs through higher leave and superannuation payments and
also lock in relatively high wages.
At the Australian workplaces examined, stevedoring operational employees are
paid for similar amounts of ordinary time hours to that of other workers, but are
paid for more overtime hours. The hours operational employees actually attend
work within roster cycles can vary greatly. Within individual weeks in a roster
cycle, for example, an operational employee may be rostered off or could work
up to 60 hours (for example, by working six days in a row with two double
headers). According to Australian Bureau of Statistics data, operational workers
were paid for around 45 hours per week in 1996, however the average hours of
work actually attended are likely to be less than this.
Permanent operational employees in the Australian workplaces examined
receive relatively high earnings. The higher incidence of accidents in the
industry is a factor, but the high earnings result primarily from overtime, which
itself may be a contributor to workplace accidents. Among the Australian
workplaces examined, the existence of equalisation schemes means that wages
do not vary greatly within grades at workplaces.121
8 PAID NON-WORKING TIME
A number of work arrangements result in time that is paid for by
employers, but not actually worked by employees. These include
longer than agreed shift breaks and shift changeovers — which can
average around 1.8 hours per ship — minimum call-up payments,
paid idle time and leave provisions. Paid idle time is one feature of
permanent employment which distinguishes it from supplementary
labour. The costs of some paid non-working time, such as shift
extensions, are magnified by excessive manning requirements. Other
forms of paid non-working time, such as call-up payments, can act as
constraints on rostering and labour allocation.
Some work arrangements in container stevedoring enable operational employees
to be paid for time when not they do not undertake work tasks. These include
leave provisions, longer than specified breaks and shift changeovers, and
minimum shift payments (such as shift extensions and idle time). Some of these
arrangements are common in other industries and reflect community norms, but
there are concerns that their length and cost are unnecessarily high in container
stevedoring. Some paid non-working time may be unexpected and therefore not
planned for by management. Although the amount of unexpected paid non-
working time is likely to be small relative to expected arrangements, it can have
significant effects on workplace performance. These issues are investigated in
this chapter.
8.1 Leave arrangements
Permanent stevedoring employees are entitled to more formal absences from the
workplace than employees under other awards examined in this study.
Relatively long leave absences and higher remuneration payments attached to
such leave1 create extra costs for workplaces, not only through direct payments
to workers on leave, but also through the need to provide suitable replacement
                                             
1 Leave provisions include annual leave, sick leave, holidays, long service leave and
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labour. This can translate into higher manning levels and because of the order of
engagement, higher overtime costs (chapter 5 and chapter 7).
In table 8.1, the days of absence from the workplace2 provided for in the
Stevedoring Industry Award 1991 are compared to other awards examined in
this study. The number of days that workers can be absent from the workplace
are higher in stevedoring. The cost of leave is also generally higher, with
loadings of 27.5 per cent on annual and long service leave, compared to 17.5 per
cent and no loading, respectively, for the other relevant awards.
























Annual leave 25 20 20 20 20
Sick leave 10 10 8 10 8
Public and industry
holidaysa
12 10 11 11 11
Long service leaveb 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3
Total days 51.3 44.3 43.3 45.3 43.3
a Assumes Victorian example.
b Equivalent of 13 weeks for 15 years. Pro-rata after 10 years.
Source: Various awards
Leave absences reduce the availability of operational employees to
approximately 50 per cent on weekday shifts (chapter 6). In comparison,
Fergusson Terminal employee availability is around five percentage points
higher. The incidence and effect of higher leave provisions can in some
instances be exacerbated in the container stevedoring industry because of the
constraints on engaging labour. For example, the order of engagement and
potentially the size of the supplementary pool can limit the ability of workplaces
to find the best mix of permanent and supplementary employees. Higher levels
of leave can result in larger numbers of permanent employees.
                                             
2 The table excludes rostered weeks off and accrued day provisions which in stevedoring
can account for an extra 50 days of leave per year.8   PAID NON-WORKING TIME
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Annual leave
Permanent operational employees receive five weeks annual leave.3 This is
above the four weeks generally received by workers under other awards
examined in this study (appendix J).
However, five weeks leave is consistent with arrangements for those other
industries where employees undertake shift work. For example, it was noted by
the Inter-State Commission that:
[t]he generally accepted industry standard under federal awards for paid annual
leave is twenty eight consecutive days (or four weeks) leave per annum.
However, shift workers who are rostered seven days a week and regularly work
on Sundays and public holidays receive an additional seven consecutive days
leave per annum. (ISC 1988, p. 138)
Not all permanent operational employees meet the Inter-State Commission shift
work criteria of being rostered on seven days a week and regularly working on
Sundays and public holidays. For example, at some workplaces examined some
operational employees are only rostered on the five weekday day shifts. Most
permanent operational employees are not rostered on Sundays and are only
rostered on some Saturdays.4
If the average grade of employees at a workplace is grade 4 and there are 300
operational employees, the additional direct costs could be approximately
$235 000 per year.5 Added to this are the costs of hiring labour to undertake
work in the weeks operational employees take the extra week of annual leave
(in this case approximately equivalent to six full-time employees).
Annual leave loadings are also relatively high in the stevedoring industry.
Permanent operational employees receive an annual leave loading of 27.5 per
cent, 10 percentage points higher than employees working under a selection of
other awards (table J.2).
                                             
3 Guaranteed wage employees receive annual leave on a pro-rata basis.
4 Operational employees at Patrick Brisbane, for instance, are not rostered on weekends.
Rather, weekend shifts are voluntary overtime. However, they work either day, evening or
night shift on weekdays. Sea-Land operational employees do work some rostered
Saturdays — approximately 14 for the year — but are not rostered on Sundays.
5 Based on the base weekly wage and includes leave loading (chapter 7). But the costs per
operational employee are even higher for workplaces with the aggregate wage because
agreement provisions require that the leave be paid at the average weekly wage rather than
the lower base weekly wage.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Sick leave
Permanent stevedoring operational employees receive 10 days sick leave per
year and the entitlement is cumulative. This is comparable to the building and
construction and storage services industries. Employees under the other relevant
awards generally can only accumulate around eight days of sick leave.
Operational employees on sick leave are generally paid at the base weekly wage
rate.6
However — unlike other awards examined in this study— the Stevedoring
Industry Award includes provisions which allow operational employees to have
some sick leave paid in lieu of taking leave. Employees may elect to have
accumulated sick leave in excess of 28 days paid out at the ordinary rate of pay
(Stevedoring Industry Award, clause 28(g)).
Rostered weeks off and accrued days
Permanent operational employees can accrue time off by working longer than
the 35 ordinary hours of work — specified in the Stevedoring Industry Award
— in some weeks. Rostered weeks off can be accrued through working longer
shifts but being paid for standard lengths and by foregoing some shift
premiums.7 At most workplaces, permanent operational employees undertake an
extra half hour each weekday shift without pay.8 In addition, at most workplaces
permanent operational employees accrue seven hours on rostered weekend
shifts for being paid the ordinary rate for the shift instead of double time. It is
the accruals on rostered weekend shifts that make it possible to accrue the
rostered weeks off so frequently (generally every seven weeks).9
At some workplaces, permanent operational employees also receive a 25 per
cent loading on rostered weeks off wages to compensate them for the inability
to earn shift premiums on rostered weeks off. This is despite the fact that they
earn shift premiums while accruing the rostered weeks off. The 25 per cent
loading is combined into permanent operational employee consolidated
allowances. The cost of this provision for a grade 4 operational employee
                                             
6 However, operational employees receiving an aggregate wage are paid at the higher
average weekly wage rate (chapter 7).
7 Generally,  operational  employees’ rosters allocate approximately seven rostered weeks off
per year.
8 However, Brisbane operational employees accrue one rostered week off every eight weeks
through working eight hour shifts on seven hours pay five days per week.
9 However, under some rosters the rostered weeks off accruals add to less than 35 hours.8   PAID NON-WORKING TIME
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(assuming approximately seven rostered weeks off per year) is approximately
$1000 per year.
Permanent operational employees can also accrue a day off by accepting
overtime wage reductions equivalent to a day shift payment. Accrued days are
generally limited to five per year and credited from trading off double header
shift payments.
Perverse incentives therefore exist whereby lower productivity can be rewarded
with the opportunity for accrued leave. Because of the order of engagement,
operational employees taking an accrued day of leave may also be creating
overtime opportunities for other operational employees. Additionally, in
conjunction with the order of engagement, these leave provisions can create
pressure for workplaces to hire additional permanent employees to cover for
periods of operational employee absences.
Holidays
Permanent operational employees generally receive only slightly more holidays
(public and industry) than employees under a selection of other awards (table J.4
and appendix J). For example, in New South Wales and Victoria, permanent
operational employees receive between one to two extra public holidays per
year relative to workers under other selected awards.
Long service leave
Permanent operational employees are entitled to 13 weeks of long service leave
after 15 years of service and can access the leave pro-rata after 10 years of
service (table J.3). The Metal Industry Award 1984 specifies an amount of leave
which is the same as that for stevedoring operational employees. However, most
of the selected awards do not contain long service leave provisions. Employees
under these awards are covered by various state government long service leave
acts which specify similar leave amounts to the Stevedoring Long Service Leave
Award 1992.10
Importantly, permanent operational employees receive a 27.5 per cent loading
on long service leave. However, employees covered by other selected awards
and provisions in various state government long service leave acts do not
                                             
10 For example, workers in South Australia receive 13 weeks after 10 years and NSW 13
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receive such a loading. For a grade 4 worker receiving the base weekly wage on
13 weeks of leave, for example, the loading would be approximately $2100.11
8.2 Shift breaks, delays and unplanned absences
Management at most of the Australian container stevedoring workplaces
examined were primarily concerned about delays that related directly to the
attitude and motivation of operational employees, such as longer than necessary
breaks and delays in changing shifts, particularly under continuous work
arrangements.12
Although the amount of this paid non-working time is likely to be small relative
to formal arrangements it can have significant effects on workplace
performance.
The Stevedoring Industry Award specifies that during a normal shift, an
employee is entitled to paid rest breaks totalling 45 minutes.13 These rest
periods may be either staggered — to allow for continuous work shifts and less
‘downtime’ — or non-staggered. But longer breaks can occur (box 8.1).
Delays specifically associated with shift changeovers were examined in data
provided by three Australian workplaces. On average the delays associated with
shift changeovers ranged between 1.7 to 2.0 hours in lost crane working time
per ship across the workplaces. If these delays could be reduced, ship
turnaround times could be improved commensurately.
During detailed discussions, some managers commented that they favoured the
continuous work shift approach because they believed it provided helpful
incentives and ‘built up a momentum’. Managers at Sea-Land Adelaide noted:
The benefits [of continuous work shifts] are that the drivers get ... [angry] if the
down drivers are late back from their smoko and the drivers have been waiting
for them.
                                             
11 The cost is higher for workplaces operating an aggregate wage. For example, a grade 4
operational employee receiving an average weekly wage of $1285 would receive
approximately $4600 in loadings for 13 weeks of long service leave.
12 Delays can occur for many reasons including inclement weather, mechanical failure, need
to undertake special operational tasks (such as cage work and lashing), late delivery of
containers, and longer shift breaks and change overs. Clearly not all delays are
unnecessary, undesirable or unavoidable.
13 When an employee works longer than a normal shift, additional rest periods may be
granted.8   PAID NON-WORKING TIME
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Box 8.1: Management comments on avoidable delays: Australian
workplaces
‘Time is lost when people are getting out of and into machines. For example, someone
gets out at 10.20 am and the other doesn’t have to go up until 10.30 am.’14
‘Excuses for lateness include forgetting straddle numbers, and forgetting overalls,
missed the bus etc. It often takes half an hour to start a shift.’
‘The boys like to take off 10 minutes before the scheduled breaks. This is related to
tradition. In the old days, 10 minutes was allocated for washing time. It’s hard to get
them back on the job five minutes after smoko. Typically, 10 minutes is lost each side of
a smoko.’
Source:  Detailed discussions
One potential cause of delays in shift starts are operational employees ‘failing to
report’ to work.15 Employees are not paid for the shift they fail to attend.
Employees failing to report to work can result in an unexpected shortage of
labour for a particular shift or operation. Often other operational employees
must be ‘called-up’ to replace those failing to attend. Supplementary employees
can be engaged to replace permanent employees who fail to attend work. At one
Australian workplace management commented:
The reasons for failing to report are usually if people have had a bad weekend or
they have worked the weekend so they take the Monday off. It is an industry
problem with the work ethic. If we are short, we will knock off a crane or another
piece of equipment, work a double header or bring in supplementaries.
Another form of absence from the workplace occurs when an employee leaves a
shift early without permission, known as the ‘nick’ (chapter 5). This practice has
historically been a problem area for Australian workplaces. It is difficult to
gather direct evidence on its current extent and frequency. However, detailed
discussions suggest that while the ‘nick’ still occurs its incidence is declining.
Increased flexibility in being able to allocate workers to other tasks when
primary stevedoring duties are completed appears to be an important factor
(chapter 5). Discussions with supervisors suggested that the extent of the ‘nick’
also depends on the level of control exercised by management.
                                             
14 On the other hand, some considered allowing delays as one way of maintaining worker
morale, noting that ‘being at their necks all the time’ is counter productive.
15 Stevedoring term for a form of absenteeism.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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8.3 Minimum payments
Stevedoring operational employees can receive minimum payments for whole
(and portions of) shifts not worked, shift extensions,16 call-ups and idle time
payments.
Shift extensions
Operational employees are paid penalty rates equivalent to ninety minutes for a
30 minute extension, while for a two hour extension they are paid penalty rates
for three hours of work (chapter 7).
Shift extensions can be a useful rostering mechanism to complete unfinished
work. However, the penalty pay rates can also provide an incentive for
operational employees to seek extensions to their shifts (chapter 7).17 Further, to
the extent that operational employees value their leisure time less than the
payments for shift extensions, they can have an incentive to ‘create’ extensions
to shifts.
The cost of shift extensions can be further increased because of manning scales
which require full gangs to be maintained to finish the shift, even if continuous
work shifts manning scales are not required (chapter 5). For example, even
though lashing duties may have been completed and the straddle drivers are not
to be relieved during the extension, down drivers would still be required to form
the full gang.
Call-up
Call-up payments are made to operational employees for attending work for the
commencement of an allocated shift for which they are then not required.18
Employees who are subsequently reallocated to the following shift, can earn
more than double the shift not worked because of shift premiums and the call-up
payment. For example, a grade 4 employee would receive $70 for attending
work but not be required for the shift, and then receive around $210 for the
                                             
16 Shift extensions occur when operational employees work up to an additional three hours
following the shift just worked.
17 These incentives are similar for double header overtime. For various operational and
rostering reasons there is a higher incidence of double headers than shift extensions.
18 Minimum call-up payments for this attendance are specified in the Stevedoring Industry
Award and workplace agreements. Day shift operational employees reallocated to the
evening shift are paid four hours for the day shift. Operational employees allocated to the
evening and night shifts are paid the full shift premium.8   PAID NON-WORKING TIME
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immediately following evening shift worked (a total of $280 for one shift
worked). This can be compared to the employee receiving around $140 if the
day shift had been worked. It was not possible to accurately establish how
frequently call-up payments occurred.
From the employee’s perspective, such payments are reasonable because they
reduce the uncertainty of earnings. However, from an employer’s perspective,
minimum payments when combined with rigid notification and the order of
engagement rules, can act as a constraint on the rostering and allocation of
labour. Further, call-up payments can adversely impact on costs and hence are
an additional budgetary constraint on the use of labour. The payments constrain
the ability of the stevedore to adjust labour quantity without, in some cases,
incurring a penalty, particularly on weekend shifts where employees must be
notified by Friday afternoon (chapter 4).
Idle time
Idle time payments occur when permanent operational employees are rostered
on to a shift but are not allocated to undertake the shift and do not attend the
workplace. The payment of idle time is one of the features of permanent
employment which distinguishes it from supplementary employment.19
For example, operational employees might be rostered to work an evening shift,
but because of delays at another port a ship might not arrive until the next day
shift. Under such circumstances, while operational employees are not actually
working, they still receive the base hourly rate for each hour of the idle shift. At
some workplaces, operational employees on idle time on the day shift can also
be allocated to the evening shift (ahead of permanent employees on double
headers, guaranteed wage employees and supplementary employees) on the
same day and are paid the ordinary rate for the idle day shift and time and a half
for the evening shift.
From the stevedore perspective, idle time is costly. There is a direct loss because
of the payment of remuneration when no production is achieved.
At Fergusson Terminal in New Zealand, the rostering and remuneration
arrangements appear to have largely eliminated paid idle time. Operational
employees are allocated to five of the seven weekdays and all shifts are irregular
(chapter 4). Managers have the flexibility to allocate an operational employee
                                             
19 Permanent operational employees are regularly rostered onto shifts and are paid regardless
of whether the shift is worked or not. Supplementary employees are not rostered and are
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over any of the seven days. At some workplaces operational employees are not
paid for shifts not worked.
It was not possible to establish how frequently idle time payments occur, but
detailed discussions indicated that it tends to be higher at workplaces which
experience higher ship call variability. However, detailed discussions at
workplaces indicate that, while it still occurs, its incidence has declined. For
example, management at one workplace reported that idle time had been
reduced to around 3 per cent of labour usage, because the company pursued a
policy of bringing employees into the terminal even if they are not required for
stevedoring operations. Such employees are allocated to housekeeping or
training duties. In discussing the various forms of paid non-working time,
management at several Australian workplaces examined suggested that paid idle
time payments are no longer a major problem. The improvements in rostering
flexibility through irregular shifts and the ability to allocate employees to other
duties appear to have been key factors (chapter 4). Detailed discussions revealed
some scepticism by Australian management about the potential to eliminate idle
time under current work arrangements. For example, management at some
workplaces claimed that even if manning levels were different, some idle time
would exist under current industrial arrangements because of the inability to
control the timing of the arrival of ships.
There may be potential to reduce idle time further. For example, the size of the
supplementary pool and the order of engagement can be contributing to idle
time. If more supplementary employees were engaged at workplaces, smaller
numbers of permanent operational employees would be required to be regularly
rostered.
8.4 Summary of findings
Permanent stevedore operational employees have a higher number of formal
absences from the workplace than those under other comparable awards. Annual
leave and long service leave loadings in the Stevedoring Industry Award are
higher than in other selected awards.
·  Some permanent operational employees receive five weeks annual leave,
yet do not undertake the rostered shift work common to employees in other
industries receiving five weeks leave.
·  Long service leave accruals are similar in the Stevedoring Long Service
Leave Award to other state acts covering employees under selected
awards. However, permanent stevedoring operational employees receive a
high loading whereas the other employees do not.8   PAID NON-WORKING TIME
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·  Permanent stevedore operational employees generally receive slightly
more public and industry (or union) holidays than employees under other
selected awards.
Operational employees taking longer than specified breaks or creating delays to
the start of shifts or changeovers are a source of lower performance. Failure to
report to work can be an important contributor to delays.
Shift extensions, while preferable to double headers, can lead to paid non-
working time. Incentives remain for operational employees to try to extend
shifts and, combined with manning rules, can contribute to higher costs.
Call-up payments combined with rigid notification rules can act as a constraint
on rostering and the allocation of labour. Idle time continues to be a feature of
employment which distinguishes permanent employees from supplementary
employees. While the incidence of idle time payments appears to have declined
— in part, by increasing the supply of non-permanent labour — they remain
effected by the order of engagement rules and restrictions on the number of
supplementary employees listed with the workplace.
Operational employees are able to accrue frequent rostered weeks off because of
premiums on rostered weekend shifts. Some also receive a loading on their
rostered weeks off. In conjunction with the order of engagement and
remuneration provisions, these leave provisions can create a need for
workplaces to hire additional permanent employees to cover for periods of
operational employee’s absences (chapter 5 and chapter 7). These additional
employees then accrue substantial potential redundancy payments.
Overtime is essentially determined by the order of engagement and encouraged
by the relatively high premiums and penalties. This has the practical effect of
rewarding time served above higher productivity. Perverse incentives therefore
exist whereby lower productivity can be rewarded with the opportunity for
accrued leave. Operational employees taking an accrued day of leave may also
be creating overtime opportunities for other operational employees.133
9 ENABLING CHANGE
There have been some improvements in container stevedoring work
arrangements in Australia as a result of enterprise bargaining and
the waterfront reform process (1989–92). They have usually been
incorporated in enterprise agreements. However, a system of
complex, inflexible and prescriptive work arrangements continues to
constrain performance.
Responsibility for changing stevedoring work arrangements
ultimately rests with managers and employees. The Workplace
Relations Act facilitates the development of more flexible work
arrangements, but other factors also influence the scope for changes
to work arrangements in container stevedoring. They include
workplace culture and management ability, union bargaining power
and the extent of industry competition.
In this chapter, the effects of work arrangements in container stevedoring on
workplace performance (in terms of productivity, timeliness, reliability and
labour costs) are summarised. A number of influences that affect the incentives
and scope for employers and employees to change work arrangements are then
examined.
9.1 Need for change
There have been some improvements in container stevedoring work
arrangements in Australia as a result of enterprise bargaining and the waterfront
reform process (1989–92). These improvements include the use of some
supplementary employees at major ports, decreased manning scales, earnings
equalised over longer periods and more efficient use of down drivers. They have
usually been incorporated in enterprise agreements. Such changes are likely to
have contributed to improvements in container stevedore performance over the
period (chapter 2). However, despite some gains, a system of complex,
inflexible and prescriptive work arrangements continues to constrain stevedore
workplace performance.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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It is difficult to isolate and accurately quantify the effects of individual work
arrangements on workplace performance. However, this study has assessed the
direction of the effects and, in some cases, provided a broad indication of their
magnitude. An indicative summary is provided in table 9.1.
The impacts of a number of these work arrangements are mutually reinforcing.
An example is the interaction between shift premiums, penalties, the order of
engagement and equalisation schemes. Higher shift premiums and penalties
provide incentives to work high paying shifts. The order of engagement ensures
that any available overtime is allocated to permanent operational employees
before supplementary employees. Equalisation schemes ensure that each
permanent operational employee within each grade has the same earnings
opportunities from overtime.
The combination of these work arrangements has created an ‘overtime culture’,
where permanent employees have the opportunity and the incentive to work
longer hours to obtain high levels of overtime payments. Timeliness suffers and
labour costs rise. High levels of overtime, as well as irregular hours, can also
adversely affect the family and social lives of employees, and their health and
safety.
Poor stevedoring performance not only results in higher charges for users such
as exporters and importers, but the lack of reliability also gives rise to other
costs, including higher production, inventory and finance costs. The potential
savings to users through reductions in these indirect costs can be substantial
(PC 1998). Unreliability further disadvantages exporters because of the greater
risk of supply, resulting in overseas buyers directing their business elsewhere.
Given the adverse effects on performance, why do these unproductive work
arrangements persist? Permanent employees clearly benefit from these work
arrangements through higher levels of job security and remuneration than would
otherwise be the case. The Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) has successfully
delivered these favourable conditions of employment to its members.
In understanding why management has accepted these arrangements, despite the
adverse implications for performance, a number of characteristics of the
negotiating environment in stevedoring are relevant. These include:
·  the adversarial relations and mistrust between management and employees,
which may contribute to the use of prescriptive agreements;
·  union bargaining power, reflecting the MUA’s extensive coverage of
operational employees and the high costs of industrial disputation; and9   ENABLING CHANGE
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Table 9.1: Summary of the key direct
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– Little or no effect;  Ò  Decrease;  Ñ  Increase;  ?  Direction uncertain.
a Direct effects exclude the effects that arise only from interactions with other work arrangements.
b Productivity refers broadly to indicators such as: output divided by employment; and crane rates.
·  limitations on competition in the industry, due to a high concentration of
ownership, limited interport rivalry and barriers to entry.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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The rest of this chapter examines in greater detail the main impediments to
change that are internal and external to the workplace, and the role of the
Workplace Relations Act 1996 in facilitating change.
9.2 Workplace-level factors
A key issue is workplace culture and the role of management. As discussed in
chapter  3, an adversarial relationship between management and employees
pervades most of the Australian container stevedoring workplaces examined.
This manifests itself in various ways, including the high levels of industrial
disputation and poor occupational health and safety performance. These effects
in turn reduce workplace performance.
Workplace culture was not uniformly poor among workplaces however, and
there were signs of improvement at most of the workplaces examined. At one
workplace — Sea-Land Adelaide — there has been a marked change from the
previous adversarial approach at the port. Its workplace culture is now
characterised by:
·  management communicating directly with employees, as well as via the
union;
·  management’s willingness to share information, including financial
information; and
·  general awareness of the need to improve performance and to keep costs
down.
The improvements at Sea-Land have been influenced by greater competitive
pressures from the Port of Melbourne, following the establishment of Patrick’s
dedicated Melbourne–Adelaide rail link in 1997. They were also facilitated by
the relatively small size of Sea-Land’s operations. The cultural change at Sea-
Land is reflected in Adelaide’s improved crane rates performance over the past
few years (BTCE 1997b).
It remains the case, however, that management at each of the stevedoring
workplaces examined, including Sea-Land, has agreed to prescriptive work
arrangements that constrain performance. Prescriptive agreements may provide
short-term benefits by reducing uncertainty about the interpretation of rules
operating at a particular workplace. This approach may have been influenced by
the limited trust between managers and employees. However, by agreeing to
such arrangements, management has also reduced its flexibility to improve
workplace performance.9   ENABLING CHANGE
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It could be argued that stevedoring management has adopted a deliberate
strategy of gradual change rather than an ‘all or nothing’ approach, after
weighing the benefits and costs and concluding that the costs of more rapid
change are too high. Despite the shift to enterprise employment, operational
employees generally still see their primary affiliation as being with the MUA.
The scope for change at individual workplaces is also influenced by the broader
policies and strategies of the national union.
But management itself has suggested that there have been problems with
management performance. Richard Hein, managing director of P&O Ports
Australia, noted that this concern has led to P&O Ports investing to improve its
management skills:
Over the past 10 to 15 years, management has a lot to answer for when it comes
to productivity issues on the waterfront. The truth is management was not up to
the task. (Way 1998)
The detailed discussions revealed that at some workplaces there has been a high
turnover of managers in recent years. However, this turnover was seen by some
as contributing to difficulties with management and employee relations.
This study was unable to examine management practices in any detail, as they
are difficult to observe directly. But, at the very least, management’s inability
to:
·  eradicate the practice of employees leaving the terminal without
permission before the end of the shift while still being paid for the full
shift;
·  improve the relatively poor occupational health and safety outcomes in
stevedoring; and
·  anticipate the perverse incentive effects of some of the agreed work
arrangements
provide support for the view that stevedoring management can do better.
9.3 Industry-level factors
Several container stevedores emphasised that the MUA exercises substantial
negotiating power as the de facto sole supplier of labour to stevedoring. In
particular, stevedores contended that the MUA’s bargaining power is a major
impediment to changes in work arrangements and improved workplace
performance.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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There are also some important constraints on competition in container
stevedoring which may have reduced the pressure on both employers and
employees to change work arrangements and improve workplace performance.
These constraints include a high concentration of ownership, considerable
barriers to entry and limited interport competition.
Employees’ bargaining power
The bargaining power of the MUA is reflected in its almost complete coverage
of operational employees in container stevedoring. This blanket coverage
continues even though union preference cannot be legally enforced as a result of
the Workplace Relations Act.
The bargaining power of the union is heightened by the high costs of delays or
stoppages imposed on shipping lines. This places considerable pressure on the
stevedore to resolve any disputes quickly. One participant noted that:
... the majority of ship owners ... tend to have a very short term approach to the
settling of labour disputes. The common catch phrase is ... ‘I want you to be firm
with the union on this issue, but after my ship has sailed’. ... Often there is a
threat made to the stevedoring company that the client will change stevedores if a
speedy resolution is not made. (response 1, p. 3)
The cost to a shipping line of delays on the waterfront is approximately $30 000
a day for a ship with a 2000 TEU capacity (BTCE 1995a). Substantial delays
have a ‘knock-on’ effect on the shipping schedule for future ports visited.
Stevedores also incur costs when ships are delayed, because contracts may
change hands when they are renegotiated with the shipping line in the longer
term. Also, if the contract with the shipping line includes a penalty (or
performance) clause, the stevedore may incur penalty charges in the short term,
depending on the contract with the shipping line. About half of all contracts
between container stevedores and shipping lines contain such clauses. These
clauses are generally in contracts with the larger shipping lines.1
Participants also noted that the influence of the MUA is further increased by its
coverage of other links in the waterfront transport chain, such as tugs and ship
crew. Industrial action in any of these links also imposes time-related costs on
users, for example shipping lines, exporters and importers. There is some
evidence that the introduction of provisions prohibiting secondary boycotts has
                                             
1 An example of a penalty clause is where a stevedore is contracted to handle a minimum
number of containers each day. If the stevedore does not meet this minimum because of
factors within the control of the stevedore, the rate paid to the stevedore for each container
declines by, say, 10 per cent.9   ENABLING CHANGE
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reduced the likelihood of the MUA using its coverage of other links in the
waterfront chain as a source of undue bargaining power (see section 9.4).
The MUA also has links with international maritime industry unions, and their
involvement may further strengthen its bargaining power. An example of this
was the recent dispute in Cairns (box 6.1).
Competition in container stevedoring
Limitations on the extent of competition in container stevedoring services can
reduce pressure on stevedores and employees (or their union representatives) to
change work arrangements to improve workplace performance, to the extent
that at least some of the costs of inefficiency can be passed on to users (for
example, shipping lines, importers and exporters).
A detailed investigation of the extent of competition is beyond the scope of this
study, but the major factors and their effects on work arrangements can be
identified.
Factors inhibiting competition in container stevedoring include high
concentration of ownership in the industry, limited interport competition and
considerable barriers to entry. As outlined in chapter 2, a nationwide duopoly
exists at the container operations at the large city ports. The main barrier to
entry is port leasing arrangements.
Concentrated ownership
A high concentration of ownership facilitates collusive or ‘following’
behaviour. However, it does not in itself preclude periods of competitive
behaviour in an industry. There have recently been signs of heightened
competitive pressures in shipping that may be placing greater competitive
pressures on stevedores (PC 1998). It is apparent that contracts of substantial
value change hands within ports.
However shipping lines, with whom the contracts are signed, have a limited
choice of container stevedores available to them. Also, one of the two
stevedores, P&O Ports, has ownership links with shipping lines owned by P&O.
The Industry Commission’s (1993) inquiry into port authority services noted
that several inquiry participants were concerned that these links could reduce
interport competition in container stevedoring.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Interport competition
Interport competition is reduced by the large distances between ports in
Australia and the relatively high cost of land transport compared with sea
freight. But interport competition appears to be greater for stevedores at the
smaller ports, such as Adelaide and Brisbane, which can lose contracts to
stevedores in Melbourne and Sydney respectively. The scope for competition
among the largest ports is further reduced by the dominance of the same two
stevedores nationally.
Discussions at Sea-Land Adelaide indicated that management, supervisors and
employee representatives were all keenly aware of the competition from
Melbourne. The potential consequences of a loss of business exert considerable
pressure to improve performance at the workplace. One manager noted that:
We don’t have the monopoly here in Adelaide. A third of South Australian cargo
goes through Melbourne. The way to fight it is efficiency and cost effectiveness.
We need to make profits to get the investment to increase the size of the pie. Our
aim is to build a better service here than in Melbourne.
Geography cannot be altered, but its effect could be reduced if lower cost road
and rail (and coastal shipping services) enabled users to switch cargo between
ports more easily (Trace 1997). In New Zealand, land distances between ports
are considerably shorter than in Australia, but efficiencies gained from land
transport reforms also placed greater pressure on the ports to improve
performance (appendix I).
Barriers to entry
Equipment costs are high in container stevedoring. Detailed discussions
suggested that the cost of a quay crane is approximately $10 million and that
each straddle carrier costs about $1–2 million. Peter Cochran, New South Wales
Shadow Minister for Transport, noted that start-up costs for a basic container
terminal in Australia were approximately $100 million (response 4, p.  4).
However, the key issue is the extent to which these investments represent a
‘sunk cost’ — that is, a cost that could not be recovered if the business failed —
thus increasing the costs of entry. Because such equipment can be sold to other
stevedores and moved between ports, the high start-up costs in themselves do
not constitute a major barrier to entry.
Given the scarcity of good harbour land, the main barrier to entry in stevedoring
within each port appears to be the length of wharf leases. Australian wharves
are generally owned and leased out by port authorities. In 1992, the then Trade
Practices Commission noted that stevedore leases at the major Australian ports9   ENABLING CHANGE
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were for periods of between one year and 25 years (TPC 1992). Many leases
had renewal rights for between five years and 21 years.
The Trade Practices Commission stated:
Because waterfront land is a scarce resource, long leases (ie those that exceed the
amortisation period of key immovable assets) may impede competition and
reduce contestability and efficiency in the stevedoring market. They can entrench
existing operators for long periods ... (p. 60)
As recently as 1993, the Port of Melbourne renegotiated its leases for container
terminals for periods of more than 20 years.
The Port of Sydney has recently renegotiated the extension of one lease from 25
years to 40 years (table 9.2).







Additional years if option
to renew lease is taken up
Patrick Sydney 1978 40 yearsa 5 years
CTAL Sydney 1979 25 years 5 years
Patrick Melbourne 1993 21 years 21 years
P&O Ports Melbourne 1993 20 years 20 years
a Recently renegotiated and increased from 25 years by the stevedore — on the basis of additional capital
expenditure of approximately $100 million in the short term.
Sources:  Melbourne Ports Corporation; Sydney Ports Corporation
The Metal Trades Industry Association (MTIA) has also expressed concern
about a lack of competition in the Australian stevedoring industry resulting from
port leasing arrangements (MTIA 1996).
Barriers to entry are lower in New Zealand than in Australia because, among
other factors, common user facilities for container stevedoring are available. At
the Ports of Auckland, any stevedore can access a berth with container handling
facilities (such as quay cranes) for variable lengths of time. This is likely to
have contributed to lower stevedore prices in New Zealand relative to those in
Australia. Most of the Ports of Auckland’s shares are owned by a statutory
body, but they are listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange and full private
ownership of port companies is allowed (box 9.1 and appendix I).WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Box 9.1: Effect of competition on New Zealand stevedoring
Broad economic reform in New Zealand included financial market liberalisation,
reductions in import barriers and other industry assistance, tax reform and public sector
reform. The reforms that had the greatest direct impacts on stevedoring in New Zealand
were the transport reforms (commenced in the early 1980s), port reforms (introduced in
1988 and 1990) and substantive labour market reforms (introduced in 1991). The
combination of all of these reforms appear to have increased competitive pressures in
New Zealand stevedoring.
In New Zealand, several factors have contributed to greater interport competition than in
Australia — there are no stevedores operating nationwide; distances between ports are
less than in Australia; and transport reform in New Zealand has improved the efficiency
of land transport. Competition within ports is also greater because of the availability of
common user facilities, whereby a number of stevedores are able to contract with the
port company for the use of berths and equipment such as straddle carriers and cranes.
Contracts apparently change hands more frequently in New Zealand. The cost of entry is
much lower as new entrants with few overheads can undercut existing stevedores. The
loss of a major contract continues to force companies out of business. Therefore, the
incentive to improve efficiency is great.
Union coverage of the workforce remains high, covering, for example, 70 per cent of the
workforce at the Ports of Auckland. However, negotiations at each port take place with
the local union branch, not the national body. Local branches are aware that competition
from another port may result in the loss of all local stevedoring employment, so the
union has more incentive to negotiate change than in many Australian stevedoring
workplaces.
Work arrangements vary considerably between workplaces. The proportion of casual
relative to permanent employees, for example, varies between 25 per cent and 100 per
cent and shift lengths vary between eight hours and 12 hours to shifts of variable lengths.
Some stevedores pay flat rates, some contract out maintenance, some pay idle time.
Although contracts with employees may be individual or collective, the majority are
collective and the union still has considerable influence over employees. Some older
employees have found the concept of loyalty to the company difficult to accept. The pay
of employees is still relatively high and was in the top 20 per cent of all income earners
in New Zealand in 1996.
Source:  Appendix I9   ENABLING CHANGE
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There is little provision of common user facilities for containers in Australia.
Access to berth space is usually provided to private stevedoring companies
under exclusive, long-term leases. The stevedores are required to provide their
own container handling equipment.
BHP have argued that gains on the waterfront will only occur through new
entrants:
Substantial gains on the waterfront will not be made until new stevedoring
providers are able to enter the market in competition with existing operators. We
suggest that the performance of port infrastructure could be increased
significantly by: implementing more flexible work arrangements in stevedoring;
ensuring that port authorities are charged with facilitating trade and promoting
competition rather than raising revenue for state governments; facilitating access
in the provision of port services. The difficulty of new stevedoring companies in
obtaining access to port infrastructure continues to limit competition. (BHP
1996, p. 13)
It is important to recognise however, that the level of throughput in the industry
influences the number of stevedores that can efficiently operate at any port. It
has been noted that economies of scale are a feature of containerisation (Dick
1992). In particular, the ‘thinness’ of shipping trades (long, low-volume routes)
operating in Australia limits the ability of Australian stevedores to reach the
performance levels of large overseas ports such as Singapore (PC 1998).
Economies of scale may mean that Australian and New Zealand container
stevedores may not be able to achieve the performance levels of ports with high
levels of throughput, but the New Zealand experience suggests that greater
competitive pressure does improve workplace performance.
The New Zealand experience also shows that it is possible to have multiple
container stevedores with ‘thin’ traffic and still improve performance. Work
arrangements are considerably more flexible in New Zealand than in Australia
and are linked to improvements in stevedore performance and greater
competitive pressure in the industry (box 9.1 and appendix I).
Contractual arrangements
Market disciplines on container stevedores to change work arrangements are
further attenuated by the indirect nature of contractual relationships in sea
freight (see also PC 1998). The shipping lines are the only users of stevedore
services with a contractual relationship with the stevedore. The interest of the
shipping lines is for ships to be loaded and unloaded quickly, because of the
high costs of ship delays.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Shipping lines are less concerned about other costs arising from delays in the
movement of cargo. Those users affected, such as exporters, importers, road and
rail transport companies, have no direct market mechanisms with which to
influence container stevedore performance. This limits the pressure on
stevedores to improve aspects of stevedore performance that affect those other
users.
In 1996, the MTIA surveyed its members about their concerns with the
timeliness of stevedore services. It found that companies were dissatisfied with
the general level of service. Companies claimed, for example, that there was an
excessive gap between cut-off times for containers and the time of ships sailing.
Some of the reliability problems on the waterfront could be overcome by
improved coordination, but there are few incentives to encourage coordination
between the numerous operators (PC 1998).
9.4 Improved legislative framework
The Workplace Relations Act is the major statute in the Australian industrial
relations framework which influences how work arrangements are negotiated at
each workplace. This is one avenue through which government influences the
conditions under which work arrangements may be changed. The Act replaced
the  Industrial Relations Act 1988 as the Commonwealth’s major piece of
industrial relations legislation.
The main objective of the Act (s.3) is to provide a framework for cooperative
workplace relations by, among other means, ensuring that the primary
responsibility for determining matters affecting the relationship between
employers and employees rests with employers and employees at the workplace
level.
The Act facilitates change to work arrangements by reducing legislative
constraints on workplace negotiations. Award simplification, for example,
reduces the coverage of awards to ‘20 allowable matters’ thereby effectively
changing the role of awards to that of a safety net.
The enterprise agreements in the workplaces examined were negotiated in 1996,
prior to the enactment of the Workplace Relations Act. As changes to enterprise
agreements are subject to negotiation between the relevant parties, changes to
existing work arrangements may be constrained until the current agreements
expire (at the end of 1999 in some cases). However, new entrants to the industry
will negotiate agreements under the new Act. Thus, it may be too early to assess
the full impact of the new Act on container stevedoring.9   ENABLING CHANGE
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However, a number of employer groups considered that further changes to the
new industrial relations legislation may be necessary. The Australian Chamber
of Manufactures, for example, considered that the Workplace Relations Act
provided a basis for stevedores to negotiate reform, but noted that government
should consider enabling legislation for ports if changes could not be achieved
through this means (response 8).
The National Farmers’ Federation also noted that:
The current industrial relations legislation is in need of further amendments to
achieve necessary labour market reform. However, criticisms it has received
from the stevedoring industry need to be seen in context. ... It is not enough for
the parties to criticise the legislation, but rather they should use the provisions
which are available in order to create high wage high productivity workplaces.
(response 16, p. 2)
While the Act facilitates change at the workplace, factors such as union
bargaining power, management performance and constraints on competition
will influence the extent to which work arrangements change in practice.
There are several important parts of Workplace Relations Act, discussed below,
that affect the negotiation and organisation of work arrangements:
·  the ‘no-disadvantage’ test;
·  award simplification provisions;
·  the role of third parties; and
·  dispute settlement provisions.
No-disadvantage test
The scope to change existing work arrangements is constrained by the ‘no-
disadvantage’ test in the Workplace Relations Act. The test applies to all types
of agreements negotiated under the Act. The no-disadvantage test requires that
an agreement does not ‘on balance’ result in a ‘reduction in overall terms and
conditions’ of employees compared with the ‘relevant award’ (s.170XA). A
possible exception is when a reduction in terms and conditions is not contrary to
the public interest, such as to help deal with a short-term crisis in a business
(s.170LT). From 1 July 1998, only allowable matters (defined in the Workplace
Relations Act) in awards will be considered when the ‘no-disadvantage test’ is
applied.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Several recent decisions made by the Australian Industrial Relations
Commission (AIRC) have clarified the application of the ‘no-disadvantage test’
under the Workplace Relations Act (DWRSB 1997 and 1998). Although the
‘no-disadvantage test’ ensures overall terms and conditions of employment
relative to the award are not reduced, this has not prevented employers ‘cashing
out’ overtime and penalty rates into wages. An example in container stevedoring
is the implementation of an ‘aggregate wage’ at Sea-Land Adelaide.
Award simplification
The Workplace Relations Act specifies 20 allowable matters that can be
included in awards made by the AIRC, including classifications of employees,
leave arrangements, penalty rates and dispute settlement procedures.
Additional matters may be included if the AIRC considers that they are
‘incidental’ or ‘necessary’ for the effective operation of the award (s.89A).
Under award simplification, the AIRC is required to review each award on or
after 1 July 1998 unless a review has already taken place (AIRC 1997a). If the
Stevedoring Industry Award 1991 includes nonallowable matters from 1 July
1998, these matters will cease to have effect.
Some provisions in the award, such as for right-of-entry and stop work
meetings, appear to fall outside the scope of the allowable award matters.
However, several work arrangements that impose major constraints on
workplace flexibility, including the order of engagement, equalisation schemes
and specification of numbers of supplementary employees, are not in the award.
In December 1997, the AIRC established general principles for award
simplification that determine the scope of the allowable matters. Under these
principles, a review of the award would, for example, not allow:
·  details that would be more appropriately dealt with at the workplace; nor
·  prescribed work practices that reduce efficient work performance or are
obsolete and need updating, having regard to fairness to employees; nor
·  prescribed number or proportion of casual employees, nor their minimum
or maximum hours of work.
Also, following the recent decision (AIRC 1997b) on award simplification for
the hospitality industry,2 award simplification would not involve a general
review of the level of award entitlements. These levels of award entitlements
                                             
2 The AIRC decision also provided model clauses for personal and parental leave, enterprise
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will not be affected by award simplification because ‘paid rates’ awards (awards
that set out actual terms and conditions) may not be varied and would take into
account any subsequent AIRC Full Bench decision on paid rates. The
stevedoring industry treats the Stevedoring Industry Award as a paid rates
award.
Enterprise agreements use awards as a basis for negotiation, so award
simplification may affect the provisions in new agreements. However,
nonallowable matters may still be included in a workplace agreement.
Indeed, many of the work arrangements in the existing agreements are not
covered by the Stevedoring Industry Award. Because agreement at the
workplace is required, the relative bargaining power and approaches of the two
negotiating parties will continue to influence the outcome.
Role of third parties
The Workplace Relations Act changed the role of third or external parties in the
negotiation of work arrangements. The Act encourages the settling of disputes
at the workplace and reduces the role of awards to that of a safety net. The roles
of external parties such as the AIRC, Employment Advocate and unions under
the Workplace Relations Act are outlined in box 9.2.
In principle, the option for employers to negotiate individual agreements in the
form of Australian workplace agreements provides scope for stevedoring
management to enter into a more direct relationship with each employee. The
MTIA noted that the administrative, procedural and drafting processes required
to negotiate and certify such agreements may reduce the likelihood that they will
be used (Boland 1997).
The strong preference of the MUA for collective, rather than individual
agreements for its members (MUA 1997f) and the MUA’s extensive coverage
of operational employees in container stevedoring, had led to only collective
agreements being negotiated at the workplaces examined. New entrants into the
industry may introduce individual agreements and if these agreements
incorporate different work arrangements, they could be a source of competitive
advantage.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
148
Box 9.2: Role of external parties under the Workplace Relations
Act
AIRC
Provisions that limit the role of the AIRC, include:
·  the administration of an award system which limits arbitration to allowable award
matters and the making of minimum rates awards (s.89);
·  the capacity to arbitrate in certain limited circumstances in relation to
nonallowable matters (s.89; s.170MX); and
·  the administration of workplace agreements limited to certified agreements, with
Australian workplace agreements administered by the Employment Advocate
(Parts VIB and VID).
Employment Advocate
The Employment Advocate was created under the Act to administer Australian
workplace agreements, which are signed individually by each employee. The
Employment Advocate also advises and assists employees and employers in relation to
their rights and obligations under the Workplace Relations Act, and investigates alleged
breaches of the freedom-of-association provisions (s.83BB).
Unions
Several provisions limit the role of unions and aim to encourage greater choice in
employee representation, including:
·  the freedom-of-association provisions which outlaw preference clauses (which
may provide that employees must be members of a particular union to work at a
workplace) (s.298A);
·  the modification of the ‘conveniently belong’ rule for registering as an industrial
organisation under the Workplace Relations Act to facilitate the establishment of
enterprise unions (s.189); and
·  the right-of-entry provisions for union officials which limit access to a workplace
(s.285).9   ENABLING CHANGE
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Dispute settlement provisions
The Workplace Relations Act, and changes to the Trade Practices Act,
introduced provisions that allow for a range of sanctions on employees and
unions engaging in certain types of industrial action, including:
·  protected industrial action, which arises when there is no agreement, or
the agreement has passed its nominal expiry date. Protected industrial
action may only be taken during a bargaining period and must not be taken
until after the nominal expiry date of an agreement. Negotiation must
precede the industrial action or lockout (ss.170ML, 170MN and 170MP of
the Workplace Relations Act); and
·  unprotected industrial action, which occurs during the operative period of
an agreement, or as a secondary boycott — that is, industrial action taken
in support of those employed by another employer (McCallum, Pittard and
Smith 1990). A party can seek damages that arise from an industrial
dispute against another organisation when the AIRC issues a certificate
because, for example, it is unable to resolve the matter by conciliation
(s.166A of the Workplace Relations Act). Industrial action in support of a
workplace taken by workers in other organisations and workplaces has
been prohibited under changes to the Trade Practices Act. The party
imposing the secondary boycott may be fined up to $750 000 (ss.45D and
45E of the Trade Practices Act).
As shown in box 9.3, stevedoring employers have used several legislative
provisions, such as secondary boycott provisions, and this may reduce the
number of days lost as a result of industrial disputes.
The secondary boycott provisions are likely to reduce one significant source of
the MUA’s bargaining power — the impact on stevedores of the action of MUA
members employed at other stevedoring workplaces that have the same
employer and at other links in the waterfront transport chain, such as tugs and
ship crew.
A recent example of the effect of these provisions of the Workplace Relations
Act is the order issued by the AIRC (1997c) to prevent Patrick Melbourne
employees from taking industrial action for two months over new rostering
arrangements. The AIRC ordered employees to cease all industrial action and
work in accordance with the award and agreement in force. The decision was
later revoked by the AIRC after the MUA voted to endorse work arrangements
that they had previously rejected (Australian Financial Review, 8 January 1998,
p. 6).WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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These sanctions against employees may not curtail industrial action by
international unions where the MUA is able to obtain their support. However,
the Australian Consumer and Competition Commission has warned that all
boycotts or arrangements that substantially hinder the supply or acquisition of
goods or services and are in breach of ss.45D and 45E of the Trade Practices
Act, are prohibited (ACCC 1998).
Application of the Workplace Relations Act
Management in the stevedoring industry have used several provisions of the
Workplace Relations Act, such as right-of-entry permits, orders to cease
industrial action and the boycott proceedings under the Trade Practices Act
(box 9.3).
As yet, few changes to work arrangements in container stevedoring have
occurred since the introduction of the Workplace Relations Act. However, in
December 1997, stevedoring employers (including P&O Ports and Patrick),
have applied to the AIRC to simplify the Stevedoring Industry Award and to
convert the award from a paid rates award to a minimum rates award (DWRSB
1998).
The AIRC’s formal order on award simplification for the hospitality industry
that deals with penalty rates may have implications for the simplification of the
Stevedoring Industry Award. The application to reduce certain penalty rates in
this decision (AIRC 1998) was dismissed because the penalty rates did not
‘prescribe work practices or procedures’ for the purposes of the Workplace
Relations Act.
The AIRC also considered that there was insufficient evidence to support claims
that current penalty rates reduced productivity and that reductions in penalty
rates would increase employment in the hospitality industry.9   ENABLING CHANGE
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Box 9.3: Use of the Workplace Relations Act
Provisions of the Workplace Relations Act that have been used by stevedoring and other
industries include the following:
Unprotected industrial action — orders to cease industrial action (s.127)
By 31 December 1997, the Department of Workplace Relations and Small Business was
aware of 267 applications under s.127. Most of these were withdrawn, adjourned or
settled, mainly because the union agreed to return to work without the AIRC needing to
issue orders. Final s.127 orders were issued in 28 cases.
Unprotected industrial action — certificates allowing actions in tort (s.166A)
The provision allows damages to be brought against a party over conduct that arises from
an industrial dispute. By the end of December 1997, eight certificates under s.166A were
made by the AIRC out of a total of 36 applications. In the other 28 matters, the AIRC did
not issue a certificate. Of the eight certificates, four actions in tort have been initiated.
Five more certificates were granted after December 1997. One of these five certificates
was issued by the AIRC to Patrick on 9 February 1998. This allowed Patrick to pursue
the MUA for damages before the Supreme Court of Victoria as a result of the continuing
dispute at Webb Dock. The Court granted Patrick Stevedores an interim injunction on 23
February, requiring the MUA to cease industrial action.
Unprotected industrial action — secondary boycott proceedings
By 31 December 1997, nine applications under s.45D or s.45DB of the Trade Practices
Act had been made. In one case, the applicant applied for damages, alleging that the
MUA was frustrating attempts to load coal at Port Waratah.
Number of Australian workplace agreements approved
The Employment Advocate approved 4676 Australian workplace agreements (covering
237 employers) between 12 March 1997 and 31 January 1998. None of these cover
stevedoring operational employees.
Right-of-entry permits
Permits may be issued to unions to allow a union official to enter a workplace. One
stevedore applied to the AIRC to remove the permit of one official because his behaviour
was considered disruptive.
Prosecutions under freedom-of-association provisions
The Office of Employment Advocate received 188 freedom-of -association complaints
between 1 March and 31 December 1997. Most of these were finalised without the need
for legal action.
Sources:  DWRSB (1998 and 1997); detailed discussionsWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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9.5 Summary of findings
There have been some improvements in container stevedoring work
arrangements in Australia as a result of enterprise bargaining and the waterfront
reform process. These improvements include the use of some supplementary
employees at major ports, decreased manning scales, earnings equalised over
longer periods and more efficient use of down drivers.
A number of arrangements, as they presently operate, continue to adversely
affect workplace performance, including:
·  the order of engagement;
·  relatively high shift premiums and penalties;
·  relatively high redundancy provisions;
·  prescribed workforce size and composition;
·  equalisation schemes;
·  some aspects of existing productivity schemes;
·  some aspects of aggregate wage schemes;
·  relatively high leave and rostered time off provisions;
·  constraints on contracting out; and
·  minimum call-up and idle time provisions.
These work arrangements form a complex, inflexible and prescriptive system
that continues to constrain container stevedore workplace performance. Many of
them (such as the order of engagement, shift premiums and penalty rates, and
equalisation schemes) are mutually reinforcing. They create incentives for
permanent employees to work longer hours to obtain high levels of overtime
payments (which can affect the health and safety of employees). They also
constrain the opportunities for management to alter the size and composition of
the workforce. The outcome is lower levels of productivity, reduced timeliness
and reliability, and higher labour costs.
The scope to change work arrangements is subject to three main sets of
influences:
·  workplace-level factors, including an adversarial workplace culture and
the attitudes and abilities of managers and union representatives;
·  industry-level factors, including the limitations on industry competition
and significant union bargaining power. These factors can reduce the
pressure on stevedores and employees to change to the extent that at least
some of the costs of inefficiency can be passed on to users of stevedore
services; and9   ENABLING CHANGE
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·  the legislative and regulatory framework, particularly industrial relations
legislation.
The Workplace Relations Act facilitates change by enabling work arrangements
to be determined primarily at the workplace and by reducing legislative
constraints on negotiations. Together with the secondary boycott provisions of
the Trade Practices Act, it has also reduced some sources of union bargaining
power. Ultimately, responsibility for better outcomes rests with managers and
their employees. Greater competition in container stevedoring would increase
the pressures on both sides to change work arrangements and improve
performance.A1
A PARTICIPATION AND VISITS
The Productivity Commission received 17 responses to the Research Issues
Brief from a variety of individuals and organisations. These participants are
listed in section A.1. During the course of the report, discussions were held with
individuals and organisations in Australia and New Zealand (section A.2).
A.1 Responses to Research Issues Brief
Participants Response number
Australian Association of Ports and Maritime Authorities 12
Australian Chamber of Manufactures 8
Australian Peak Shippers Association 6
Bunbury Port Authority 5
Cattle Council of Australia 3
Globex International Pty Ltd 15
Institute of Transport Studies 10
Ken Freeman 1
Liner Shipping Services Ltd 7
Metal Trades Industry Association 9
National Farmers’ Federation 16
Newcastle Port Corporation 13
Peter Cochran, Shadow Minister for Ports, New South Wales 4
Port of Brisbane 14
Ports Corporation Queensland 2
Office of Marine Administration, New South Wales 17
Ministry of the Premier and Cabinet, Western Australia 11
A.2 Visits
Australia
Association of Australian Ports and Marine Authorities
Australian Maritime Officers UnionWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics
Department of Primary Industry and Energy (Commonwealth)
Department of Transport and Industry Development (Commonwealth)
Department of the Treasury (Commonwealth)
Department of Workplace Relations and Small Business (Commonwealth)
(formerly Department of Industrial Relations)
Maritime Union of Australia
National Farmers’ Federation
National Key Centre in Industrial Relations, Monash University
New South Wales Minister for Ports
P&O Ports Head Office
P&O Ports Melbourne
Container Terminals Australia Ltd
Patrick The Australian Stevedore Brisbane
Patrick The Australian Stevedore Head Office
Patrick The Australian Stevedore Melbourne






New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Ltd
New Zealand Employers Federation






The approach followed in this study for examining work arrangements in
Australian stevedoring workplaces is described. The data collection methods are
outlined, and the selection of work arrangements and workplaces is discussed.
B.1 Scope
There have been numerous studies on stevedoring since world war II. Previous
inquiries generally focused on industry-wide arrangements. The Industry Task
Force on Shore-Based Shipping Costs (1986), for example, examined industry
labour allocation systems and awards. The Inter-State Commission (ISC 1989b)
also examined industry arrangements, and recommended the introduction of
enterprise-level arrangements. Under subsequent reforms in the early 1990s, the
stevedoring industry adopted enterprise bargaining (appendix F). This provides
a strong rationale for shifting the focus of research on work arrangements to the
workplace level.
Unlike previous research, this study examines a range of work arrangements in
selected stevedoring workplaces. The advantage of this approach is that it can
reveal important insights into:
·  the nature and extent of work arrangements and how they vary across
workplaces;
·  interrelationships between work arrangements (for example, how rostering
arrangements affect manning levels);
·  links between work arrangements and workplace performance (for
example, how pay systems influence incentives and productivity); and
·  internal factors (such as workplace culture) and external factors (such as
the industry structure and industrial relations framework) which may be
inhibiting changes in work arrangements.
B.2 Data collection
Such an approach necessarily requires detailed information obtained at the
workplace level. A number of methods have been used to collect qualitative and
quantitative data from primary sources including:
·  initial consultations with industry participants;WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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·  a public call for views and evidence;
·  detailed discussions at selected workplaces; and
·  workplace information requests.
These data collection methods are outlined below. Primary data were
supplemented by secondary information sources.
Consultations
In the initial phase of the project, consultations were undertaken with industry
participants: stevedoring employers, maritime unions (the Maritime Union of
Australia (MUA) and the Australian Maritime Officers Union) and other parties
including government departments and specialist academics. This input assisted
in:
·  defining the scope of the study and the likely set of issues; and
·  selecting the work arrangements and workplaces for analysis.
An important issue raised in consultations was the appropriate points of
reference for comparing work arrangements. In this study, work arrangements
are compared:
·  over time within workplaces;
·  across different workplaces in the Australian container stevedoring
industry;
·  with arrangements in other Australian industries (for example, the
transport industry) where considered appropriate; and
·  with stevedoring workplaces in New Zealand.
Public call for information
Following the consultations, a public brief, the Research Issues Brief, was
prepared and distributed widely to interested parties. The Research Issues Brief
outlined the background to the study, the broad work arrangements under
consideration, and the main issues. It provided parties upstream and downstream
of stevedoring activities with an opportunity to express their views and to
contribute to this study (appendix A).
Views and evidence (such as examples of the effect of particular work
arrangements on workplace performance) were sought from stevedoring
companies, stevedore employees and maritime unions, shipping lines, exportersB   RESEARCH METHOD
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and importers, and other operators and agencies involved in, or affected by,
waterfront activities.
Detailed discussions
Qualitative information on work arrangements and performance was obtained
from discussions at selected workplaces. In-depth discussions were held at
selected Australian workplaces in four capital city ports (section B.4). Meetings
were held separately with management, supervisors and Site Committees
(comprised of elected union representatives at the workplaces).
Participants were asked for their views on the advantages and disadvantages of
work arrangements in the industry. Information was also sought on the effects
of work arrangements, such as shiftwork, on employees’ family and social lives.
Participants were asked for their views on better ways of organising work and
impediments to possible improvements.
A possible drawback of the information collected through these discussions is
the potential for selection bias. Management and unions ultimately decided
which supervisors and employees were made available for the detailed
discussions. In the case of supervisors, the majority of those available at the
time participated in the discussions. Employees were represented by Site
Committee members nominated by the MUA. As with all surveys and
interviews, there is also the potential for participants to place undue weight on
certain issues for strategic reasons. Given the potential for bias, other
information was used wherever possible for validation.
The main benefits of the semi-structured approach followed in the discussions is
that it provided a capacity to:
·  set the broad parameters of the discussion with the flexibility to further
explore issues where required;
·  seek elaboration and clarification of points; and
·  obtain first-hand information from participants with a detailed knowledge
and experience of stevedoring activities.
In addition, discussions with people in different groups within an organisation
offered insights into how these groups interact (including the extent of
communication between them) and the state of workplace relations, attitudes
and culture. Other researchers (for example, Ichniowski and Shaw 1995;
Womack, Jones and Roos 1990) acknowledged the value of having access to
managers and workers for plant and firm-level studies.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Workplace information requests
Information was requested from the five selected Australian workplaces, as well
as Fergusson Terminal, Ports of Auckland, New Zealand. This included data on
labour productivity, throughput and equipment. Specific information was also
requested on the selected work arrangements.
The initial information requests varied between workplaces according to the
information available from other sources, such as enterprise agreements.
Secondary sources
Primary data were supplemented by information drawn from a range of
secondary sources, including:
·  the Stevedoring Industry Award 1991, enterprise agreements and industry-
specific and general industrial relations legislation;
·  the awards of four other industries: the Transport Workers Award 1983,
the  Storage Services — General — Interim Award  1996, the Metal
Industry Award 1984 and the National Building and Construction Industry
Award 1990;
·  Australian Bureau of Statistics data;
·  previous industry-specific literature, including government inquiries
pertaining to work arrangements; and
·  labour economics, industrial relations and human resource management
literature.
Key features of the Stevedoring Industry Award and enterprise agreements of
the selected workplaces are summarised in appendix J. Detailed examination of
clauses in these enterprise agreements provided a basis for assessing the extent
to which workplace practice diverges from formal arrangements, and the extent
to which formal arrangements vary across workplaces.
B.3 Selection of work arrangements
The criterion guiding the selection of work arrangements was to include those
arrangements that are reputed to have a significant influence on workplace
performance in the stevedoring industry and are of general concern to
discussion participants and respondents.
The selection process was iterative. Work arrangements were initially selected
on the basis of preliminary consultations and a detailed analysis of theB   RESEARCH METHOD
B5
Stevedoring Industry Award, enterprise agreements and other secondary
sources. The Research Issues Brief provided interested parties with the
opportunity to comment on the work arrangements selected at that stage. The
list of specific work arrangements was finalised following the detailed
discussions (table B.1).
Table B.1: Work arrangements selected for analysis
Broad arrangement Specific arrangement
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Nearly all of the work arrangements1 selected are specified in enterprise
agreements or in the Stevedoring Industry Award. Enterprise agreements
include clauses relating to manning scales and the order of engagement, for
example. However, some work arrangements, such as equalisation schemes,
                                             
1  The term ‘work arrangements’, as defined in chapter 1, is used in this report rather than
‘work practices’. In the consultation phase of this study, industry participants indicated
that the term ‘work practices’ suggested an emphasis on informal practices, such as longer
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have evolved through ‘custom and practice’. The selected work arrangements
are discussed in more detail in chapters 4–8.
B.4 Selection of workplaces
The focus in this study is on container operations, particularly the core functions
of stevedores — the loading and unloading of ships and the loading and
unloading of freight of land transport operators servicing the wharf (receival
and delivery).
Workplaces selected for comparison were:
·  Sea-Land (Port Adelaide);
·  CTAL (Port Botany, Sydney)2;
·  P&O Ports (Port Melbourne);
·  Patrick (Port Melbourne);
·  Patrick (Fisherman Islands, Brisbane); and
·  Fergusson Terminal (Ports of Auckland, New Zealand).
The Australian terminals selected account for around three quarters of the
annual throughput handled at major container terminals in Australia. In
selecting workplaces, consideration was given to:
·  having scope to document alternative work arrangements;
·  including larger as well as smaller stevedoring operations; and
·  being able to compare the same stevedoring company in different ports
and different stevedoring operations in the same port.
Where information was given on a ‘commercial in confidence’ basis,
workplaces and employees have not been identified.
Regional ports, which generally undertake few container operations, were not
visited. However, telephone discussions were held with representatives of
several regional stevedoring facilities as part of the initial phase of research.
Consultations and written responses suggested that useful insights could be
gained by contrasting Australian work arrangements with a comparable overseas
port. For instance, the Association of Australian Ports and Marine Authorities
suggested that:
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... the study should make some attempt to compare work practices in relation to
Australian container operations with those in other comparable ports, for
example, Auckland, Singapore, some European ports say Antwerp and Hamburg
and say Los Angeles or other North American ports. (response 12, p. 2)
Fergusson Terminal in Auckland, New Zealand, was selected as an appropriate
international comparison. There were a number of reasons for this choice.
·  First, New Zealand and Australia are countries with broadly similar
cultures and living standards.
·  Second, the annual throughput of Fergusson Terminal falls within the
range of containers handled by the Australian workplaces selected
(table 1.2). Choosing an overseas terminal with a throughput similar to that
of Australian terminals is a means of controlling for scale effects.
·  Third, extensive reforms have been undertaken in the New Zealand
waterfront, transport sector and labour market in the past decade. These
reforms led to significant increases in productivity and lower costs in the
New Zealand stevedoring industry (see appendix I for further detail on
these reforms and their impacts).
·  Finally, work arrangements at New Zealand terminals, in many cases,
differ substantially from work arrangements at Australian terminals.
Consultations indicated that variations in work arrangements between
Australian and New Zealand container terminals were likely to be much
greater than variations across Australian terminals.
Discussions were held with a number of New Zealand stevedores (including the
Ports of Auckland), users of the waterfront, the Waterfront Workers’ Union and
the Department of Labour (appendix A). Follow-up discussions were held with
the management of the Ports of Auckland to obtain further information on work
arrangements.C1
C LABOUR TASKS AND THE CONTAINER
STEVEDORING PROCESS
The container stevedoring process requires the use of specialist machinery and
infrastructure. Labour performs a range of duties, including operating
machinery and undertaking manual tasks. Stevedoring employees are generally
organised into different operational areas according to the tasks that they
perform. Classifications based on skills identified in the Stevedoring Industry
Award 1991 form the basis of career paths in most workplaces examined.
C.1 Container stevedoring process
Container stevedoring is a mechanised process which involves the use of
specialised equipment, such as cranes and container transport vehicles, in
terminals dedicated to handling containers.1 Other infrastructure includes yard
space for short-term storage and computer systems for planning and processing
the movement of containers through the terminal (figure C.1).
Despite the mechanisation of the lifting and moving tasks, there are still manual
tasks which must be performed.
There are two main techniques used to load and unload containers from ships.
Those ships that specialise in the transport of containers rely on shore-based
cranes (quay cranes) to lift containers on and off; this process is used to move
the majority of containers arriving at capital city ports. The second technique
relates to roll on, roll off (ro-ro) ships. These are loaded and unloaded by
forklifts driving aboard the ship using a ramp. Generally, ro-ro ships do not
specialise in the transportation of containers and they carry other types of break
bulk cargoes.
Several different methods and types of equipment are used in Australia’s major
container terminals. The choice is partly related to characteristics of operations
such as yard area and throughput. Regardless of the types of equipment used at a
particular terminal, a container moves through a similar series of stages in
loading and unloading operations (figure C.2).
                                             
1 Some Australian terminals — for example, Patrick Brisbane — also handle break bulk
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A container is generally handled separately on at least two occasions between
land and sea transport. For outgoing cargo, the first stage involves a lift between
road or rail transport and stacks (rows of containers) in the yard. Containers are
generally stored two or three high in the yard on a short-term basis before being
transferred to a ship. Depending on the terminal, several types of equipment
including straddle carriers, gantry cranes and internal transfer vehicles
(including truck and trailer) are used in this stage. Forklifts are generally not
used in terminals to move containers to or from the stack. Planning systems are
designed to minimise the restacking of cargo, but containers may be shifted
between stacks before being moved to the quay crane.
Similar equipment is involved in the next stage of moving containers between
the stack and the quay crane located next to a ship. The quay crane then lifts the
container into a designated place on the ship. Computerised planning systems
seek to minimise the number of lifts per container from when it is loaded onto a
ship and unloaded at its final destination. Nevertheless, where a ship carries
containers bound for several destinations, a container may be lifted several
times if it is necessary to access containers below those stacked on top at the
same port, or at other ports en route to the container’s final destination.
The process for incoming containers is reversed. As noted in box 2.1, some
types of containers require different handling techniques. There are special
requirements, for example, for some hazardous cargo (such as chemicals) which
affect the stowage of containers aboard the ship and within the yard.
The introduction of new technology, particularly containerisation and
computerisation, has required considerable investment in new equipment and
processes. Productivity enhancing technology has led to changes in the way
work is organised and to significant reductions in labour requirements. The
introduction of computer-assisted planning for ship loading and unloading, for
example, has changed the role of some employees and has reduced the number
of clerical employees required to process and produce ship working plans.
In recent years, the two major operators, P&O Ports and Patrick, have made
significant investments in their container terminal operations. Investment by
these two operators has totalled well over $600 million over the past five years.
The investments partly reflect the development of more reliable and faster
equipment and the consolidation of terminals following the Waterfront Industry
Reform Authority reforms.C   LABOUR TASKS AND THE CONTAINER STEVEDORING PROCESS
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C.2 Labour tasks and responsibilities
In a container terminal, employees are organised to carry out several functions
associated with the movement of containers between the ship and land transport.
The separation of management, planning, supervisory and operational functions
varies among terminals. This section provides a general outline of the duties and
tasks performed in each functional area.
Terminal and operations managers
There is usually one terminal manager who is responsible for the smooth
running of the container terminal, overseeing its planning and operational
functions. The operations managers are responsible for the logistical aspects of
the terminal and work with the ship planners. There is usually a separate
operations manager for the ships and the yard.
Ship and yard planners
The ship planner receives information from the ship about the placement of
containers on incoming ships that need to be unloaded. The yard planner
receives information from the truck booking system as to which containers are
being delivered or picked up by trucks or rail.
Information about which containers are to be loaded onto incoming ships is
provided to the ship planner who determines where the containers arriving by
land transport are best loaded onto the ship, based on several factors including
the contents and weight of each container. The yard planner determines where
containers arriving by truck and from the ships should be placed in the yard. The
location of containers in the yard is planned to minimise the number of times
they have to be moved and the distance to the quay crane.
Clerks work with the planners and inform operational employees as to where
containers are to be moved by straddles and cranes. When supervisors or
foremen encounter unexpected problems, such as containers not being where
they should be, or ships listing, information is transferred back to the planners to
adjust the order of work.
Supervisors
A supervisor has overall responsibility for the working of a ship, which may
require the working of several shifts to complete the exchange. Consulting withWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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the operations manager and other supervisors, the supervisor is responsible for
the working of a ship and decides:
·  how to deploy physical capital (including the berth, number of cranes and
other equipment, and area of the yard); and
·  how much labour is required for the loading and unloading operations.
The supervisor also coordinates the receival and delivery of cargo for the ship.
A shipment of containers arriving at the terminal by rail, for example, may
require extra labour and equipment to be engaged for receival and delivery
operations for a shift.
Once labour requirements have been determined and employees have been
allocated to each shift, the supervisor can determine which employees undertake
each task. Supervisors are often required to make on-the-job decisions when
faced with late receivals, equipment breakdowns and poor or incorrect ship
presentation. After the working of a ship is completed, the supervisor reports to
management on the whole cycle of operations.
Operational employees
Operational employees2 perform a range of roles and tasks including clerical
duties, maintenance and machinery operation.
Foremen
Foremen work in consultation with supervisors and are responsible for
coordinating and monitoring the work of other operational employees in the
working of ships and in receival and delivery operations. Foremen may have
some discretion as to how work is performed in some aspects of the operation,
including the allocation of employees to machinery and other duties.
Foremen may work on the wharf or ship with other operational employees to
direct cranes and yard equipment, supervise lashing gangs and check containers
against sequencing sheets. An operational employee with some training as a
foreman may be upgraded to carry out these duties for the duration of a shift.
Clerks
Several clerical functions in container stevedoring have been computerised.
Nevertheless, clerical employees continue to perform tasks associated with
tracking the movement of containers into, within and out of the terminal. Some
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clerks may be involved in directing equipment and checking yard operations
against sequencing sheets. Clerks are also involved in processing receival and
delivery documentation from transport operators. Additional tasks, such as the
allocation of labour and payroll functions, are also performed by clerical
employees. At certain terminals, some employees have been trained to work in
other operational areas.
Machinery operators/general duties
The operation of heavy machinery (such as quay cranes and straddle carriers —
see below) and other general duties/manual tasks are performed by operational
employees. The tasks may be undertaken for the whole shift or, in the case of
heavy equipment (such as quay cranes and straddle carriers), drivers may
perform other tasks during their ‘down periods’. Some examples of manual
tasks that employees may perform include:
·  ship work — unfastening lids which cover onboard ship bays,
lashing/unlashing (which involves lifting heavy 12 foot steel rods to lock
in containers on ships — see below), placing/removing cones and
twistlocks which are used to lock in containers, and locating containers;
·  yard work — plugging/unplugging and monitoring refrigerated containers
and locating containers; and
·  ancillary operations — cleaning containers, machinery and amenities,
linemarking and refuelling machinery.
The conditions under which manual tasks are performed vary from day to day
and may affect the sequencing and speed of loading and unloading operations.
Some of these factors include damaged cell guides on ships (which may make
container stowage difficult), poor lashing equipment, damaged containers and
inclement weather.
Driving quay cranes
Up to three shore-based quay cranes are used to load and/or unload containers
from a ship. They are the most expensive heavy machinery operating on site,
with a new crane costing approximately $10 million. Depending on the type of
crane, they can lift weights of 20–40 tonnes to a height of approximately 45
metres.
The driver catches an elevator to the control cabin near the top of the crane,
some 32 metres above the ground. An ability to work at heights is therefore an
essential criteria for the development of a proficient crane driver. Several
discussion participants noted that it is not uncommon for operational employeesWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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to trial crane driving but decide against further training because they have
difficulty coping with the height.
Competent crane driving also requires excellent hand–eye coordination, good
eyesight and an ability to concentrate.
Once in the cabin, the crane driver operates the machine from a sitting position,
looking around and down through glass walls and glass floor panels. A visual
display unit provides the driver with specific directions from the planner on
which containers to unload from the ship, or conversely, on where to place a
container being loaded on board.
To unload a container from a ship’s deck or hold, the driver must adjust the
spreader (which is attached to the boom by wire ropes) to the correct container
length of 20 or 40 feet. The driver then lowers the spreader and moves it over
the top of the container to be lifted. The spreader is then accurately aligned with
the four corners of the container and lowered into position so the corners of the
spreader lock into the corners of the container. The container is then raised,
moved from ship deck or hold to shore, and lowered onto the pavement and
released for the straddle carrier to pick up, or placed onto a truck and trailer.
The reverse process occurs to lift a container onto a ship.
Due to the height of the driver relative to the spreader when nearer ground level
an inexperienced driver can take significantly longer to move a container than a
skilled driver who has the expertise to minimise the sway of the wire ropes and
minimise the number of attempts to lock the spreader onto the container.
Inclement weather, such as strong winds and rain, exacerbates the difficulties.
Discussion participants noted that although drivers work in air-conditioned
cabins with good visibility and ergonomic seats (in the newer cranes), the nature
of the task — the constant looking down — may cause back, neck and eye strain
injuries.
Driving straddle carriers
Workplaces which operate straddle carriers3 often have 20 or more in use at a
time, with each new machine costing about $1–2 million. Driving a straddle
carrier requires a similar aptitude and skills to those needed for crane driving,
                                             
3 Four out of the five workplaces examined use straddle carriers to move containers around
the yard. However, CTAL Sydney uses rubber-tyred gantries (which are similar to straddle
carriers but move along fixed tracks) and internal transfer vehicles (that is, truck and
trailer). Driving skills required for rubber-tyred gantries are similar to those for straddle
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because its purpose is similar — to pick up and deposit containers. Straddle
carriers, unlike cranes, move containers around the yard and on and off trucks.
Although substantially lower than a crane, straddle carriers are nonetheless tall
(and narrow) to enable them to move along rows of containers stacked two or
three high in the yard. As with crane driving, the straddle driver sits in a cabin
high above the ground (about 10 metres), receives instructions via computer in a
similar manner, and picks up and deposits containers in a similar manner.
The manoeuvrability of straddle carriers, relative to cranes, brings its own set of
potential problems. The design of a straddle carrier (tall and narrow) is
inherently unstable. Drivers must take care to keep the centre of gravity low by
carrying containers as low as possible. Cornering must also be undertaken with
care to ensure the vehicle does not tip over: the cabin computer screen provides
information on the lean of the vehicle while cornering. Visibility from the
cabins is generally good but there are blind spots. Drivers therefore need to
watch out for other vehicles and people on foot when manoeuvring the straddle
carriers around the yard. The skill of an experienced driver is also needed for
manoeuvring straddle carriers over stacks of containers which have little space
between the rows so neither the machine or the containers are damaged.
Lashing
Lashing is a manual task which requires a greater degree of physical strength
than is needed for operating heavy equipment. Lashing duties involve handling
heavy 12-foot rods which lock containers onto the ship’s deck. These rods are
designed to prevent containers from dislodging while the ship is at sea. In the
past, unlashed containers have toppled over (damaging their contents) or have
been lost overboard in rough sea conditions.
The lashing gang begins its duties after a ship berths at the terminal. The gang
walks up the gangway or is hoisted onto the ship in a lashing cage by the quay
crane. Gang members move about the ship’s deck and holds to unfasten and
remove the steel rods on the containers that are to be lifted. Once the exchange
is completed, the lashing gang reboards the ship to fasten steel rods onto the
new load of containers. The gang then returns to shore.
Shipboard conditions can increase the difficulty of the lashing task and also
affect safety (box 2.4). Given its physically demanding nature, lashing is
considered the least popular task in ship working operations.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Maintenance
Maintenance employees usually comprise formally accredited mechanics and
electricians who carry out maintenance on stevedoring equipment. Generally,
maintenance employees undertake the full range of maintenance functions
including preventative maintenance, periodic servicing, major repairs and
refurbishment. Maintenance is normally undertaken in workshops located
within terminal grounds. However, maintenance employees are often called to
repair or service machinery anywhere within the terminal as required.
Some maintenance work is performed by contractors (chapter 6). For example,
maintenance work on machinery can be outsourced. In some terminals,
maintenance employees may also be available to work in other operational areas
for which they are trained.
C.3 Labour classifications
Classifications based on skill levels set out in the Stevedoring Industry Award
are reflected in enterprise agreements in most stevedoring workplaces, and they
incorporate the tasks performed by employees in different functional areas
(table C.1).
Employees are graded at the level for which they have the necessary skills.
Skills are generally acquired or developed by employees through structured
training programs run by the employer at each workplace. Employees may be
regraded to a higher level when they are able to demonstrate the skills required
at that level.
The skill grade does not strictly determine the types of tasks that an employee
performs or the on-the-job seniority of employees.
However, those aspects of the operation requiring a higher level of skills (such
as driving quay cranes) are generally undertaken by employees at the skill level
of 4 or above. Other heavy equipment, such as straddle carriers, are generally
operated by employees graded 3 or higher. At Patrick Melbourne, for example,
straddle carriers are operated by employees at skill level 3, 4 or 5. Manual tasks,
such as lashing, may be performed by employees at all skill levels.
Most new employees are trained in all functions and tasks in a grade. Recently
recruited guaranteed wage employees and supplementary employees are graded
at skill level 2 following initial introductory training. These employees will have
the opportunity to be graded at a higher level with further training and on-the-
job experience.C   LABOUR TASKS AND THE CONTAINER STEVEDORING PROCESS
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Table C.1: Stevedoring award employee classification levels
Skills used in each classification level
Level Clerical Operational Other Maintenance
1 Induction and initial training
2 Small equipment use, ship and wharf duties, basic equipment servicing and basic
clerical tasks































5 – assistance and coordination of the work of lower level staff and liaison with supervisory
staff










7 – plan and coordinate integrated stevedoring operations (including maintenance) and
labour in connection with ships and/or cargo
8 Not defined
Source:  Stevedoring Industry Award, clause 13D1
D EMPLOYEE CHARACTERISTICS
Stevedoring employees in this appendix refer to employment in the stevedoring
industry — including bulk and break bulk operations as well as container
operations.1 Several characteristics of stevedoring employees, before and after
reforms implemented by the Waterfront Industry Reform Authority (WIRA), are
examined. The hours of work and remuneration of stevedoring employees are
also discussed.
D.1 Gender
In 1991, over 95 per cent of stevedoring employees were men. The proportion
of women has been increasing, particularly as a result of trainee intakes, but it
remains low — less than 7 per cent in 1996.
D.2 Age
The combination of the WIRA retirement and redundancy program and
recruitment significantly changed the age profile of stevedoring employees
between 1991 and 1996 (figure D.1). An increase in the proportion of younger
workers in the industry reduced the average age from approximately 48 in 1991
to 43 in 1996. Redundancies and early retirements substantially reduced the
share of employees aged 55–64. However, the average age of stevedoring
employees continues to be markedly higher than in the labour force as a whole
(ABS 1996b).
D.3 Birthplace
In 1996, approximately one quarter of stevedoring employees were born in a
non-English speaking country, compared with about 14 per cent of the labour
force as a whole (ABS 1996b; ABS unpublished census data). The proportion of
                                             
1 The statistical classification of the stevedoring industry used in this appendix refers to
Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification industry class 6621
(Stevedoring). Some bulk operations, such as coal terminals and wheat terminals are
excluded from the stevedoring industry and included in industry class 6622 (Water
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non-English speaking background stevedoring employees declined from
approximately 31 per cent to 24 per cent over the period 1991–96. This partly
reflects the changes in the age composition of stevedoring employees, with
employees of a non-English speaking background being overrepresented in the
older age groupings.























a Includes employment in Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification class 6621 for 1996
and Australian Standard Industrial Classification class 5721 for 1991.
Sources:  ABS (1996b); ABS unpublished census data
D.4 Occupation
The proportion of stevedoring employees in different occupational groups
changed between 1991 and 1996, partly reflecting technological changes and
the structure of the industry (figure D.2). The proportion of employees in
operational areas (clerical workers, plant operators and labourers) declined from
approximately 87 per cent in 1991 to 76 per cent in 1996. This was offset by a
significantly higher proportion of employees in professional areas (including
engineering and business management) and sales representatives.D   EMPLOYEE CHARACTERISTICS
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a Includes employment in Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification class 6621 for 1996
and the Australian Standard Industrial Classification class 5721 for 1991.
Source:  ABS unpublished census data
D.5 Educational attainment
Over the period 1991–96, the proportion of stevedoring employees with tertiary
or vocational training qualifications increased from approximately 28 per cent to
39 per cent (ABS unpublished census data). The increase in educational
attainment over the period mainly reflects an increase in the proportion of
employees who had undertaken vocational, rather than tertiary, training.
Changes in the level of educational attainment across occupational groups are
shown in table D.1. The increase in the proportion of plant operators and
labourers with tertiary or vocational training qualifications partly reflects an
increase in the opportunity for existing employees to attend training following
WIRA reforms and the development of competency-based standards by the
National Training Advisory Council (BTCE 1995a). In contrast, the proportion
of managers with tertiary or vocational training qualifications declined by
11 percentage points between 1991 and 1996.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Plant operators 22 28
Labourers 20 28
a Includes employment in Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification class 6621 for 1996
and the Australian Standard Industrial Classification class 5721 for 1991.
b Occupational groupings are classified according to the Australian Standard Classification of Occupations (first
edition) for 1991 and the second edition for 1996.
Source:  ABS unpublished census data
D.6 Average wages and hours worked
In 1996 the average gross weekly earnings of full-time, nonmanagerial
stevedoring employees was in the top 5 per cent of wage and salary earners in
Australia (ABS 1996a, ABS unpublished data).
The earnings of stevedoring employees vary across workplaces, partly reflecting
differences in hours worked and remuneration arrangements negotiated in
enterprise agreements at each workplace. Chapter 7 examines remuneration
arrangements and the level of earnings and hours worked by employees in
container stevedoring in more detail.
The average annual earnings of full-time, nonmanagerial stevedoring employees
in the industry was approximately $72  000 in 1996. On average, full-time,
nonmanagerial stevedoring employees worked approximately 45 hours per week
in the same year (ABS unpublished data). Stevedoring employees earned
significantly more than workers in similar occupational groups in other
industries (table D.2).D   EMPLOYEE CHARACTERISTICS
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Table D.2: Average weekly total earnings of stevedoring employees
and selected occupational groups, 1996
a





Plant and machine operators and drivers 757
Labourers and related workers 601
All occupations 727
a Data presented for the selected occupational groupings are for adult, male, nonmanagerial employees in the
Australian Standard Classification of Occupations (first edition) groups 4, 5, 7 and 8.
b Includes employment in Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification class 6621.
Sources:  ABS (1996b); unpublished ABS dataE1
E FACTORS AFFECTING THE LOADING AND
UNLOADING OF SHIPS
This appendix discusses some of the factors that affect the performance of
stevedore workplaces. These factors specifically relate to constraints on loading
and unloading a ship. Other factors affecting performance such as work
arrangements and distance between ports are discussed elsewhere.
E.1 Throughput
Participants in the study frequently noted that interport comparisons failed to
account for the size of each operation. In particular, many claimed comparisons
of Australian stevedores with those in Singapore, for example, were unfair. This
was largely because of the port sizes and the types of ships differed. Four or five
cranes may discharge an entire ship in the larger international ports, while in
Australia it was invariably one, two, or at most, three cranes moving only a
portion of the containers carried. This size consideration is also relevant for
interworkplace comparisons within Australia. As Tim Blood, the Container
Business Manager for P&O Ports Victoria, recently stated:
If we had 90 per cent transhipment instead of 10 per cent and vessels of 6000
TEU capacity instead of 600 TEU, with single destination cargoes, and no late
changes to cargo stowage and lower safety standards, we would achieve over
30 containers per crane on all vessels, all of the time. (MUA 1997b)
E.2 Difficult stows
Some stevedores, because of their location, often face small exchanges. The
ports of Brisbane and Adelaide, being either a first or last port of call, tend to
have more difficult stows. Often the movement of containers is not isolated to
one part of the ship. A number of containers may need to be moved (and later
restowed) to access the containers required. Similarly, the crane driver may have
to stop lifting to move the crane to another part of the wharf to access a small
number of containers. As Captain Andrews from Sea-Land explained:
Adelaide may only have half the container rate of some Sea-Land terminals, but
all our other terminals trade Sea-Land stowed ships. Stow is central to
productivity. Sea-Land ships are computer stowed. The boxes that come off first
are stowed on the side of the ship, not in the middle where you have to lift them
four high to get them out. (MUA 1997b, p. 46)WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Difficult stows may also be exacerbated by poor planning in previous ports of
call. Containers may be placed in the wrong position, or may not correspond
with the computer plan.
E.3 Mix of containers
The number of 40-foot containers versus 20-foot containers loaded and
unloaded also affects crane productivity. The 20-foot containers are loaded on
and off ships built with 40-foot cells. This slows the rate at which 20-foot
containers can be loaded or unloaded because crane drivers are able to only use
one cell guide. As a Sea-Land crane driver explained:
If you have more than one crane working, the ship’s ballast can’t keep up. The
vessel rocks and the box [container] comes out of the guide and you have to start
all over again. So you go much slower to avoid this happening. Twenty-footers
slow me down by about 10 boxes an hour. (MUA 1997b, p 46)
Obviously, the greater the proportion of containers to be loaded and unloaded
that are 40-foot rather than 20-foot, the higher (all other things equal) the crane
productivity. As the Sea-Land crane driver also noted:
If we always had ships come in with around 400 40 footers all in one bay, instead
of one or two here and one or two there, we would average 35–40 boxes
[containers] an hour. I know, I’ve done it when the MYK ships come in from
Japan with 600–700 boxes to exchange. (MUA 1997b, p 46)
E.4 Late delivery and receival
Stevedores are only one link in a complex transport and distribution chain.
Stevedores can be delayed by transport companies failing to deliver containers
on time. Late delivery of containers can affect the ability to plan and move the
containers within the allocated shipping window. In the case of late receivals,
some stevedores charge companies for delays in picking up containers because
they can affect available pavement space.F1
F REFORMS IN THE STEVEDORING INDUSTRY
Between September 1989 and October 1992, a program of reforms under the
Waterfront Industry Reform Authority (WIRA) was implemented. One feature
of the reforms was a change from industry-based employment arrangements to
enterprise employment. These reforms are discussed in this appendix and
changes to work conditions, the size and composition of the workforce and the
number of unions in the stevedoring industry (including bulk and break bulk
operations as well as container operations) are examined.
F.1 Enterprise employment
The labour force, before the WIRA process, was organised on an industry basis.
Each port was allocated a number of employees based on quotas adjusted
quarterly to take account of the requirements of each port. There were
opportunities for reviewing the allocation of labour to individual employers in
changed circumstances.
At major ports, all registered employees were permanent employees of the
stevedoring companies. Daily inter-hire transfers (administered by a ‘labour
coordinator’ in each port) and quarterly reallocation of labour between
companies (conducted by the employer body, the Association of Employers of
Waterside Labour) allowed for the transfer of employees between stevedoring
companies to meet changes in labour requirements. If a stevedoring company
ceased operations, its entire workforce would be distributed among the
remaining stevedoring companies in accordance with the proportion of port
employment which each stevedore employed (ISC 1988, pp. 93–6).
Supplementary employees could be used from a register of employees
maintained by the Association of Employers of Waterside Labour in periods of
shortages of labour when labour requirements could not be met through
transfers (ISC 1988, p. 103). However, little or no supplementary labour was
used in major ports (ISC 1988, p. 94).
The main union representing stevedoring employees before WIRA was the
Waterside Workers Federation (WWF). Under the industry labour arrangements,
the WWF was involved in several aspects of labour management in the
stevedoring industry through its membership of port committees in each port.
The committees comprised equal representation from employers and the WWF.
Port committees had a role in determining the quantity of permanent labourWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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employed in different ports, reviewing labour transfer arrangements and
interviewing short-listed candidates for vacant positions (ISC 1988, pp. 108–9).
The WIRA process abolished the labour pooling arrangements and operational
employees became directly employed by each stevedore. There are now no
arrangements for the transfer of employees between enterprises. Under
enterprise employment, employees depend upon the success of the employer in
attracting business to the enterprise. Attitudinal change reflecting a change in
loyalty from the industry to the employer was seen to assist in the improvement
of productivity and the introduction of innovation (BTCE 1995a, p. 10).
Enterprises were also encouraged to manage the dispute resolution process on
an enterprise basis as industry-specific provisions relating to port conciliation
committees were removed from industrial relations legislation. Disputes were
able to be referred to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission as a last
resort (WIRA 1989, p. 13).
F.2 Determination of workplace conditions
A range of 21 different awards in the stevedoring industry were replaced by a
single award in November 1991.1 The Stevedoring Industry Award continues to
underpin enterprise agreements in the industry. The award established eight new
skills-based job classifications, replacing 10 different job types (each with
several classifications) which existed in previous awards (BTCE 1995a, p. 17).
The new skill classifications aimed to provide career paths and opportunities to
improve job satisfaction, and increase multiskilling and flexibility
(BTCE 1995a, p. 19). Training programs were also developed by each employer
in accordance with the needs of the enterprise and standards were established by
the National Training Advisory Council (Stevedoring Industry Award 1991,
clause 40).
Some work arrangements, such as incentive schemes and rostering, were left to
be negotiated in enterprise agreements at each workplace. Since the conclusion
of the WIRA process, parties in container stevedoring have been through the
negotiation process and have certified enterprise agreements on two or three
occasions. Enterprise agreements presently in operation extend until the end of
1999 in some cases.
                                             
1 A separate award, the Stevedoring Australian Vocational Training Systems Award 1994,
covers trainees. Long service leave arrangements are covered by the Stevedoring Industry
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F.3 Workforce size and composition
The size and average employee age of operational employees in the stevedoring
industry has changed through a program of early retirement and redundancy and
through recruitment. The redundancy program, under which 4479 employees
left the industry, was partly funded by a direct contribution of $165 million by
the Commonwealth Government. Users of the stevedoring industry contributed
$254 million.
A further 840 workers left under normal industry arrangements. By October
1992, 265 new employees had entered the industry. As a result of the program,
the stevedoring workforce was reduced from 8872 in September 1989 to 3800
by December 1993. During this period, the average age of employees fell from
49 years to 44 years (BTCE 1995a).
F.4 Union amalgamation
More than 20 unions had members involved in waterfront activities before the
WIRA process (ISC 1988, p. 9). Union rationalisation, although not part of the
WIRA reforms, was encouraged by several factors: the policies of the
Australian Council of Trade Unions and the WWF of encouraging union
amalgamations in the maritime industries; the development of the single
industry award; and federal legislation which required a higher number of
members for federal union registration.
Between 1989 and 1993 several union amalgamations reduced the number of
unions in the stevedoring industry to two — the Australian Maritime Officers’
Union (AMOU) and the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA).
The AMOU was formed from a merger between the Australian Stevedoring
Supervisors’ Association and the Maritime Services Guild. The MUA was
formed from an amalgamation of the Seamans Union of Australia and the WWF
in July 1993. (Previously the WWF had already subsumed the Australian
Foreman’s Stevedores’ Association (which represented foremen) and some
members of the Federated Miscellaneous Workers’ Union (which represented
watchmen)). The MUA also represents a wide range of employees in other
maritime-related industries, including offshore oil and gas facilities, harbour
transport and port and maritime authorities.G1
G OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY
Safety is a major issue at all stevedoring workplaces. Safety committees operate
in each Australian workplace examined to communicate information about
safety issues between management and employees (chapter 3). A recent study
found that the stevedoring industry (including bulk and break bulk as well as
container operations) was ‘performing very poorly in comparison with other
sectors of the maritime industry and other major industries in Australia’
(Easson, McCann and Ronfeldt 1997, p. 1).1
Easson, McCann and Ronfeldt (1997) used data from Worksafe Australia. For
several reasons, these data should be interpreted with care. The data only relate
to claims involving a fatality, a permanent disability or a temporary disability
resulting in an absence from work of more than five working days. Further, the
data do not include Victoria or the ACT workplaces because there are
definitional differences.2 The data are also of limited use to examine
relationships about the possible causes of the safety performance of the
stevedoring industry:
It is important to note that the data [are] primarily concerned about ‘outcomes’,
rather than processes. Such an analysis is inherently limited in terms of its ability
to explain the causes of injury or disease or to account for the differences
between industry sectors. Moreover, such data ... [do] not indicate anything
significant about cost and efficiency consequences. (Easson, McCann and
Ronfeldt 1997, p. 5)
G.1 Indicators of occupational health and safety in the
stevedoring industry
Between 1991-92 and 1994-95 the stevedoring industry performed poorly
compared with other industries (chapter 3).3 The stevedoring industry has
                                             
1 The statistical classification of the stevedoring industry used in this appendix refers to
Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification industry class 6621
(Stevedoring). Some bulk operations, such as coal terminals and wheat terminals are
excluded from the stevedoring industry and included in industry class 6622 (Water
transport terminals).
2 See Worksafe (1996) for information on the limitations of data on compensated accidents.
3  Easson, McCann and Ronfeldt (1997, p. 15) noted that caution should be applied in
comparing stevedoring with broader industry groups for several reasons. One reason is that
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shown an upward trend in several indicators of occupational health and safety
outcomes since 1991-92. Over the period 1991-92 to 1994-95, the incidence of
new cases in the stevedoring industry increased from approximately 109 per
1000 employees to around 170 — an increase of over 50 per cent. It is unlikely
that physical working conditions over the period deteriorated; they may even
have improved. Ergonomic seats that provide drivers with a more comfortable
driving environment, for example, are a feature of new equipment.
Data obtained from stevedores on accidents and injuries since 1994-95 (the
latest year for which comprehensive data are available from Worksafe) indicate
that there has been no significant change in the incidence of accidents at the
Australian stevedoring workplaces examined.
No comparable data on accidents were available for Fergusson Terminal, New
Zealand. During 1996-97, Ports of Auckland reported 121 lost time accidents
(defined as accidents which lead to an absence extending beyond the shift) for
all of its employees. Over the past five years at Fergusson Terminal, two
fatalities have occurred.4
G.2 Mechanism of injuries
The major mechanism of injuries5 in the stevedoring industry between 1992-93
to 1994-95 were sound and pressure injuries, accounting for approximately 30
per cent of accidents.
Falls, trips and slips (25 per cent) and body stressing, such as muscular stress
and repetitive movement (20 per cent), were also major mechanisms of injuries.
The incidence of these mechanisms of injuries is high in the stevedoring
industry compared with other industries (table G.1).
Easson, McCann and Ronfeldt (1997) considered that a possible explanation for
the high level of claims in stevedoring is the pattern of compensation claims,
whereby employees leaving the industry make claims for injuries such as
hearing loss.
                                                                                                                                  
there may be a lower proportion of non-operational employees in stevedoring compared
with other industries.
4 Permanent employment at Fergusson Terminal accounts for approximately 30 per cent of
the total employment at Ports of Auckland.
5 ‘Mechanism’ refers to the means by which the injury or illness (for which the employee
was compensated) was inflicted.G   OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY
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Table G.1: Average incidence of mechanism of injury and disease, new






















Stevedoring 43.1 7.8 22.7 44.9 33.1 6.6 161.1
Mining 11.9 3.9 11.8 16.0 16.0 6.5 66.2
Manufacturing 6.0 5.7 7.7 6.7 17.9 4.5 48.4
Construction 11.2 4.4 6.9 6.6 15.3 3.7 48.2
Transport and
storage
10.5 2.8 6.4 7.6 16.5 6.1 50.0
All industries 5.3 2.5 3.9 2.5 10.9 3.7 28.9
Source:  Easson, McCann and Ronfeldt (1997)
The incidence of different mechanisms of injuries incurred in the stevedoring
industry indicates that injuries associated with mechanical equipment are more
significant than those associated with manual tasks. Easson, McCann and
Ronfeldt (1997, p. 35) considered that this supports an impression that the
stevedoring industry is ‘plagued by unnecessary and easily avoided injuries and
disease’, which may be remedied by a ‘more systematic approach to
occupational health and safety management and regulation’.H1
H DISCIPLINARY MEASURES
Disciplinary measures can be invoked by employers and employees.
Management has the legal right to dismiss or discipline employees under
specified grounds. Employees have recourse to personal grievance procedures if
they believe they have been unfairly treated or dismissed by the enterprise.
Industrial action (in its various forms) is available to either party.
Employees can be dismissed for gross breaches of their contract of employment.
Grounds for dismissal are set out in the Stevedoring Industry Award 1991
(clause 8). The grounds include: being absent from work without permission;
refusal of duty (unless the refusal relates to a genuine safety issue); wilful
neglect of duty; failure to work according to reasonable instructions; being
under the influence of alcohol or drugs; continued or repeated unsafe conduct;
and assault or abusive behaviour. Employees summarily dismissed are not
entitled to termination payments.
Detailed discussions indicated that dismissal has been relatively infrequent in
the stevedoring industry. Management at one Australian workplace commented
that dismissal can be a costly and protracted exercise, requiring detailed
recording of an employee’s breaches of the employment contract. As noted in
chapter 5, there have been several recent cases of employees being dismissed at
Australian workplaces for leaving work without permission. These employees
were later re-instated by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission
(AIRC).
Other disciplinary measures (which fall short of dismissal) include the ‘docking’
of pay and removal from duties. The Stevedoring Industry Award allows the
employer, for defined instances of unsatisfactory performance, to suspend an
employee for the balance of a shift (clause 8). Management at one Australian
workplace, for example, measures employees’ performance and, if found
unsatisfactory, places the subject employees ‘off pay’ for the balance of the
shift. At this workplace, performance of crane drivers is also monitored on a
shift-by-shift basis, with management reserving the right to replace crane
drivers if their rates of work fall below acceptable standards; the enterprise
agreement states that management determines the placement of employees to
particular tasks at the start of, and during, the shift.
According to management, employees who consistently underperform are
generally given opportunities and assistance to improve their performance.
Underperforming employees at one Australian workplace are interviewed byWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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management with a union official in attendance. The employees are counselled
about their performance and retraining may be considered.
Personal grievance procedures are outlined in several of the enterprise
agreements examined. The procedures can be activated by employees if they
claim the company has:
·  unjustly dismissed them;
·  passed them over for promotion or placement in a training course; or
·  taken some other action which is unjustifiable.
In the first case, the matter is progressed according to clause 8 in the
Stevedoring Industry Award or provisions in the Workplace Relations Act 1996.
In the second case, employees must lodge an appeal, documenting the grounds
for the appeal including any supporting evidence. Management is obliged to
reconsider all aspects of the case and, if requested, give the employees or their
union representative the opportunity to present their case personally.
In the third case, employees or their union representative must notify
management of their concerns. If the matter cannot be resolved by management,
there are several options for seeking a resolution, including: discussions
between management and union representatives; referral to a grievance
committee (consisting of management and union representatives); referral to an
agreed arbitrator/conciliator; or referral to the AIRC.I1
I THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE
This appendix summarises the main elements of reform in New Zealand and its
effect on stevedore performance and work arrangements, rather than presenting
New Zealand as a ‘model’ to be emulated.
I.1 Reform in New Zealand
New Zealand’s substantive labour market reform in 1991 was preceded by
broad economic reform, including financial market reforms, tariff reductions,
the removal of most industry subsidies, tax reform and public sector reform
(Evans et al. 1996). Port reforms in New Zealand were introduced in 1988 and
1990, while transport reforms commenced in the early 1980s.
Factors that facilitated waterfront reform in New Zealand included:
·  general acceptance that reform was necessary;
·  simultaneous reform across many industries, including all forms of
transport;
·  the international openness of the New Zealand economy, which made
ports a key area of infrastructure; and
·  the New Zealand Government’s ability to change legislation nationwide.
Port reform
In 1988, the New Zealand Port Companies Act 1988 abolished the harbour
boards which had run the various ports for many years. Port authorities were
established to operate as commercially viable companies. Centralised controls
over port planning and prices were removed (Vasey 1997).
The Waterfront Industry Commission, which administered an industry labour
pool from which labour was allocated to the stevedoring firms, was abolished
under the Waterfront Reform Act 1989. This removed centralised control over
employment, introduced enterprise-based employment and allowed casual
labour (BIE 1995b).
Full private ownership of port companies was allowed under the Port
Companies Amendment Act 1990. The ports were corporatised and ownership
passed from government harbour boards to regional councils. Regional councils
are permitted to sell their ownership, but not below 50 per cent unless the NewWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Zealand Government agrees. Five ports are now partly listed on the New
Zealand Stock Exchange (Hirst 1997). In the case of the Ports of Auckland, 80
per cent of shares are owned by the Auckland Regional Services Trust, a
statutory body.
Transport reform
In rail freight, the Railways Corporation was established from the former
department in 1982. The corporation was restructured into New Zealand Rail
and privatised in 1993 (Duncan 1996). By 1992, New Zealand Rail had 500
employees — one quarter of the number employed ten years previously.
Road transport and coastal shipping were deregulated in parallel with rail. There
are now few barriers to entry in road transport and competition is intense
(Duncan and Bollard 1992). A summary of the freight transport reforms is listed
in table I.1.
Table I.1: Chronology of freight transport reforms in New Zealand
Year Reform
1978 Introduction of road user charges, initially at a low level
Review of all transport licensing
1980 Inquiry into freight forwarding industry
1982 Corporatisation of NZ railways (previously a government department)
Circulation of discussion paper on Land Transport Licences and Regulation
1983 Regulatory change in the Transport Amendment Act (no. 2)
1984 Replacement of quantity licensing for road haulage
End of maximum freight charge regulation
Removal of compulsory union and transport association memberships
Major revision of road user charges
1986 Completion of phase-out of permits of long distance haulage
Removal of imposts on road transport, including excise taxes on fuel and reduced import
tariffs on tyres and trucks
1989 Corporatisation of ports
Removal of centralised control of waterfront labour
1990 Privatisation of ports allowed
1991 Removal of cabotage on coastal shipping
1993 Privatisation of NZ rail
Sources:  Duncan (1996); Duncan and Bollard (1992)I   THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE
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Labour market reform
Between 1984 and 1990, there was considerable debate about the need for
increased labour market flexibility in New Zealand and a number of regulatory
reforms occurred. These reforms initiated some changes in labour market
structure, but major reform did not take place until 1991 with the introduction of
the Employment Contracts Act 1991. The key elements of the Act are (Maloney
and Savage 1996):
·  freedom of association: pre- or post-entry closed shops are illegal and
union membership is voluntary;
·  bargaining structures: e mployers must recognise bargaining agents
nominated by individual employees. The status of such agents is always
contestable. Each employee may choose to negotiate an individual
employment contract or be bound by a collective contract. The employer is
under no obligation to agree to a collective contract — whether contracts
are individual or collective is always a matter for negotiation by the
parties;
·  personal grievances: all contracts must contain an effective procedure
for dealing with personal grievances (such as disputes over unjustified
dismissal and discrimination) and settlement of disputes of contract
interpretation, application or operation;
·  enforcement of employment contracts: contracts create enforceable
rights, with enforcement being carried out by the parties to them;
·  strikes and lockouts: constraints are placed on the right to strike or
lockout. In particular, it is unlawful to strike while a collective contract is
still in force. Employers in essential services including ports, must be
given at least 14 days notice of the intention to strike;
·  institutions: the Act establishes an Employment Court and an
Employment Tribunal to facilitate the resolution of conflicts over the
content of contracts and personal grievances; and
·  minimum terms and conditions of employment: for all employees related to
wages, leave, occupational safety and health, and dispute resolution
procedures. The national awards system was abolished.
I.2 Some effects of reform
This section examines the main outcomes of the reform process, with an
emphasis on the effects on the stevedoring industry and some comparisons with
Australian stevedoring.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Port reforms
Within a year of the reforms, competition between ports increased and port
companies improved their efficiency and profitability. Port charges fell and
employment declined from 3100 waterside workers in October 1989 to 1300
several months later (Trace 1997). The BIE (1995b) estimated that New Zealand
ports in 1995 handled as much cargo as before 1988 with about half the labour
force. Indeed, waterfront reform is considered to have ‘transformed New
Zealand ports from among the most expensive and inefficient in the world to
service providers of an international standard’ (Reveley 1997).
Table I.2 compares the Ports of Auckland and selected Australian ports in terms
of ship turnaround time — one indicator for which some comparison over time
can be made for these ports. The earlier data on turnaround time for the Ports of
Auckland are not directly comparable with data for the Australian ports, but
they indicate that turnaround time has substantially improved in recent years in
Auckland relative to that in most Australian ports. In Australia, the port of
Adelaide’s turnaround also improved substantially.
Table I.2: Median ship turnaround timea







a Inter-temporal comparisons only should be made as each port has a different set of parameters to measure the
turnaround time of ships calling at container terminals.
b Estimate for 1993 is not available. Median ship turnaround time in 1989 was 38.0 hours.
c Estimate is for 1996.
Sources:  BTCE (1997c; 1994); Vasey (1997)
Another performance indicator is stevedoring charges by port. Changes in port
charges over time are not available, but a 1995 study by the Bureau of Transport
and Communications Economics compared stevedoring charges in selected
Australian and New Zealand ports. Overall, the study found that stevedoring
charges are lower at New Zealand ports compared with the selected Australian
ports (table I.3).I   THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE
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Table I.3: Relative stevedoring charges
a for containers in selected
Australian and New Zealand ports, 1995






a Charge per TEU or lift.
Source:  BTCE (1995b)
The reduced charges could reflect the substantial fall in stevedoring operating
costs (before interest) following reform. Operating costs at the Ports of
Auckland in 1988, for example, were 100 per cent of total turnover. These costs
fell to 60 per cent of total turnover in 1996 (Vasey 1997).
The pressure from competition that drives improvements in work arrangements
is substantially greater in New Zealand where competition among stevedores
(within and between ports) is fierce. This reflects several factors:
·  a greater number of ports in close geographic proximity;
·  improved interport road and rail links as a result of transport reform;
·  the absence of stevedores that operate nationwide; and
·  low barriers to entry, partly reflecting the availability of common user
facilities at several ports.1
Port companies do not have a landlord function in New Zealand, as do many in
Australia. In New Zealand ports, stevedoring operations are often operated by
the port company, and common user (or multi-user) facilities provided by the
port company are used by several stevedores at several ports. However, the
ports of Tauranga and Napier only have common user facilities because the port
company does not provide stevedoring services.
The port company at the Ports of Auckland has exclusive use of the main
container terminal, Fergusson Terminal. Three other stevedores use the common
user facilities for containers at Bledisloe Terminal. They compete with each
other and with the port company. New entrants have few overheads because the
common user berths are available. Therefore, they can undercut existing
                                             
1 These port facilities, including berths and equipment such as straddle carriers and cranes,
can be used by a number of stevedores that have a contract with the port company.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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stevedores and contracts frequently change hands. Geoff Vasey, the Chief
Executive of the Ports of Auckland, described this arrangement:
No New Zealand port leases berths to stevedoring companies. Our facilities are
either dedicated terminals, where the whole operation is run by the port
company, or they are multiuser facilities where stevedores come and go ...
(Vasey 1997)
Discussions with New Zealand stevedores revealed that new entrants have few
overheads and can undercut existing stevedores because ports provide common
user facilities. New entrants therefore do not face the same barriers to entry that
they would in Australia. This results in intense competition and the loss of a
major contract has the potential to force companies out of business. Thus, the
incentive to improve efficiency is great.
Transport reforms
Reform of the road freight and coastal shipping industries contributed to a
highly competitive domestic freight industry, which induced reform of the rail
industry.
Total New Zealand rail staff fell from 14 900 to 4600 between 1987 and 1994.
Yet many staff reductions had been made before 1987, after the Railways
Department was corporatised in 1982. Most corporatised and privatised
organisations in New Zealand maintained or increased output while
significantly reducing their staff numbers (Duncan 1996).
The Queensland Manufacturing Industry Forum’s submission to the Black Coal
Inquiry noted the benefits of rail reform in New Zealand:
In New Zealand, the monopoly on rail service has been removed and the public
corporation has been privatised. Over the period 1983–93, freight rates decreased
by 50 per cent and staff decreased by 80 per cent. (1997)
One New Zealand stevedore manager noted that improved land transport
following reform has resulted in stevedore business shifting between ports.
Labour market reforms
A survey examining the effects of the Employment Contracts Act across a range
of employers and industries was undertaken in 1995 in conjunction with the
New Zealand’s Institute of Economic Research’s Quarterly Survey of Business
Opinion (Savage and Cooling 1996). According to the 562 employers who
responded, the main outcomes of the Act, which varied between industries,
were:I   THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE
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·  lower allowances and penalty rates but higher ordinary time wages and
greater use of performance-based pay. Therefore, the net effect on the
overall wage bill tended to be small;
·  the predominant use of individual employment contracts in almost half of
the companies. Individual contracts were more common in businesses that
had a relatively low level of unionisation before the Employment
Contracts Act;
·  the main changes to work arrangements being an increase in ordinary time
wage rates, an increase in flexible work arrangements, reduced
demarcation, greater multiskilling and increased use of performance-based
pay;
·  enhanced productivity, operational flexibility and greater training being
the most significant outcomes reported by employers. Increased
employment, particularly of casual and part-time jobs, was also reported;
and
·  unionisation decreasing in half of the surveyed businesses. However, the
level of unionisation in each business was closely related to its level of
unionisation before the Act.
The survey indicated that labour market reform in New Zealand has had
significant effects on bargaining structures, pay and conditions. These appear to
have flowed through into changes in business outcomes — three quarters of the
employers surveyed considered that the Employment Contracts Act positively
contributed to their overall performance. Most importantly, there has been a
significant decline in the level of industrial disputes since the Act across all
industries (table I.4).












1986–90 178 82 727 520 260 6.1 48.7
1991–95 64 29 632 65 632 2.3 9.0
Source:  Statistics New Zealand, as presented in Savage (1997)
Work arrangements in stevedoring
Changes to labour markets and work arrangements following reform have been
widespread, but the effects vary across industries. The degree of regulatoryWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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reform in each industry was an important factor affecting the extent to which
work arrangements changed in each industry. The extent of industry competition
therefore created additional pressure on employers and employees to change
work arrangements. Another factor was the willingness of employers to make
significant changes to work arrangements soon after the introduction of the
Employment Contracts Act. Industries which made small changes found it more
difficult to later negotiate workplace reforms.
Discussions with several New Zealand stevedores and the stevedoring union
revealed that reform in stevedoring resulted in more flexible work arrangements
than those in Australia, with substantial variation among ports and among
stevedores within a port.
The majority of employment contracts are collective. These contracts are
confidential, so information on their contents is based on discussions with New
Zealand stevedores, unless otherwise specified.
Unlike the Australian enterprise agreements examined, for which most work
arrangements are prescribed in some detail, New Zealand stevedore contracts do
not specify roster arrangements, shift breaks and manning levels.
Workplace culture
One union (the Waterfront Workers Union) represents operational employees,
but negotiations at each port take place with the local union branch. Local
representatives are conscious that competition from another port may result in
their port closing, so the incentive to negotiate change is greater than in many
Australian ports.
The level of unionisation varies between stevedores in New Zealand. Union
coverage at Fergusson Terminal, Ports of Auckland, is about 70 per cent. At
another stevedore at the Ports of Auckland, 85 per cent of the permanent
workforce are union members.
As in Australia, there is a long history of adversarial relations between
employers and employees and this is only changing slowly. Many employees
continue to identify more closely with their union than with their employer, for
example:
Most stevedores opt for collective agreements as it is very difficult to develop
individual contracts without trust between employee and employer. New Zealand
stevedoring in 1990 had no history of trust ... However ... since 1990 ... we have
tried to treat workers as equal to staff. (Manager)
The Employment Contracts Act is not all one way. It does not provide protection
for the employer. A contract still won’t be changed without the union agreeing.
(Manager)I   THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE
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Some of the men that remained have never been able to come to grips with being
part of the company — they cannot understand that their livelihood relies on the
company keeping contracts and succeeding, rather than the union. ... The
majority of workers are still union members as too many hassles are created for
them if they are not. Even most of the new workers ... join the union because they
are intimidated. The union, therefore, still has an influence at the workplace ...
The culture is slowly changing but it is long term. (Manager)
Rostering
Rostering varies among stevedores. A selection of arrangements are listed
below.
·  Several stevedores at different ports have adopted a system whereby any
five days out of seven are worked with no overtime on weekends.
·  One stevedore has some contracts that are Monday to Friday, while others
cover weekend, nightshift and overtime work. Some are based on working
five days out of seven while others are based on working 40 hours over
seven days.
·  Another stevedore has moved from three shifts to just-in-time with a
variable shift length. This is to avoid paying for idle time when the shift
starts at 7 am and finishes at 3 pm, but the ship arrives at 1 pm.
·  Another stevedore used to have eight-hour shifts, but these are now
flexible up to 12 hours. This stevedore has a separate weekend roster and
offers employees a choice of which weekend out of three they have off.
·  At one stevedore, permanent employees still receive priority for additional
work over casual employees, but the stevedore would like this priority
removed.
One stevedore said that it would not run double headers for safety reasons. A
ceiling of 70–80 hours per week for each employee has been imposed to help
reduce the injury rate.
Manning
Unlike the Australian enterprise agreements examined, minimum manning
levels (both total permanent stevedore employment and gang size) are not
specified in stevedore employment contracts. Gang sizes can therefore be varied
downwards if desired.
Some New Zealand stevedores employ only casuals, with a few permanent
supervisors. Other stevedores have less than 25 per cent of their total workforce
as casuals.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Contracting
Before reform it was difficult to contract out, but stevedores are now able to
contract out any activity. A Ports of Auckland manager noted that during the
reform period, the cost of each of their services was compared with the cost of
contracting out. Services were contracted out if cost savings could be made, and
excess stevedore employees were made redundant.
Only some stevedores contract out activities, such as maintenance. Ports of
Auckland, for example, has its own workshop and does maintenance for other
stevedores as well, whereas Wellington Stevedoring Services outsources
maintenance and the Port of Wellington does its own maintenance but does not
undertake work for others.
One stevedore made substantial savings by reducing the incidence of idle time.
It achieved the savings by unloading and loading bulk ships itself and using
contractors for unloading and loading other ships.
Remuneration
The level and type of remuneration vary between New Zealand stevedores. For
example:
·  one stevedore has an hourly rate of NZ$21.70 that does not vary between
grades but pays up to NZ$30 for the night shift. Casuals are paid almost
half this rate, at NZ$12.50 an hour;
·  another stevedore has base pay of NZ$18.50 an hour with an overtime rate
of NZ$21.40. Casuals are paid about NZ$13 an hour and approximately
NZ$16 an hour for overtime; and
·  idle time is paid by some stevedores, but not by others. One stevedore pays
a retainer for idle time, but this is less than what the employee would be
paid when working.
Productivity bonuses and payments are not paid by New Zealand stevedores
examined.
Crane drivers and foremen at the Ports of Auckland earn around NZ$65 000 per
year. This income is well within the upper quintile of New Zealand personal
incomes (Statistics New Zealand 1998).J1
J WORKPLACE NEGOTIATIONS, AWARDS
AND AGREEMENTS
The advent of enterprise bargaining meant that negotiation of stevedoring work
arrangements shifted from the industry (and awards) to the workplace and
enterprise1 agreements. Agreements continue to be introduced, implemented and
changed as a result of negotiation between the relevant parties within the
workplace. However, the process is often complex, with a variety of factors
influencing the negotiation process. This process is discussed in section J.1
while the outcomes (that is, the work arrangements examined in this study) and
their interrelationships with awards and agreements are covered in section J.2.
The impact of these work arrangements on workplace performance and on
employees is discussed in chapters 4–8.
J.1 How are work arrangements determined?
The outcome of negotiation of work arrangements at the workplace is
influenced by factors both internal and external to the stevedore. Workplace-
specific (internal) factors, such as customer service requirements, the type and
age of equipment, and the ease of substitution between labour and other inputs,
can contribute to the persistence of particular work arrangements depending on
how they influence each party’s estimation of the benefits and costs in the
negotiation process. These benefits and costs, and therefore negotiation
outcomes, are likely to vary between workplaces.
Institutional (external) factors, particularly industrial relations regulation,
establish the framework in which bargaining takes place, and therefore can also
affect the benefits and costs of bargaining2 at the workplace in such a way as to
facilitate or hinder changes to work arrangements.
Some external factors of particular importance to work arrangement outcomes
in the stevedoring industry include:
·  the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC), which sets the
industry-wide conditions by regulating awards that apply to the
stevedoring industry. Other functions of the AIRC that affect the
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stevedoring industry include its role in the resolution of disputes,
assistance with workplace bargaining and regulation of employee
representation by unions;
·  the Workplace Relations Act 1996, which sets the framework for
workplace-focused negotiations and sets the responsibilities and duties of
parties directly involved in negotiating enterprise agreements and third
parties, such as the AIRC and Employment Advocate;
·  the Trade Practices Act 1974, which provides a means for an affected
party to apply for injunctive relief from secondary industrial action that
may disrupt the workplace;
·  the Employment Advocate, who provides assistance and advice to
employers and employees about their rights and obligations under the
Workplace Relations Act, including relevant award and statutory
entitlements. The Employment Advocate also administers the negotiation
of Australian Workplace Agreements and investigates breaches of
freedom-of-association provisions in the Workplace Relations Act;
·  the Federal Court, which (among its other functions) hears appeals on
AIRC decisions, issues injunctions under the Trade Practices Act and
enforces directions made by the AIRC;
·  operational requirements of legislation (such as the Customs Act 1901) and
agencies (such as the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service),
which affect stevedores’ handling procedures; and
·  federal and state occupational, health and safety legislation and regulation
affecting workplace safety, and Marine Orders, which regulate ship-board
safety.
At the workplace, significant changes in work arrangements are considered
within the context of a bargaining process. This may be continuous — for
example, changes to work arrangements at several stevedoring workplaces are
negotiated and implemented during the life of an enterprise agreement as issues
arise — or more episodic, with negotiation occurring at the time of
renegotiation of an agreement (table J.1). However, most changes occur at the
time of renegotiation.
The particular package of work arrangements which forms an enterprise
agreement is influenced by the specific workplace characteristics and
institutional factors noted above. Bargaining outcomes will also be influenced
by the negotiating expertise of the parties, the relative strength of the parties and
the extent to which organisational hierarchy (for both the stevedore and unions)J   WORKPLACE NEGOTIATIONS, AWARDS AND AGREEMENTS
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brings broader organisational strategy to bear on workplace bargaining. These
issues are discussed in detail in chapter 9.
Table J.1: How change to work arrangements is negotiated
Type of negotiation Workplace







Keep to agreement and alter when agreement is
renegotiated P&O Ports Melbourne
a Most changes, however, occur at the time of renegotiation of enterprise agreements.
Sources:  Workplace information requests
J.2 Comparison of work arrangements in the award and
agreements
Enterprise agreements represent the formal outcome of the negotiation process
in each of the Australian container stevedoring workplaces examined. This
section reviews the work arrangements examined in this study in the context of
these enterprise agreements and the Stevedoring Industry Award 1991, focusing
on the significance of the award and agreements and comparisons between
them.
Enterprise agreements
Formal enterprise agreements were first developed in the stevedoring industry
as part of the Waterfront Industry Reform Authority (WIRA) process.
Previously, there were often only poorly documented ‘customary’ agreements.
The move to enterprise employment (1989–1991) resulted in 108 agreements
being implemented in the industry by mid-1992, including agreements at
Conaust and Strang Patrick Stevedoring (predecessors to P&O Ports and Patrick
respectively) (WIRA 1992).
Each of the Australian workplaces examined has negotiated two or three
collective agreements; Patrick Melbourne has recently finalised its third
agreement while CTAL Sydney is currently negotiating its third. All agreements
have been negotiated on a collective basis involving employers and
representative unions.WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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Collective agreements are also the norm at Fergusson Terminal in Auckland,
New Zealand (appendix I). However, given that individual employment
agreements are also significant there, and that all such agreements are
confidential, this section will focus on comparisons between Australian
workplaces only.
The enterprise agreements examined below are very prescriptive, covering a
broad range of issues in considerable detail. There are six pages in Patrick
Melbourne’s enterprise agreements, for example, that detail rostering and
allocation arrangements alone.
Stevedoring Industry Award
The Stevedoring Industry Award was introduced as a result of the WIRA
process, effectively reducing 21 awards into one. It also established the
exclusive right of the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) to represent
operational employees in negotiations where previously eight unions had been
involved.
The approach taken in the award was, among other things, to:
·  facilitate enterprise employment;
·  establish skill-related career paths;
·  eliminate impediments to multiskilling;
·  create appropriate relativities between different worker categories within
the industry and at the enterprise level; and
·  ensure that work patterns and arrangements enhance flexibility and
efficiency. (Stevedoring Industry Award, preamble)
Significance of the award and agreements
By providing the benchmark for the test of ‘no-disadvantage’,3 the Stevedoring
Industry Award provides a set of base provisions (underlying principles or rules)
from which enterprise agreements can be negotiated. Base provisions that are
relevant to the work arrangements examined in this study include those relating
to shift premiums, shift working times, the base weekly wage and leave
conditions (table 2.8) (see table J.3 for more detail on relevant provisions in the
Stevedoring Industry Award and each enterprise agreement).
                                             
3  Under the ‘no-disadvantage’ test, an agreement may not ‘on balance’ result in a ‘reduction
in overall terms and conditions’ of employees compared with the ‘relevant award’,
although individual provisions may be changed (chapter 9).J   WORKPLACE NEGOTIATIONS, AWARDS AND AGREEMENTS
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The Stevedoring Industry Award is superseded by the provisions of enterprise
agreements to the extent of any inconsistencies, but the award does provide the
structural basis for the development of detailed work arrangements in enterprise
agreements. Its provisions regarding shift length and starting times, for example,
form the basis of detailed roster systems negotiated at each workplace and are
incorporated in the relevant agreement.
Most work arrangements negotiated at the workplace and examined in this study
have been incorporated in agreements, rather than the Stevedoring Industry
Award. Provisions relating to the order of engagement, roster schedules,
manning scales and remuneration schemes, for example, are all specified in
agreements (table 2.9; table J.3). These work arrangements are usually applied
on-site with little variation from the agreement.
There are important links between the award provisions, between an enterprise
agreement’s provisions and between the Stevedoring Industry Award and an
agreement. Moreover, the effects of some provisions are magnified when linked
to others. Performance constraints evolve from these interactions. Shift
premiums combined with penalty rates and the order of engagement, for
example, increase incentives to create overtime. In some cases, operational
employees can earn up to three times the base rate of pay for a shift before
supplementary employees can be hired. These high overtime rates can render
productivity bonus schemes ineffective. In addition, the pooling of productivity
scheme earnings also makes the productivity bonuses seem small relative to
potential overtime earnings (see chapter 7 for a detailed discussion of these
issues).
There are a few work arrangements examined in this study that are not specified
in enterprise agreements or in the Stevedoring Industry Award. These work
arrangements have tended to develop as a result of custom and tradition. They
include longer shift breaks and delays in starting shifts.
Two other examples are worth noting. First, although some provisions relating
to the equalisation scheme are specified in the enterprise agreements examined,
details of relevance to its operation are not specified — for example, how points
are allocated to employees and how many points are earned for each shift.
Second, although union preference specified in the award (clause 16) can not be
legally enforced as a result of the Workplace Relations Act, virtually all
operational employees are union members.
As noted in section J.1, other work arrangements may be of an interim nature,
being negotiated and implemented at the workplace before the due date forWORK ARRANGEMENTS IN CONTAINER STEVEDORING
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renegotiation of the registered enterprise agreement (for example, changes to the
Productivity Employment Programme at CTAL Sydney).
Variations between enterprise agreements
Most provisions in the enterprise agreements at different workplaces are
remarkably similar. However, a small number of provisions vary between
agreements, both within and between companies (see table J.3 for comparisons
between workplaces).
Variations between workplaces within companies
Within companies, most provisions relating to the work arrangements examined
are identical or similar between workplaces. Workplaces within Patrick and
those within P&O Ports, for example, have identical or similar provisions
relating to manning scales for equipment, notification, order of engagement4
and redundancy (table J.3).
However, provisions vary between workplaces in several instances, even within
the same company.
·  Across workplaces, within both P&O Ports and Patrick:
-  there are minor variations in penalty rates;
-  there are variations in remuneration systems: for example, CTAL
Sydney use an ‘aggregate wage’ compared to a ‘base plus’ system
used at P&O Ports Melbourne; and
-  although the base rules for rosters (such as shift length and starting
time) are the same, the roster systems which have developed are
different: for example, the proportion of irregular shifts and whether
shifts are rostered on weekends.
                                             
4 However, at P&O Ports Melbourne and Patrick Brisbane, surplus labour from the
company’s other stevedoring operations (break bulk cargo) are incorporated within the
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·  Within Patrick:
-  a team-based approach has recently been introduced at Patrick
Sydney.5 However, the concept is not in place at either Patrick
Melbourne or Brisbane; and
-  there is a 25 per cent premium on rostered days off at Patrick
Brisbane which does not exist at Patrick Melbourne. However,
penalty rates are similar in other matters.
Variations between companies
Comments on variations within companies also apply between companies. For
example, there is little or no variation between companies with provisions
relating to the order of engagement, manning scales and redundancy provisions.
However, provisions that do vary between companies include those relating to
rostering systems, penalty rates, remuneration (Sea-Land’s aggregate wage
compared with Patrick’s base wage plus remuneration) and the team system
(Patrick Sydney).
Variations in provisions relating to enterprise arrangements, both between and
within companies, will reflect the wide range of factors discussed in section J.1.
Depending on the combination of factors affecting each workplace, particular
variations may always exist. Workplaces with less regular throughput, for
example Patrick Brisbane, are always likely to require a higher proportion of
irregular shifts (other things being equal) than will a larger workplace such as
Patrick Melbourne (chapter 4).
However, in other instances, a variation which exists at one point in time will
not always remain so. The impact of the implementation of a new work
arrangement — such as the Productivity Employment Programme scheme at
CTAL Sydney, an aggregate wage at Sea-Land and, more recently, a team
system at Patrick Sydney — are keenly watched by management and unions
alike within the industry. If the work arrangement is perceived to be operating
favourably at that particular workplace, a similar arrangement may be
negotiated at other workplaces.
                                             
5  The agreement is not detailed in table J.3 because this workplace is not one of the five
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Comparisons between awards
The base provisions in the Stevedoring Industry Award relating to work
arrangements examined in this study are compared to similar provisions in a
selection of four other awards (table J.4).
The awards for comparison with stevedoring were selected for a variety of
reasons. The Transport Workers Award 1983 and Storage Services — General
— Interim Award 1996, which provides federal cover for storemen and packers,
were selected because they relate to the movement of containers and involve
some similar functions and tasks to stevedoring.6
The  Metal Industry Award 1984 has also been included for comparative
purposes. This award has been used in the past as a model award, including for
the stevedoring industry. It continues to be used in test case applications for
safety net adjustments to awards. This award was recently rewritten as part of
the award simplification process, and was renamed the Metal Engineering and
Associated Industries Award.
The National Building and Construction Industry Award 1990 is the key federal
award for the building and construction industry. As for stevedoring, a feature
of the industry is variable demand. Some of the tasks, such as driving cranes and
other heavy equipment, are similar to stevedoring. This industry was included as
one of the comparative industries by the Inter-State Commission (ISC 1989a).
There are clearly significant differences between the building and construction
and stevedoring industries — for example, unlike stevedoring, building and
construction firms do not keep workers on the payroll during troughs (that is,
between construction jobs) — but this industry has been cited by participants as
the most suitable comparison with stevedoring.
A selection of provisions specified in table J.4 have been presented in a
simplified format in table J.2 for comparative purposes. It is evident that many
of the provisions do not vary substantially across these four awards, but that
many do vary significantly from the Stevedoring Industry Award.
Many of the base provisions in the Stevedoring Industry Award relating to work
arrangements examined in this study — for example, those relating to
remuneration — exceed those for the four other awards. However, several
provisions are similar — for example, the level of sick leave.
                                             
6 Comparisons with this award were particularly valid in the past when stevedores
extensively used forklifts, but the advent of quay cranes, straddle carriers and rubber-tyred
gantries, makes comparisons today somewhat less relevant.J   WORKPLACE NEGOTIATIONS, AWARDS AND AGREEMENTS
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Comparisons between awards across industries should be interpreted with
caution because:
·  the industries in which the awards operate are not, by nature, comparable
in many respects. Without an understanding of the particular industry and
its features, it is difficult to conclude that a particular provision is more or
less favourable in one industry than another. Both continuous and
noncontinuous work shifts, for example, are used in stevedoring.
However, this is not a feature of many other industries;
·  moreover, without this industry understanding, comparing individual
provisions may be less meaningful when important links go unrecognised.
The link between stevedoring’s shift premiums, penalty rates and the order
of engagement, for example, may have parallels in other industries but
only a detailed analysis would reveal these parallels;
·  numerous variations in the details of provisions means that direct
comparisons between awards are not straightforward. Comparisons of
penalty rates and shift premiums, for example, are complicated by the fact
that under the Stevedoring Industry Award, penalties at ordinary time rates
are added to the shift premium to give an overtime rate for public holidays.
However, under the Storage Services — General — Interim Award, a flat
rate of overtime is specified for public holidays (table J.4); and
·  provisions in an award may not always reflect work arrangements at
particular workplaces because they may be overridden by different
arrangements negotiated in agreements at the workplace and by ‘on-site’
practices. Redundancy provisions, for example, are higher in agreements
than under awards (excepting stevedoring) (table J.3).h:\www\research\labmrkt\stevedor\appendixjt2.doc Kai Swoboda 30/7/99 2:30 PM Page 1 of 2















Annual leave 5 weeks 4 weeks 4 weeks 4 weeks 4 weeks
Annual leave
loading
27.5 per cent 17.5 per cent 17.5 per cent 17.5 per cent 17.5 per cent
Sick leave after
first year
10 days per year,
cumulative
10 days per year,
cumulative




8 days per year, not
cumulative
Long service leave no award provision,
13 weeks for 15 years
(another awardb)




































































aged over 58 yearsi
maximum 8 weeks for
4 years or more
servicej
maximum 8 weeks for
4 years or more
servicej
maximum 8
weeks for 4 years
or more servicej
maximum 8 weeks
for 4 years or more
servicejh:\www\research\labmrkt\stevedor\appendixjt2.doc Kai Swoboda 30/7/99 2:30 PM Page 2 of 2
a This table is a simplified summary of selected provisions specified in the awards, and is summarised in more detail in table J.4 and the awards. Caution should be applied
when making comparisons (see main text).
b Stevedoring Industry (Long Service Leave) Award 1992.
c Employees under these awards are covered by various state long service leave acts. For example, employees in South Australia are entitled to 13 weeks for 10 years service
under the Long Service Leave Act (SA) 1997. In NSW, employees are also entitled to 13 weeks for 15 years service under the Long Service Leave Act (NSW) 1955.
d Metal Industry (Long Service Leave) Award 1984.
e No leave loading in state long service leave acts or in Metal Industry (Long Service Leave) Award 1984.
f Numbers vary by state as a result of variations in the number of prescribed state holidays. NSW and Victoria are illustrative only. The number of public holidays may vary for
other states.
g Timings of day, afternoon (evening) and night shifts can vary slightly between awards, but they are broadly comparable.
h Work undertaken outside of ordinary hours (7 am to 5.30 pm or more than eight hours in a day) is paid at 1.5 time the ordinary rate for the first two hours and then double
time for the remaining hours.
i specified in retirement and redundancy agreements.
j However, agreements are generally more generous, providing for two weeks for each year of service.
Sources: Various awards; various state long service leave acts(cont.)
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‘Day shift’ shall mean a shift commencing between 6.00 a.m. and 9.00 a.m. ‘Evening shift’ shall mean a shift
commencing between 1.00 p.m. and 5.00 p.m. ‘Night shift’ shall mean a shift commencing at or after 10.00 p.m.
An employee, who by direction of the employer reports at the commencing time of the day shift but is not employed
and is instructed to report back for work on the immediately following evening or night shift, shall be paid for four
hours at the ordinary rate for so reporting at the commencing time of the day shift in addition to his or her weekly
wage.
Except in the case of emergency, an employee who has worked a night shift shall not be required to work the next
succeeding evening shift and an employee who has worked a day shift shall not be required to work the next
succeeding night shift.
The parties acknowledge that where work requirements fluctuate such as in small ports, it may be appropriate to
work 12 hour shifts. Such a shift system shall only be introduced by agreement, and shall ensure that the ordinary
hours per week of weekly employees do not exceed an average of 35 hours. Twelve-hour shifts shall be inclusive of
meal breaks and rest periods.
An enterprise agreement between the employer and the union(s) shall contain rostering arrangements and may
provide for the following: (i) five, six or seven-day shift arrangements with either irregular or regular rostering; (ii)
the length of each shift provided that the ordinary hours of work shall not exceed a weekly average of 35 hours; (iii)
where a seven-day continuous shift work roster is to be worked, the inclusion in the ordinary hours of work of shifts
worked on holidays, as prescribed by clause 26 of this award, as well as Saturdays and Sundays, provided that
payment for such shifts is in accordance with this award; (iv) provisions for the timing of meal breaks and/or rest
periods; (v) provisions for the extension of shifts provided that all such extensions shall be paid at overtime rates;(cont.)




(vi) notification and cancellation arrangements; (vii) staggering of shift start and finish times.
No rostering arrangement shall require an employee to change shifts such that it would necessitate the working of
two consecutive shifts, or to work more than one shift on any one day.
Unless otherwise provided for in an enterprise agreement, an employee shall not be required to report for duty at
any time earlier than nine hours after the employee ceased work on overtime, including circumstances where a
double header has been worked.
Employees working a seven-hour shift shall be entitled during the ordinary hours of work to a break or breaks
totalling 45 minutes duration. Employees working an eight-hour shift shall be entitled during the ordinary hours of
work to a break or breaks totalling 60 minutes duration. Meal breaks and rest periods shall be taken at a time and a
manner agreed between the union(s) and the employer and may be staggered.
Clause 24 states that employer may: (1) change those employees working day work to shift work; and/or (2) change
employees working shift work to day work, provided that the employer shall give the union(s) a minimum of seven
days notice of the intention to interchange between day work and shift work unless otherwise agreed. Where
employees are required to interchange between day work and shift work the appropriate day work arrangements and
shift work arrangements (including rostering, etc.) shall be the subject of enterprise level negotiations in accordance
with the day and shift work provisions of the award.
19 Sea-Land
Adelaide
Operational employees have a 15-week roster cycle and work 7.5-hour shifts on weekdays. On weekends 7-hour
shifts are worked. When allocated to security function, 8-hour shifts are worked. Clause 19.5 states no working of a
rostered day off will be sought during a rostered week off. Mechanics have a 15-week roster cycle and work 7.5-
hour shifts on weekdays and 7-hour shifts on weekends.
21.2 CTAL Sydney Operational employees have a 15-week roster cycle and work 7.5-hour shifts. No working of rostered days off will
be sought during rostered weeks off nor the single rostered day off in weeks 3, 5 and 10. There is some rostered
weekend work and opportunities to work overtime. Security officers have an 8-week roster cycle and work 8-hour
shifts.(cont.)






Operational employees have a 15-week roster cycle and work 7.5-hour shifts. There is some rostered weekend work
and opportunities to work overtime. No working of rostered days off will be sought during rostered weeks off nor
on the single rostered days off in weeks 3, 6, 9, 11 and 12. Watchmen have a 25-week roster and work 8-hour
shifts. There are some rostered shifts on weekends and opportunities to work overtime. Reefer attendants have an 8-
week roster cycle. There is some rostered weekend work and opportunities to work overtime. Allocators have a 15-
week roster and work 7.5-hour shifts. There is some rostered weekend work and opportunities for overtime.
Storemen have a 15-week roster and work 7.5-hour shifts. There are no rostered weekends but opportunities for
overtime. Gear foremen have a 15-week roster cycle and work 7.5-hour shifts. All are regular day shifts. There are
no rostered weekend shifts but opportunities for overtime. Machinery washmen have a 15-week roster and work





Operational employees have a 30-week roster cycle and work 7.5-hour shifts. There are some rostered weekends
and opportunities for overtime. Employees are not be permitted to work during rostered weeks off. Technical
service employees have a 15-week roster cycle and work 7.5-hour shifts. There is some rostered weekend work and
opportunity for overtime. Ancillary employees have a 15-week roster and work 7.5-hour shifts. There are no
regularly rostered shifts. Other employees such as gatekeepers have a 200-day roster cycle and work 8-hour shifts.







Operational employees have an 8-week roster cycle Monday to Friday with one week rostered off and work 8-hour
shifts. Weekends are worked as voluntary overtime and shift length is 7 hours. Operational employees are not
permitted to work during rostered weeks off. Maintenance employees have an 8-week cycle and work 8-hour shifts
on weekdays. Weekends are worked as voluntary overtime and shift length is 7 hours. Ancillary staff have an
8-week cycle and work 8-hour shifts on weekdays. Weekends are worked as voluntary overtime and shift length is 7
hours. Gatekeepers have a 16-week roster, work 8-hour shifts with no full weeks rostered off. There is one rostered
overtime shift every four weeks.(cont.)











Similar provisions to Patrick Melbourne
18.1 CTAL Sydney While clause 18.1 under the CTAL enterprise agreement specifies an order of engagement, CTAL Sydney have a
new order of engagement which overrides this and is not registered with the AIRC. It allows supplementaries to be
engaged before permanent employees working double headers.
3.2 P&O Ports
Melbourne
Similar provisions to Patrick Melbourne. However, surplus labour from the company’s other stevedoring operations
(for example, general cargo) are incorporated within the order of engagement at each stage.
28 Patrick
Melbourne
On weekdays employees are engaged in the following order:
1. regular rostered workers;
2. irregular rostered workers;
3. guaranteed wage employees (two shifts);
4. permanent double headers (maximum of two non-consecutive);
5. guaranteed wage employees over guarantee of two shifts; and
6. supplementaries.
On weekends, employees on rostered days off generally have an opportunity to work before double headers are
worked (that is, between categories 2 and 3 on the above weekday order of engagement).
27 Patrick
Brisbane
Similar provisions to Patrick Melbourne. However, surplus labour from the company’s other stevedoring
operations, (for example, general cargo) are incorporated within the above order of engagement at each stage. All
work on weekends is performed as voluntary overtime.(cont.)








Where an employee is working shift work, and provided that there is no suitable relief available, the employee may
work two consecutive shifts (a double header). No employee shall be required to work more than two double
headers in any week. Double headers shall not be worked on consecutive days.
22 Sea-Land
Adelaide
An employee required to work a double header shall be notified as soon as possible, and confirmed by the meal
break on the first shift worked unless exceptional circumstances make this impossible. In addition, an employee
shall not be required to work a double header provided there is another suitably qualified employee available who is
willing to work the double header. An employee shall not be required to work more than two double headers
against their will in any one full week or to work double headers on two consecutive days in any one week. An
employee may elect to receive a day off in lieu of a penalty payment for the second double header worked in any
week. An employee so electing may accrue up to five such days in the year and any days accrued up to the
maximum shall be taken with the immediate next annual leave period unless mutually agreed otherwise.
23.2 CTAL Sydney Same as P&O Ports Melbourne
3.7.2 P&O Ports
Melbourne
Double headers to be confirmed by 12.15 p.m. and by no later than the end of day shift on the day. On 1 July each
year, an employee may elect to receive a day off in lieu of a penalty payment for the second double header worked
in any week. An employee so electing may accrue up to five such days in the year and any days accrued up to the
maximum shall be taken with the immediate next annual leave period unless mutually agreed otherwise. After
consultation between the firm and employees, the firm may seek employees to work additional or consecutive
double headers to meet operational and skill requirements.
29 Patrick
Melbourne
Double headers, from day to evening shift, shall be worked by employees as required and shall be voluntary subject
to a guarantee of sufficient suitably qualified and accessible labour being available to perform the necessary work.
Double headers on any day shall be confirmed by 12 noon and once confirmed shall not be cancelled. In respect of
the one-hour break between the day and evening shifts of a double header, the company may elect to cover the
break in the following order: (1) stop wholly or partially for the one-hour break; (2) provide meal relief of one hour;
(3) work through with employees allocated to double headers who shall be paid the appropriate penalty rate in(cont.)




accordance with the Stevedoring Industry Award. With the exception of the 30 minutes available to start shifts early
or complete work on a shift, employees working double headers shall not work extended shifts in any circumstance.
28 Patrick
Brisbane








No specific clause. However, aggregate wage operates and employee work hours are monitored.
25 CTAL Sydney The parties agree to provide work opportunity for each employee within each group of category of identically




West Swanson Container Division shall provide general equity of work opportunities among permanent employees
of the same category and skill level over the financial year.
28 Patrick
Melbourne
Equalisation and allocation arrangements including overtime/double headers shall be conducted within functional
categories and not across a grade or between grades. Equalisation of earning opportunities shall be attempted to the
extent possible over a 15-week period. This involves a points equalisation system where employees are given points
according to shifts worked. A tolerable range of 30 points ‘either side’ shall apply and all employees shall
commence the enterprise agreements with zero points. Equalisation systems shall not apply to the placement of
employees to locations, jobs or functions.
27 Patrick
Brisbane
Equalisation and allocation arrangements including overtime/double headers shall be conducted within functional
categories and not across a grade or between grades. Equalisation of earning opportunities within functional
categories shall be attempted to the extent possible, but the company has the right to operate outside the(cont.)




equalisation scheme after union consultation. Equalisation systems shall not apply to placement of employees to








Any employee may be notified of his/her next shift for the following day by either being advised before the end of
the day or evening shift being worked or as soon as practical by telephoning after 4.30 p.m. Such orders may
require an employee to telephone between 9 a.m. and 11 a.m. the following day for possible allocation to the next
afternoon or midnight shift.
22 CTAL Sydney Detailed notification times and procedures are contained in clause 22. For example, every effort shall be made to
notify regular and irregular rostered employees working on day shift Monday to Thursday of their allocation for the
following day by no later than 12.15 p.m. that day. Also, regular rostered employees working on evening shift
Monday to Thursday shall be notified by no later than 2.30 p.m. that day as to whether a requirement exists for
them to work evening shift on the following day. In terms of weekends and holidays, employees shall be notified no
later than 12.15 p.m. Friday of their allocation or otherwise to weekend shifts (including Sunday midnight shift and
Monday and Tuesday public holidays).
3.6.1 P&O Ports
Melbourne
P&O Ports Melbourne have similar notification provisions to CTAL Sydney. For example, clause 3.6.1 states every
effort shall be made to notify regular and irregular rostered employees working on day shift Monday to Thursday of
their allocation for the following day generally by 12.45 p.m. and no later than the end of the shift, subject to
appropriate communication between the firm and the local MUA officers.
28 Patrick
Melbourne
Orders will be posted on the job by the end of day shift, where practicable, for the following day, evening and
midnight shifts Monday to Thursday and, where practicable, by the end of day shift on Friday for all weekend shifts
and first shift Monday.(cont.)






Orders will be posted on the job by the end of the day shift, where practicable, for the following day, evening and
midnight shifts Monday to Friday and, where practicable, by the end of day shift on Friday for all weekend shifts
and first shift Monday. Where orders are unable to be posted by the end of the shift, employees shall ring the tape







No specific manning scales
9 Sea-Land
Adelaide
Container cranes will be manned on the basis of two men for one quay crane. Straddles and heavy forklifts will be
manned by three men for two machines or five men for three machines. The number of employees required for
lashing/unlashing shall be in accordance with real operational requirements.
9 CTAL Sydney Quay cranes will be manned on the basis of two men for one quay crane. All other heavy equipment will be manned





Quay cranes will be manned on the basis of two men for one quay crane. Straddles and heavy forklifts will be
manned by three men for two machines or five men for three machines. Clause 3.1 also discusses manning for





Fixed manning levels shall not apply. However, indicative levels which can be varied are specified in schedule 8.
Wharf cranes will be manned on the basis of two employees for one wharf crane. Straddle carriers, heavy forklifts
and the rail gantry crane operations will be collectively manned in each area three men for two machines or five
men for three machines. Lashing duties will be performed by a minimum of three employees under the general
supervision of the foreman of the vessel being lashed. Other manning arrangements are detailed in schedule 8.(cont.)









Fixed manning levels shall not apply. Indicative manning scales are contained in schedule 8. Manning levels may
be varied from time to time to reflect changes consistent with safe work practices, improved technology and new
types of machinery or systems, and to reach the levels of productivity required by the company. Schedule 8 states
that quay cranes will be manned on the basis of two men for one quay crane. Straddle carriers and heavy forklifts
will be collectively manned by three men for two machines or five men for three machines. Lashing will be
performed by all gang members except for the down crane driver.





10, 15, 16 Sea-Land
Adelaide
The number and grades/classification of personnel at the commencement of the enterprise agreement is specified.
Fourteen guaranteed wage employees are to be recruited after the commencement of the agreement.
10, 14, 17 CTAL Sydney The requirement for employees by grade at the commencement of the enterprise agreement is specified. Fifteen





The establishment of labour (size, composition and grades of the workforce) is set out in annexure 3.3. Nine





The agreement will commence with the number of employees and grading set out in
schedule 9. A formal review of permanent and supplementary employees will take place six months after the






The agreement will commence with the number of employees and grading set out in
schedule 9. Six guaranteed wage employees and 12 supplementaries are to be initially recruited.(cont.)











Upon full implementation of the agreement [Sea-Land] shall employ the following personnel in the
grades/classifications listed. The levels of employment will be monitored continually and adjustments shall be made
from time to time.






In recognition of the intent of the agreement, the company will provide security of employment for permanent
employees throughout the term of the agreement. It is agreed to review the agreement and/or the size and
composition of the workforce in the event of any loss of business or facilities or through the introduction of change
in accordance with clause 43 of the award. Reductions in the size of the permanent workforce shall be processed in
accordance with the Retirement and Redundancy Agreement (including redeployment arrangements) or the




Includes similar provisions to Patrick Melbourne with several additions. For the purposes of any reduction in the
permanent workforce at Fisherman Islands, voluntary redundancies are sought by skill in accordance with the
Retirement and Redundancy Agreement. Such voluntary redundancies will initially be sought from the Fisherman
Islands workforce. In the event that insufficient volunteers in the required skill group(s) are forthcoming, the parties
shall confer on appropriate options, which shall include redeployment and extension of the call for volunteers to
other skill groups at Fisherman Islands/Maritime Wharf. All employees of both areas shall be taken to constitute a(cont.)




single combined workforce. In the event of the above steps failing to secure agreed numbers, there will be no





A supplementary employee is one engaged and paid as such. A supplementary employee for working ordinary time
shall be paid per hour 1/35 of the weekly award wage for the work which he or she performs, including the district
allowance where relevant, plus 20 per cent.
16 Sea-Land
Adelaide
The use of supplementaries in different functions as required is specified.
17 CTAL Sydney Same as P&O Ports Melbourne
1.13 P&O Ports
Melbourne
A supplementary workforce shall operate as an independent nonpermanent workforce. Supplementary employees
shall be trained and paid in accordance with the work they perform. Supplementary employees shall be contacted
by the firm at nominated times to determine if a requirement for work exists. Clause 1.13.7 allows the firm to
allocate (and redeploy) supplementaries. It states supplementary employees shall contact the firm at agreed
nominated times for possible allocation purposes and where a requirement for work is known, the firm shall contact
supplementary employees as necessary.
26 Patrick
Melbourne
The firm may deploy and redeploy supplementaries as necessary. All supplementary employees shall not be subject




Similar provisions to Patrick Melbourne. Supplementary employees may be required to work overtime shifts on
weekends/public holidays or to work meal reliefs and shift extensions.(cont.)








An employer may require an employee to perform any function or duty for which the employee is skilled or
qualified in accordance with his or her classification.
9 Sea-Land
Adelaide
Sea-Land may place and move employees between functions and tasks. Employees are required to be available for
and to carry out during the course of a shift, any function and mix of functions for which they are qualified in
accordance with operational needs and the classification structure in the Stevedoring Industry Award. In the event
that an employee is unable to continue to perform those functions within his classification level as a result of a
disability then retraining or redeployment will be examined based on each circumstance and the provisions of the
award. There are various alternative duties that employees can be redeployed to in the course of a shift. For
example, employees allocated to wash duties, will perform any other function they are trained to do, if and when
required.
9,  17 CTAL  Sydney Similar provisions to P&O Ports Melbourne in terms of employees being available for other duties and





Employees must be available to carry out a mix of functions for which they are qualified in accordance with
operational needs. Clause 3.1.14 allows available labour to be shifted to road receival and delivery duties when
required. Clause 3.2.4 allows an interlocation transfer of employees. Employees of the container division may
volunteer to be placed on a list of transferees. All such employees, when otherwise on idle time, will be offered to
the bulk and general stevedoring division for work in that division, if required, subject to holding the appropriate
skills. When such employees accept engagement under this arrangement, they shall work at the bulk and general
stevedoring division in accordance with part 2 of the enterprise agreement. When working on transfer, unless
engaged for a higher grade for which they are qualified, they shall be paid at their substantive grade for any work
they perform including shift premiums and overtime.
22 Patrick
Melbourne
The firm retains the right to determine the placement of employees to particular functions on an individual basis at
the start of and throughout the course of any shift. An employee shall perform such work as the company shall(cont.)




reasonably require, from time to time, including transfer between and within facilities and work areas. Volunteers
sought for interstate transfers shall be covered, while on transfer, by arrangements concluded and agreed on a local
basis from time to time.
22 Patrick
Brisbane
Similar provisions to Patrick Melbourne





In the first instance, preference to new employees will be given to union members surplus to the requirements of the
industry and secondly to persons who agree to become members of the union upon commencement of employment.
11,14,15 Sea-Land
Adelaide
Preference of engagement provisions apply in accordance with the award. Clause 14 states the firm shall recruit
eight Australian vocational trainees such as trainees under the terms of the Australian Vocational Training Scheme.
Clause 15 states the firm shall recruit 14 guaranteed wage employees as soon as possible after the commencement
of the agreement.
11,13 CTAL Sydney Preference of engagement provisions will apply in accordance with the award. The order of preference for further
recruits shall be: (1) subject to State Training Authority, trainees employed under the AVC training scheme; (2)
existing employees engaged under the guaranteed wage system; (3) supplementary employees; and (4) external
applicants. Clause 13 states that the company shall recruit 10 Australian vocational trainees as soon as possible





Preference of engagement provisions will apply in accordance with the award. If any vacancies are not filled
internally, Conaust will hire applicants according to the following preference order: (1) trainees employed by the
firm under the Australian Vocational Training Scheme; (2) existing employees engaged by the firm under the
guaranteed wage system; (3) supplementary employees within the firm; and (4) external applicants. Clause 1.11
states that the firm shall recruit some Australian vocational trainees with numbers to be decided. Clause 1.12 states(cont.)




that some guaranteed wage employees shall be recruited with numbers to be decided.
25, 27 Patrick
Melbourne
No recruitment provisions specified. Patrick shall recruit 10 guaranteed wage employees as soon as possible after




No recruitment provisions specified. Clause 25 states Patrick shall recruit six guaranteed wage employees and one
trainee employee after the commencement of the enterprise agreement.
Redeployment
8(g), 16, 48 Stevedoring
Industry
Awarda
An employee who has been temporarily allocated or transferred by the employee’s usual employer to work for
another employer under the Stevedoring Industry Award shall accept and carry out the instructions of the employer
to which the employee has been allocated or transferred. The first mentioned employer shall at all times be
responsible for ensuring that the employee receives his or her correct wages and other allowances and any other
payments for which the first mentioned employer is liable. Clause 16 states preference of engagement shall be given
to members of the union(s) who are surplus to the industry, including redundant employees. Clause 48 states that an
employee may be required to work in an outport but such requirement shall be subject to the terms and conditions
for such transfer as may be contained in an enterprise agreement. The employer must pay accommodation, meal and
travel allowances for such work.
annexure 9 Sea-Land
Adelaide
All vacancies covered by enterprise agreements within Sea-Land shall be offered firstly to their own employees





CTAL Sydney Vacancies covered by the enterprise agreement shall be offered to suitable Conaust/CTAL employees seeking






Similar provisions as CTAL Sydney(cont.)







Any vacancies shall firstly be offered to suitable Patrick employees seeking redeployment from another
location/port to that vacant position. Schedule 3 states that in circumstances where a Patrick employee who is
surplus in one port and is accepted by Patrick for employment in another port, the company shall pay the employee
in regard to travel expenses. For full-time union officials (names listed), Patrick will take the first person available













Annexure 9 provides a Retirement and Redundancy Agreement. It states that upon the declaration of a redundancy
situation by the company, volunteers for retirement/redundancy shall be sought from employees in the redundant
positions in the following order: (1) for employees aged 58 years or more with 15 years or more service, the
entitlement shall be 57% of the remaining weeks to age 65 years with a maximum entitlement of 148 weeks at the
award rate; (2) for employees aged 45 years or more with eight years or more service, the entitlement shall be 50%
of the remaining weeks to age 65 with a maximum entitlement of 130 weeks payment at the award rate; (3) for
employees aged 35 years or more with four years or more service the entitlement shall be 45% of the remaining
weeks to age 65 years with a maximum entitlement of 104 weeks payment at the award rate; and (4) for employees
aged under 35 years or for other employees with less than four years service, the entitlement shall be 40% of the
remaining weeks to age 65 years with a maximum entitlement of 78 weeks payment at the award rate. The
enterprise agreement also states that where sufficient volunteers are not forthcoming, the companies, unions and
employees shall confer with the companies in exercising any intended necessary retrenchments. It states that where
a redundancy situation occurs, volunteers for retirement/redundancy shall be sought before retrenchments occur.(cont.)















Similar provisions to Sea-Land
schedule 3 Patrick
Melbourne
Similar provisions to Sea-Land
schedule 3 Patrick
Brisbane








The firm can seek the use of a contractor who will provide hire cranes (without driver) for operation by suitably
trained Sea-Land employees. In addition, more highly sophisticated equipment may be contracted in with driver.
Sea-Land is willing to train employees in that regard if it is achievable with consultation with the union. Clause
9za(8) states all existing line marking needing renewal and all new line marking will be carried out by a Sea-Land
contractor, assisted by Sea-Land employees as required.
9 CTAL Sydney CTAL shall seek the use of a contractor who will provide hire cranes without driver for operation by a suitably
trained CTAL employee. More highly sophisticated equipment may be contracted in with driver. CTAL is willing,(cont.)




in the longer term, to train CTAL employees in that regard.
3.8.14 P&O Ports
Melbourne
The employer ensures that the enterprise agreement reached as to the number of permanent tradesmen and their
conditions of employment will not be diminished by the use of contract labour. The use of such contracting for the
repair and maintenance of terminal equipment and facilities is not designed to replace permanent employees.
Contracting out of maintenance will occur when: the equipment or technological skills are not available within the
terminal to perform the required task and/or there is a heavy workload beyond normal capacity; equipment is under
warranty; and repairs and maintenance associated with buildings, fencing, paving and other facilities not currently
performed by maintenance employees is required.
schedule 2 Patrick
Melbourne
The enterprise agreement allows the additional services of contractors to be used on occasions to meet the needs of
the maintenance programme. However, the employment of contractors should not be to the detriment of the
employment of the company’s employees with regard to numbers.
schedule 2 Patrick
Brisbane
Contractors may, after discussions with the workshop delegates, be used when: equipment or skills are not available
to perform the required task; or a heavy short term work load arises which is beyond the normal capacity of the
maintenance garage or which would adversely affect the terminal operations; or equipment is under warranty. Some






The award prescribes weekly base rates of pay for stevedoring employees based on a skill-based classification





Employees shall be paid wages in accordance with the principles of the aggregate wage. Clause 41 states that the
aggregate wage is based on the award base rates. The enterprise agreement adjusts the base rates specified in the
award for inflation and other factors. Annexure 8 states the aggregate wage includes all award-nominated rates(cont.)




which cover base rate, overtime, public holidays, shift penalties, consolidated allowances, meal monies, annual
leave and loading and productivity scheme payments. The aggregate wage is based on 1596 ordinary shift hours
and 1227.5 premium shift hours for a total of 2823.5 hours.
35, PEP CTAL Sydney Adjusted base wage rates consistent with those set out in the award. The Productivity Enhancement Programme
provides for a productivity-based aggregate wage.
1.14 P&O Ports
Melbourne
Adjusted base wage rates consistent with those set out in the award.
18 Patrick
Melbourne
The base rates (adjusted for inflation) in the award apply.
18 Patrick
Brisbane





Sunday night to Friday night = ordinary time for day; 1.5 times ordinary rate for evening; two times ordinary rate
for night. Friday night = two times ordinary rate. Saturday day = two times ordinary rate. Saturday evening = 2.5
times ordinary rate. Saturday night = 2.5 times ordinary rate. Sunday day = 2.5 times ordinary rate. Sunday evening




PEP CTAL Sydney Uses aggregate wage
–P & O  P o r t s
Melbourne
No provision outside the award
28 Patrick
Melbourne
Double time for Saturday day and evening; 2.5 times for Sunday day and evening.(cont.)












Penalties apply to shift extensions, double headers, voluntary overtime on rostered days off and work on holidays.
Shift work: continuous with usual shift = the ordinary rate in addition to the rate appropriate for the shift to be
worked; noncontinuous with usual shift = twice the ordinary rate for Monday to Saturday, 2.5 times the ordinary
rate on a Sunday and on the day and evening shift on a public holiday, and three times the ordinary rate on the night
shift on a public holiday. The first double header (double shift) worked during a week (Monday to Friday) is paid at
the ordinary rate in addition to the rate appropriate to the additional shift worked. On Saturdays, Sundays, and




23, PEP CTAL Sydney Under the enterprise agreement, all time worked in excess of the normal length of the shift shall be paid at the rate
of ordinary time in addition to the rate for the shift just worked with a minimum payment of 1.5 hours excluding
closing work. When a shift is extended by a further hour, the minimum penalty becomes 2.5 hours. Weekday
double headers are paid single time in addition to the shift rate for the additional shift worked. A double header on
weekends or public holiday shall be paid in addition to the shift rate for the additional shift worked, half time. The
Productivity Enhancement Programme scheme includes a productivity-based aggregate wage. The average weekly
wage rate under this program is calculated on the program’s hourly rate (which is an increase on the existing grade
hourly rate) and has been calculated on five rostered shifts per week and includes shift premiums/annual leave
loadings. This means an employee receives the same average weekly rate for 52 weeks of the year, regardless
whether work is performed on day, evening or midnight shifts.
3.7.1, 3.7.2 P&O Ports
Melbourne
Shift extensions shall be paid at the ordinary rate of time in addition to the rate for the shift being extended. Double
headers on a weekday are paid at ordinary time in addition to the shift rate for the additional shift worked. Double(cont.)




headers on weekends and public holidays shall be paid at half the ordinary rate in addition to the shift rate for the
additional shift so worked.
28, 29 Patrick
Melbourne
All overtime/double headers shall be paid for at 7.5 hours at the appropriate overtime rate (for example: Saturday,
overtime shift, 7.5 hours at double time = 15 hours ordinary pay).
27 Patrick
Brisbane









Clause 14(a) provides a laundry or drycleaning allowance of $6.95 per week per employee. Clause 14(b) provides a
telephone allowance of $6.40 per week in the case where employees are required to telephone for their labour
allocation. Clause 14(c) specifies a consolidated disability allowance which varies between grades. This allowance
is compensation for such factors as conditions which are unusually dirty, confined spaces, height, noise or heavy
lifting. Clause 14(d) describes disabilities covered by the consolidated allowance. Other clauses refer to allowances
which cover rates for different types of cargo, work on roll-on/roll-off vessels and first aid.
39 Sea-Land
Adelaide
An annual allowance of $4330 shall be part of the aggregate wage with any future adjustments being consistent to
changes to the aggregate wage.
36 CTAL Sydney Same allowance amount as P&O Ports Melbourne
3.9 P&O Ports
Melbourne
An annual allowance of $4500 per year shall be paid to all eligible employees on a weekly basis. Adjusted for
movements in the CPI.
19 Patrick
Melbourne
An annual allowance of $5288 per year shall be paid to all permanent employees of the company on a weekly basis.
Adjusted for movements in the CPI.
19 Patrick
Brisbane
An annual allowance of $6600 per year shall be paid to all permanent employees on a weekly or yearly basis.
Adjusted for movements in the CPI.(cont.)













The performance-related productivity scheme is based on a threshold number of lifts handled per crane hour as
calculated per vessel. The minimum (threshold) performance rate for any bonus to be paid is 20 lifts per crane hour,
labour on to labour off each vessel. The bonus pool is included in the aggregate wage. The productivity payment
($5000 per year) is paid as part of the aggregate wage and is on the basis that targets will continue to be achieved.
annexure 4
and PEP
CTAL Sydney Annexure 4 of the CTAL enterprise agreement outlines a productivity scheme. A bonus pool is distributed among
employees on a weekly basis. However, this was replaced by the Productivity Enhancement Programme designed to
reward employees for increased performance. The scheme included a receival and delivery component as well as a
vessel operations component. The scheme no longer operates as a whole.
annexure 3.4 P&O Ports
Melbourne
The bonus scheme operates on ship working and receival and delivery. The total bonus is made up of the sum of the
calculated ship and road bonuses above certain levels. The total pool is split among all employees, other than those
on Workcare leave, each week of the year, and is paid each week.
schedule 7 Patrick
Melbourne
The scheme shall operate on a weekly basis covering all shifts worked from first shift Monday to twilight shift
Sunday inclusive. The scheme relies on the achievement of required productivity targets in ship working and
receival/delivery, each of which is treated separately. The ship working assessment is based on a threshold number
of revenue earning lifts being handled per working hour. A receival and delivery bonus is paid for all containers
received or delivered provided a minimum average number of containers per machine employed is achieved. The
rate of bonus is $5 for each container movement. Payments earned under the scheme form part of a total weekly
bonus pool which is then distributed among all permanent and entitled supplementary employees. All permanent(cont.)








The scheme shall operate on a weekly basis covering all shifts worked. The scheme relies on the achievement of
required productivity targets in ship working (inclusive of lashing/unlashing). The dollar rate per lift payable is
based on the average lift rate achieved over the whole of the assessment period and will be paid for every revenue
lift carried out during that period. Payments earned under the scheme form part of a total weekly bonus pool which
is then distributed among all permanents, guaranteed wage employees and entitled supplementary employees. All
permanent employees each week shall receive an equal share of the bonus irrespective of whether they performed








Sea-Land shall maintain a superannuation scheme of which all employees may be members. Employees who belong
to the Stevedoring Employees Retirement Fund may continue to do so. New employees shall have the right to join
either fund.
35 CTAL Sydney The firm shall maintain a superannuation scheme of which all employees may be members. Employees who belong




Similar provisions to Sea-Land
18 Patrick
Melbourne
Certain employees who were previously remunerated on a salary structure with superannuation contributions based
on salaries, and who will convert to the award wage and overtime calculation system applicable to all other
employees, shall continue to have superannuation contributions calculated at the former rate, as indexed in(cont.)




accordance with the percentage movement for wages agreed on 31 January 1995.
– Patrick
Brisbane






Supplementary employees: minimum payment of one shift for any day the employee is required to work. Day shift:
employee that reports for day shift but is reallocated to evening/night shift shall be paid for four hours at the
ordinary rate. Evening/Night shift: employees that report for work at the commencement of either shift shall be paid
the shift premium for the full shift. Weekend/holiday: employees that report to work on one of these days shall be
paid for a minimum of seven hours at the appropriate rate. Clause 22 states an employee required to do preparatory
work shall be paid a minimum of 30 minutes at the appropriate overtime rate. Also, when a stevedoring employee
grade 7 is required to be present at, or liaise with, a pickup centre to implement labour orders outside his or her
ordinary shift hours, he or she shall be paid a minimum payment of four hours at the appropriate rate. A
maintenance employee recalled to work overtime after leaving the employer’s business premises (whether notified
before or after leaving the premises) shall be paid for a four-hour minimum at the appropriate overtime rate for each
time the employee is recalled, provided that if the call-back is for a period of over four hours and up to six hours
the minimum payment shall be for six hours and if the call-back is for a period of more than six hours the minimum
payment shall be for a full shift.
20 Sea-Land
Adelaide
An available regular rostered evening shift employee that is not allocated to the evening shift is entitled to payment
for that shift if subsequent reallocation that morning of an irregular rostered employee to that shift occurs or if a
double header is performed other than for the purpose of covering for a failure to report. Employees who report to
the allocation centre, and who are reallocated from the centre to either evening or midnight shift that day, shall be
entitled to a reallocation payment of four hours at the ordinary time in addition to the normal payment for the
evening or midnight shift worked. If not reallocated to day, evening or midnight shift that day, employees shall
receive an ordinary time payment for the day.(cont.)




22 CTAL Sydney Employees reallocated from the centre to either evening or midnight shift that day shall be entitled to a reallocation
payment of four hours at ordinary time in addition to the normal payment for the evening or midnight shift worked.
If not reallocated to day, evening or midnight shift that day, employees shall receive ordinary time payment for the
day. An available regular rostered evening shift employee not allocated to the evening shift on a particular day shall
be entitled to payment for that shift if subsequent reallocation that morning of an irregular rostered employee to that
shift occurs or if a double header is performed other than for the purpose of covering for a failure to report. Regular
rostered employees working on evening shift Monday to Thursday, if not required for the following evening shift,
shall be paid ordinary time for that day. Once notified, extensions must be paid whether worked or not.
3.6 P&O Ports
Melbourne
Employees reallocated to evening or night shifts on the same day shall be entitled to a reallocation payment of four
hours at ordinary time in addition to the normal payment for the evening or night shift ultimately worked. If not
reallocated to day, evening or night shift that day, employees shall receive ordinary time payment for the day. An
available regular rostered evening shift employee not allocated to the evening shift on a particular day shall be
entitled to payment for that shift if subsequent reallocation that morning of an irregular rostered employee to that
shift occurs or if a double header is performed other than for the purpose of covering for a failure to report. Regular
rostered employees working on evening shift Monday to Thursday shall be notified by no later than the start of the
shift that day as to whether a requirement exists for them to work the evening shift on the following day. If not
required for the following evening shift, employees shall be paid ordinary time for that day. In addition, once
notified, a shift extension shall not be cancelled and payment shall be made whether performed or not.
28 Patrick
Melbourne
Where a rostered weekend shift is cancelled, the company shall credit the employee with 7.5 hours towards
payment for the rostered week off.
27 Patrick
Brisbane
Regular rostered day shift employees who are not required to work that shift and who would otherwise be idle may
be allocated to evening shift before double headers, guaranteed wage employees or supplementaries and shall be
paid ordinary time for the non-worked day shift and time and a half for the evening shift worked.
Annual leave arrangements
27 Stevedoring Five weeks annual leave for shift workers for each year of continuous service with a loading of 27.5 per cent.(cont.)






Annual leave can be taken over three periods during one year, each of which can be not less than one week.
25 Sea-Land
Adelaide
Annual leave is taken in accordance with the award, subject to maintaining skills to meet customer requirements.
27 CTAL Sydney Same provisions as award
1.16.1 P&O Ports
Melbourne
Same provision as Sea-Land
– Patrick
Melbourne
No provision outside award
– Patrick
Brisbane








Permanent employees are entitled to 13 weeks leave for 15 years continuous service with a loading of 27.5 per cent.
Long service leave pro rata entitlements begin after 10 years.
30 Sea-Land
Adelaide
Same provisions as the Stevedoring Industry (Long Service Leave) Award, with payments as per aggregate wage
28,  PEP CTAL  Sydney Same provisions as the Stevedoring Industry (Long Service Leave) Award. The Productivity Enhancement
Programme has long service leave payments calculated according to the program’s hourly rate plus a loading.
1.16.2 P&O Ports Same provisions as the Stevedoring Industry (Long Service Leave) Award(cont.)















Paid sick leave entitlements of 10 days per year. Sick leave is cumulative. Employees may elect to have
accumulated sick in excess of 28 days paid out.
29 Sea-Land
Adelaide
Similar provisions to award
29 CTAL Sydney Similar provisions to award
1.16.3 P&O Ports
Melbourne











An employee who works overtime continuous with the ordinary hours shall be paid for a minimum period of one,
two or three hours. An employee that works overtime which is not continuous with the ordinary hours shall be paid
for a minimum period of seven hours. Day shift: minimum payment of one or two hours (provided the shift may be
extended up to three hours) or one hour where a non-seven-hour shift is worked (provided the shift may be(cont.)




extended up to two or three hours). Evening/night shift: minimum payment of one hour for work which is
continuous with the evening or night shift (provided the shift may be extended by up to two hours) or minimum
payment of seven hours at the appropriate rate for work which is not continuous with a shift. Preparatory work: an
employee required to commence a shift early due to preparatory work shall receive a minimum payment of 30
minutes; when a stevedoring employee grade 7 is required to be present at, or liaise with, a pickup centre to
implement labour orders outside his or her ordinary shift hours, he or she shall be paid a minimum payment of four
hours at the appropriate rate.
21 Sea–Land
Adelaide
Day shift: may be extended by one hour, 1.5 hours, or 2.5 hours. (Extensions of up to one hour incur payment of
one hour while further extensions incur a minimum payment of 2.5 hours.) Evening/midnight shift: may be
extended by one hour. (The award minimum payment provisions hold. Once notified, an extension shall not be
cancelled and payments shall be made whether performed or not.)
23 CTAL Sydney All time worked in excess of the normal length of the shift shall be paid at the rate of ordinary time in addition to
the rate for the shift just worked with a minimum payment of 1.5 hours excluding closing work. When day shift is
extended by a further hour, the minimum payment shall be 2.5 hours.
3.7.1 P&O Ports
Melbourne
Day shift: may be extended for 1.5 hours or 2.5 hours. Evening/midnight shift: may be extended by 1.5 hours.
Award minimum payment provisions apply. Receival and delivery: employees required to attend to receival and/or
delivery requirements up to one hour before the commencement of the day shift receive a minimum payment of one
hour at double time.
29 Patrick
Melbourne
Day shift: may be extended up to 2.5 hours with a minimum payment of 1.5 hours. Evening/midnight shift: can be
extended by 1.5 hours for any reason and a further hour to finish a hatch, vessel or specific operation which has
commenced. The award minimum payments apply.
28 Patrick
Brisbane
Day shift: may be extended up to 2 hours. Evening/midnight shift: evening shift may be extended by one hour and a
further hour where a hatch vessel or job is unfinished, a labour shortage exists or there is an emergency. Midnight
shift may be extended up to one hour in the same circumstances as those for the further hour evening shift
extension. The enterprise agreement does not specify minimum payments so the award provisions apply.(cont.)









The unions and the employers undertake to take all necessary steps to ensure that branches, officers, members,
executives and company staff follow the procedure as set out herein; the intention being that any or all disputes
shall be promptly resolved by conciliation in good faith. The employer and the union shall respectively notify each
other as soon as possible of any industrial matter which in the opinion of the party notifying may give rise to an
industrial dispute including consultation before the introduction of a new method of work or new technology. In the
event of a dispute arising at job level, the union delegate/representative and the immediate supervisor shall
immediately confer at job level and shall attempt to resolve the issue without delay. If no agreement is reached at
job level, a branch official of the union shall discuss the matter in dispute with a representative of local
management of the employer. If agreement has not been reached, the employer or the union officer may, where
agreed, submit the matter to a mutually agreed independent local conciliator who shall endeavour to reconcile the
parties in dispute and for this purpose, may make a recommendation or, where the parties agree, arbitrate the
matter. The conciliator shall in all cases make a written summary of the matters in dispute, including the facts as he
or she sees them. A copy of such record shall be available for any further non-judicial proceedings between the
parties relating to the matters in dispute. Failing agreement on a local basis, effort will then be made to resolve the
dispute by negotiations at federal level, including where agreed the involvement of a mutually agreed independent
conciliator. Should the foregoing steps fail to resolve the issue within a reasonable time, the matter(s) in dispute
shall be referred by either party to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission. The procedures shall not
preclude the right of either party to refer a dispute to the Commission at any stage of this procedure if the
procedures are not being observed or are otherwise inappropriate in the circumstances. Pending the completion of
the procedure set out in this clause, work shall continue without interruption and both parties agree to use their best
endeavours to ensure that continuation. No party shall engage in provocative action and pending the resolution of
the dispute. The ultimate terms of settlement of the dispute shall not be affected in any way nor shall the rights of
any person involved in or affected by the dispute be prejudiced by the fact that work has continued normally
without interruption. The procedures and obligations shall be equally binding on the employers and their staff and
the employees and their union. The decisions of the Commission shall be accepted and adhered to by all parties(cont.)



























Any employee who considers that they have grounds for a personal grievance may submit the grievance to a
supervisor or manager. The grievance shall be so submitted as soon as practicable after the grievance has arisen so
as to enable the supervisor or manager to remedy the grievance rapidly and as near as possible to the point of
origin. Where the grievance so submitted is not remedied by the supervisor or manager, or the grievance is of such
a nature that direct discussion between the employee and the supervisor or manager is regarded by the employee as
inappropriate, the employee may request the union to pursue resolution of the grievance. Where the union considers
that the personal grievance has substance, it shall forthwith take the matter up with the employer with a view to
reaching a settlement of the grievance. In the event that agreement or resolution of the grievance is not reached
between Sea-Land and the union, the parties agree to submit the matter to an agreed independent mediator for(cont.)




resolution. The decision of the mediator shall be equally binding on all parties.
38 CTAL Sydney Similar provision to Sea-Land Adelaide
1.21 P&O Ports
Melbourne
Similar provision to Sea-Land Adelaide
schedule 4 Patrick
Melbourne
Similar provision to Sea-Land Adelaide
schedule 4 Patrick
Brisbane










Annexure 1 provides for a communication committee with the following objectives: to increase employees’
contributions in the decision making process; to focus attention on the requirements of customers and the needs of
employees; and to improve site productivity. Annexure 5A provides for an occupational health and safety
committee with the following objectives: to involve employees in the maintenance of a safe working environment;
to ensure the safety practices and procedures are maintained; to ensure emergency procedures exist in all
workplaces; to provide training necessary to support occupational health and safety; and to ensure adequate
monitoring of lost-time injuries.
annexure 6 CTAL Sydney Similar occupational health and safety committee to Sea-Land Adelaide; no communication committee prescribed
annexure 3.6 P&O Ports
Melbourne
Similar occupational health and safety committee to Sea-Land Adelaide; no communication committee prescribed
9,  11 Patrick An enterprise communication and productivity committee comprising management, supervisors, operational(cont.)




Melbourne employees and union representatives which shall meet to discuss and improve the performance of the firm, the
welfare of employees and level of customer service is outlined. Clause 11 states that an occupational health and
safety committee will improve working conditions and safety.
9, 11 Patrick
Brisbane





The employer has the right to dismiss any employee without notice for misconduct that justifies instant dismissal,
including malingering, inefficiency or neglect of duty and in such cases the wages shall be paid up to the time of
dismissal only.
An employee who does not retain the competency, skills or qualifications necessary for the employee’s grade, may
be re-graded downwards to the next highest grade for which the employee qualifies, provided that: (i) there is
notice in writing to the employee of the intention to apply this clause containing particulars of the lost competency,
skills or qualifications; (ii) a re-grading under this subclause shall not take place before the employee has had a
reasonable opportunity to recover the lost competency, skills or qualifications; (iii) if the employee raises with the
employer a grievance concerning the regrading within three days after it is to take effect, the re-grading shall be
deemed not to have taken effect until it has been agreed by the employer and the employee’s union or has been
determined under the avoidance of disputes procedure; (iv) this subclause shall not apply in respect of an employee
(1) whose loss of competency, skills or qualifications results directly from an injury or illness for which the
employee is entitled to workers’ compensation, or (2) who, upon the written advice of a medical practitioner is no
longer capable of performing the duties or functions for which the employee is classified (provided that in these
circumstances the employer may nominate the medical practitioner and in addition the employer may require, or the
employee may request, periodic medical reviews which may include reference to a specialist medical practitioner);(cont.)




(v) in circumstances where paragraph (iv) hereof applies the employee shall retain the higher rate of pay.
37 Sea-Land
Adelaide
No direct dismissal clause. However, clause 37 states Sea-Land can take disciplinary action in accordance with the




37 CTAL Sydney No direct provision for dismissal although clause 37 states that disciplinary action may be taken by the company in
accordance with the award against an employee in the event of any action or conduct which is contrary to the terms
of the enterprise agreement.
1.20 P&O Ports
Melbourne
Similar provisions as CTAL Sydney
13 Patrick
Melbourne
No formal dismissal procedures although clause 13 states that a formal handbook (at the national level) that
includes a general code of conduct is to be formulated.
13 Patrick
Brisbane
Same provision as Patrick Melbourne
a Stevedoring Industry Award 1991
b This provision can not be legally enforced as a result of the Workplace Relations Act 1996.
c Generally, the enterprise agreement productivity incentive schemes are based on achieving threshold levels of ship working and receival/delivery with the bonus pool 
of earnings achieved distributed equally among all employees.
The enterprise agreements compared are: Conaust Ltd, Melbourne Enterprise Agreement 1996 (P&O Ports Melbourne), Patrick Terminals Fisherman Islands Enterprise
Agreement 1996 (Patrick Brisbane), Patrick Melbourne Enterprise Agreement 1996 (Patrick Melbourne), Sea-Land (Australia) Terminals Pty Ltd Port Adelaide Terminal
Enterprise Agreement 1997 (Sea-Land Adelaide) and the CTAL Enterprise Agreement 1994–1997 (CTAL Sydney). The reference to CTAL Sydney’s agreement is the
CTAL agreement (CTAL Sydney consists of the former Conaust and CTAL stevedores). A new agreement is being finalised at CTAL Sydney. However, this was
unavailable at the time of publication. The long service leave provisions are part of the Stevedoring Industry (Long Service Leave) Award 1992. The productivity
employment program is an arrangement which remains partly in operation at CTAL Sydney.
Sources: Stevedoring Industry Award; various enterprise agreements(cont.)
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Table J.4: Comparison of award provisions
Hours of work (average per week) Provision for supplementary/casual employment
Stevedoring Industry
Award 1991
35 Supplementary employees to be paid 1/35th of the weekly award wage
plus 20 per cent.
Transport Workers
Award 1983
38 Casual employees to be paid 1/38th of the appropriate weekly award rate




No set provision Daily hire employees paid the hourly award wage times 52 divided by
50.4. The calculation of the hourly rate takes into account a factor of eight





38 (Monday to Friday inclusive, spread over four weeks) Casual employees shall be guaranteed not less than four hours engagement




38 (eight hours per day, including meal breaks) Casual employees to be paid 1/38th of the weekly award wage plus 20 per
cent.
Shift worka Shift premiumsb
Stevedoring Industry
Award 1991
Day shift: commencing between 6 a.m. and 9 a.m. Evening
shift: commencing between 1 p.m. and 5 p.m. Night shift:
commencing at or after 10 p.m.
Sunday night to Friday night–day: ordinary time. Evening: 1.5 times
ordinary rate. Night: 2 times ordinary rate. Friday night: 2 times ordinary
rate. Saturday day: 2 times ordinary rate. Saturday evening: 2.5 times
ordinary rate. Saturday night: 2.5 times ordinary rate. Sunday day: 2.5
times ordinary rate. Sunday evening: 2.5 times ordinary rate.
Transport Workers
Award 1983
Day shift: commences at 5.30 a.m. or later, but finishes at
or before 6.30 p.m. Afternoon shift: finishes after 6.30 p.m.
but not later than 12.30 a.m. Night shift: finishes after
Rotating afternoon shift: ordinary rate plus 15 per cent. Permanent
afternoon shift: ordinary rate plus 17.5 per cent. Rotating night shift:
ordinary rate plus 20 per cent. Permanent night shift: ordinary rate plus 30(cont.)
Shift work(cont.)a Shift premiumsb (cont.)
12.30 a.m and at or before 8.30 a.m. per cent. Permanently working alternate night and afternoon shift: where
for an afternoon shift: ordinary rate plus 17.5 per cent: where on night
shift: ordinary rate plus 30 per cent. Shiftwork performed on a Saturday:
time and a half rates. All time of duty on any Sunday shall stand alone and
shall be paid for at the rate of double time with a minimum payment of




Afternoon shift: finishes at or after 9 p.m. and at or before
11 p.m. Night shift: finishes after 11 p.m. and at or before
7 a.m. Morning shift: finishes after 12.30 p.m. and at or
before 2  p.m. Early afternoon shift: finishes after 7  p.m.
and at or before 9 p.m.
Continuous employees for five shifts Monday to Friday. Afternoon and
night shift: ordinary time plus 50 per cent. Morning and early afternoon
shifts: ordinary time plus 25 per cent. Broken shifts (that is, fewer than
five consecutive shifts Monday to Friday): ordinary time plus 50 per cent




Ordinary working days of the week: 7 a.m. to 5.30 p.m. An
employer shall not alter the starting and finishing times in
any establishment without giving one week’s notice.
Where relevant, terms and conditions for shiftwork are included in other
awards covering storemen and packers.
Metal Industry Award
1984
The ordinary hours of work prescribed herein shall be
worked continuously, except for meal breaks, at the
discretion of the employer between 6  a.m. and 6  p.m.
Provided that the actual ordinary hours of work shall be
determined by agreement between an employer and the
majority of employees in the plant or work section or
sections concerned. Afternoon shift: any shift finishing
after 6 p.m. and at or before midnight. Night shift: any shift
finishing subsequent to midnight and at or before 8 a.m.
Rostered shift: a shift of which the employee concerned
has had at least 48 hours notice.
Afternoon and night shift: ordinary rate plus 15 per cent. Afternoon and
night shift that does not continue for at least five successive days in a five-
day workshop or six successive days in a six-day workshop: ordinary rate
plus 50 per cent for the first three hours and ordinary rate plus 100 per
cent thereafter. Permanent night shift: ordinary rate plus 30 per cent.
Between midnight on a Friday and midnight on the following Saturday:




Continuous with usual shift: the ordinary rate in addition to
the rate appropriate for the shift to be worked. Non-
continuous with usual shift: twice the ordinary rate for
Monday to Saturday, 2.5 times the ordinary rate on a
Sunday and on the day and evening shift on a public
holiday, and three times the ordinary rate on the night shift
on a public holiday. The first double header (double shift)
worked during a week (Monday to Friday): the ordinary
rate in addition to the rate appropriate to the additional
shift worked. The first double header on Saturdays,
Sundays, and holidays: half the ordinary rate in addition to
the rate appropriate to the additional shift worked.
A minimum payment for seven hours is required where the overtime is not
continuous with the ordinary hours of work. Where an employee is
required to work overtime that is continuous with the ordinary hours of




For all work done outside ordinary hours the rate of pay
shall be time and a half for the first two hours and double
time thereafter, such double time to continue until the
completion of the overtime work. Shiftwork on weekend
and holidays: time and a half rates, except for Good Friday
and Christmas Day which are double time. If an employee
is required to work on a holiday other than Good Friday
and Christmas Day during hours which, if the day was not
a holiday, would be outside the range of ordinary working
time, he shall be paid for such hours at double time and a
half, instead of the ordinary time and a half. Provided
further that he shall be paid treble time for all overtime
worked on Good Friday and Christmas Day.
Minimum payment for four hours for working on a Saturday, Sunday or
public holiday.(cont.)




All time worked beyond the ordinary time of work
inclusive of time worked for accrual purposes of this award
shall be paid for at the rate of one and a half times ordinary
rates for the first two hours thereof and at double time
thereafter. An employee recalled to work overtime after
leaving his/her employer’s business premises (whether
notified before or after leaving the premises) shall be paid
for a minimum of three hours work at the appropriate rates
for each time he/she is so recalled; provided that except in
the case of unforeseen circumstances arising, the employee
shall not be required to work the full three hours if the job
he/she was recalled to perform is completed within a
shorter period. Overtime work on Saturday shall be paid
for at the rate of time and a half for the first two hours and
double time thereafter, provided that all overtime worked
after 12 noon on Saturday shall be paid for at the rate of
double time. Provided that all work performed on the
Saturday following Good Friday shall be paid for at the
rate of double time and a half. All time worked on Sundays
shall be paid for at the rate of double time. An employee
required to work overtime on a Saturday or to work on a
Sunday shall be afforded at least three hours work on a
Saturday or four hours work on a Sunday or shall be paid
for three hours on a Saturday or four hours on a Sunday at
the appropriate rate. Provided that an employee required to
work on the Saturday following Good Friday shall be
afforded at least four hours work or paid for four hours at
Minimum payment for working overtime is for three hours on a Saturday
and four hours on a Sunday. A minimum payment for four hours applies to
working overtime on a public holiday. A minimum payment for three
hours is required where an employee is recalled to work overtime after
leaving his/her employer’s business premises. There is a minimum
payment for three hours on Sunday and for Union Picnic Day.(cont.)
Penalties(cont.)c Minimum payments (cont.)





Time and a half for the first two hours and double time
thereafter calculated on a daily basis. Provided that when
double time becomes payable it shall continue until the
completion of the overtime worked. An employee who
works eight ordinary hours Monday to Friday with a day
off in the fourth week, is paid overtime after eight hours
each day.
Double time shall be the rate for all work done on Sunday
and Union Picnic Day. Double time and a half shall be the
rate for all work done on New Year’s Day, Australia Day,
Good Friday, Easter Monday, Labour Day, Anzac Day (in
industries named in the Seventh Schedule to the Labour
and Industry Act), Queen’s Birthday, Melbourne Cup Day,
Christmas Day and Boxing Day.
Where an employee is required to work in a higher grade, pay for up to
three hours on any one day at the rate prescribed for such higher
classification (with a minimum of one hour); where work is more than
three hours on any one day, a full day’s pay at the rate prescribed for such
higher classification; where such work is more than 20 hours in any one
week, a full week’s pay at the rate prescribed for such higher
classification.
An employee recalled to work overtime after leaving the employer’s
business shall be paid for a minimum for four hours work at the
appropriate rate for each time he/she is recalled, provided that if such
recall is made after 12 noon on a Saturday, the employee shall be paid at
the rate of double time.
Metal Industry Award
1984
For all work done outside ordinary hours, the rates of pay
shall be time and a half for the first three hours and double
time after that, and double time will continue until the
completion of the overtime work. An employee not
engaged on continuous work shall be paid at the rate of
double time and a half for work done on public holidays,
with such double time and a half to continue until he is
relieved from duty.
Minimum payment for four hours for overtime on a Saturday and for three
hours for work on a Sunday or public holiday.(cont.)
Grounds for dismissal Allowances
Stevedoring Industry
Award 1991
The employer has the right to dismiss any employee
without notice for misconduct that justifies instant
dismissal, including malingering, inefficiency or neglect of
duty and in such cases the wages shall be paid up to the
time of dismissal only.
Clause 14a provides a laundry or drycleaning allowance of $6.95 per week
per employee. Clause 14b provides a telephone allowance of $6.40 per
week in the case where employees are required to telephone for their
labour allocation. Clause 14c specifies a consolidated disability allowance
which varies between grades. This allowance is compensation for such
factors as conditions which are unusually dirty, confined spaces, height,
noise or heavy lifting.
Transport Workers
Award 1983
Immediate dismissal for conduct that justifies instant
dismissal, including malingering, inefficiency or neglect of
duty.
There is a special allowance for workers in the Northern Territory in
addition to district allowances for workers in Queensland and Western
Australia. Also where an employer covered by this award contracts with a
principal site contractor to perform recognised on-site construction work,
he shall pay the applicable site and/or disability allowance (as determined
by the Commission) payable to employees while engaged in such work.
An employee engaged in ordinary travelling on duty or on work on which
is unable to return to his home at night shall be paid personal expenses as
he reasonably incurs in travelling, but shall be paid the sum of $22.21 per
day at least. Where an employer requires an employee to give change to




The employer has the right to dismiss an employee without
notice for misconduct or refusing duty.
In general there are expense-related allowances, industry allowances,
disability allowances, location allowances (including accommodation),
tools allowances, special rates or allowances, and responsibility
allowances. For example, an employee shall be paid an allowance at the
rate of $16.90 per week to compensate for the following disabilities
associated with construction work; (a) climatic conditions when working
in the open on all types of work; (b) the physical disadvantage of having to
climb stairs or ladders; (c) the disability of dust blowing in the wind, brick
dust and drippings from newly poured concrete; (d) sloppy and(cont.)
Grounds for dismissal (cont.) Allowances (cont.)
muddy conditions associated with the initial stages of the erection of a
building; (e) the disability of working on all types of scaffolds or ladders
other than a swing scaffold, suspended scaffold or a bosuns chair. An
employee required to work underground shall be paid an allowance of
$8.31 per week for all purposes of the award in addition to the above
allowances. Extra rates shall be paid to employees for many other tasks
such as insulation work, working with heavy equipment, working with
toxic and dangerous substances, and height work. A multistorey allowance
shall be paid to all employees on site engaged in construction or
renovation of a multistorey building to compensate for the disabilities
experienced in, and which are peculiar, to construction or renovation of a
multistorey building. An allowance for travel and mobility requirements is
also specified in the award. An employee required to work overtime for at
least 1.5 hours after working ordinary hours inclusive of time worked for
accrual purposes shall be paid by his/her employer an amount of $7.70 to
meet the cost of a meal. An employee living in a construction camp where
free messing is not provided shall receive a camping allowance of $115.90
for every complete week he/she is available for work. If required to be in
camp for less than a complete week, he/she shall be paid $16.70 per day
including any Saturday or Sunday if he/she is in camp and available for





The employer shall have the right to dismiss any employee
without notice for conduct that justifies instant dismissal,
including malingering, inefficiency or neglect of duty and
in such cases the wages shall be paid up to the time of
dismissal only.
An employee required to work overtime for any period in excess of one
hour after the usual hour of ceasing duty shall be paid an allowance of
$7.90 as meal money, provided  that such meal allowance shall not be
payable to an employee who can reasonably return home for a meal. An
employee who on any day or from day to day is required to work at a job
away from his accustomed workshop or depot shall at the direction of his(cont.)
Grounds for dismissal (cont.) Allowances (cont.)
employer present for work at such job at the usual starting time, but for all
time reasonably spent in reaching and returning from such job (in excess
of the time normally spent in travelling from his home to such workshop
or depot and returning) he shall be paid travelling time, and also any fares
reasonably incurred in excess of those normally incurred in travelling
between his home and such workshop or depot. The rate of pay for
travelling time shall be ordinary rates, except on Sundays and holidays
when it shall be time and a half. An employee, qualified to St. John’s
Ambulance standard or equivalent, if requested to act as the First Aid
Attendant shall be paid an allowance of $6.30 per week.
Metal Industry Award
1984
Employment can be terminated as a consequence of
conduct that justifies instant dismissal, including
malingering, inefficiency or neglect of duty.
Working in boiling down works: 24 cents per hour extra. Working for
more than one hour in places where the temperature is reduced by
artificial means below 0 degrees Celsius: 34 cents per hour extra. Working
in confined space (as defined): 45 cents per hour extra. Work, other than
ship repair work, which a foreman and workman shall agree is of an
unusually dirty or offensive nature: 35 cents per hour extra. Employees
other than linesmen, linesmen’s assistants, riggers and splicers engaged in
the construction, erection, repair and/or maintenance as the case may be,
of ships, steel frame buildings, bridges, gasometers or other structures at a
height in each case of 15 metres or more directly above the nearest
horizontal plane: 24 cents per hour extra. Working for more than one hour
in the shade in places where the temperature is raised by artificial means
to 46–54 degrees Celsius: 35 cents per hour extra; in places where the
temperature exceeds 54 degrees Celsius: 45 cents per hour extra. Working
in lead works: 24 cents per hour extra. Pattern maker in lignum vitae
outside the workshop and fitting to stern bushes: 45 cents per hour extra.
Working on repairs in oil tanks or meat digestors: 35 cents per hour extra.
Provided that if any employee is so engaged for more than(cont.)
Grounds for dismissal (cont.) Allowances (cont.)
half of one day or shift he shall be paid the prescribed allowance for the
whole day or shift. Working in sanitary works: 22 cents per hour extra. An
employee who is working aboard a ship while bulk wheat is being loaded
into the ship and who is subject to the dust arising from such loading shall
be paid 45 cents per hour extra while so working. There are many other
work site allowances such as payments for working with power tools, in
submarines and in wet places. An employee who by agreement with the
employer uses his own motor vehicle on the employer’s business shall be
paid an allowance of 52 cents per kilometre travelled. In clause 37 there
are similar allowances to those mentioned for various districts, industries
and plants where metal industry workers are employed. Clause 48
provides site allowances for New South Wales sugar milling employees.
Workers in New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland (air-
conditioning and refrigeration work only) and Tasmania also have on-site
construction work allowances, including a travel fare.
Annual leave (weeks) Annual leave loading
Stevedoring Industry
Award 1991
Five weeks annual leave for shift workers for each year of
continuous service. Annual leave can be taken over three





28 consecutive days (four weeks) per year to an employee





28 consecutive days (four weeks) to all employees other
than casuals, after 12 months continuous service.
17.5 per cent(cont.)




At the end of each year of employment by any employer,
an employee becomes entitled to an annual holiday of four
weeks on ordinary pay.
17.5 per cent. In the case of a shift worker where the employee would
have received shift loadings had the employee not been on leave during
the relative period and such loadings would have entitled such employee
to a greater amount than the 17.5 per cent loading, then the shift loadings




Four weeks per year for a year of continuous service.
However where an employee with 12 months continuous
service is engaged for some of that time as a seven-day
shift worker, the worker shall be entitled to an increase by
half a day for each month they are engaged as a shift
worker.
17.5 per cent
Sick leave Bereavement leave
Stevedoring Industry
Award 1991
Paid sick leave entitlements of 10 days per year. Sick leave
is cumulative.
Three days paid leave on each legitimate occasion.
Transport Workers
Award 1983
Sick leave is paid leave. The employee shall not be entitled
during the first year of any period of service to leave in
excess of five days of ordinary working time, or in the case
where the employee normally works more than ordinary
hours in any day, shall not be entitled to leave in excess of
38 hours of ordinary working time. An employee shall not
be entitled during the second or subsequent year of any
period of service with any employer to leave in excess of
eight days of ordinary working time.
Two days paid leave on each legitimate occasion.(cont.)




An employee during his/her first year of employment with
an employer shall be entitled to sick leave entitlement at
the rate of one day at the beginning of each of the first ten
calender months of his/her first year of employment. Sick
leave with an employer shall accumulate from year to year
so any balance of the period specified accumulates,
provided that an employee who has completed one year of
continuous employment shall be credited with a further ten
days sick leave entitlement at the beginning of his/her
second and each subsequent year.




During the first year: five days of ordinary working time
calculated pro rata from the first year of service. During
any subsequent year of service: ten days of ordinary
working time. Sick leave is cumulative.
Up to two days without loss of pay on each legitimate occasion
Metal Industry Award
1984
An employee shall not be entitled during the first year of
any period of service with an employer to leave in excess
of five days of ordinary working time or in cases where he
normally works more than eight ordinary hours in any day,
he shall not be entitled to leave in excess of 40 hours of
ordinary working time. Provided further that during the
first five months of the first year of a period of service with
an employer he shall be entitled to sick leave which shall
accrue on a pro rata basis of one day of ordinary working
time for each month of service completed with that
employer to a maximum of 40 ordinary hours. Employees
shall not be entitled during the second or
Two days without loss of pay on each legitimate occasion(cont.)
Sick leave (cont.) Bereavement leave (cont.)
subsequent year of any period of service with an employer
to leave in excess of eight days of ordinary working time,
or in excess of 64 hours of ordinary working time in the
case of an employee who normally works more than eight
ordinary hours on any day.
Long service leave Long service leave loading
Stevedoring Industry
Award 1991
No provision. Under the Stevedoring Industry (Long
Service Leave) Award 1992 permanent employees are
entitled to 13 weeks leave for 15 years continuous service.
Long service leave pro-rata entitlements begin after 10
years.
No provision. Under the Stevedoring Industry (Long Service Leave)
Award 1992, employees are entitled to 27.5 per cent loading.
Transport Workers
Award 1983








No award provisiond No award provisione
Metal Industry Award
1984
No provision. Under the Metal Industry (Long Service
Leave) Award 1984 in respect of 15 years service so
completed: 13 weeks. And in respect of each 10 years’
service with the employer completed since last entitled to
long service leave: eight and two-thirds weeks.
Under the Metal Industry (Long Service Leave) Award 1984, there is no
loading.(cont.)
Other leave arrangementsf Public holidays
Stevedoring Industry
Award 1991
Employees are entitled to maternity, paternity and adoption
leave and to work part-time in connection with the birth or
adoption of a child. Maternity, paternity and adoption
leave is unpaid leave.
New Year’s Day, Good Friday, Easter Saturday, Easter Monday,
Christmas Day and Boxing Day; Australia Day, Anzac Day, Queen's
Birthday (or State Foundation Day in Western Australia), Labour Day;
Picnic Day on a common day in each State or Territory, Melbourne Cup
Day (Victoria), Geelong Cup Day and Proclamation Day (South
Australia). Where in a State, Territory or locality, public holidays are
declared or prescribed on days other than those set out above, those days
shall constitute additional holidays for the purpose of this award.
Transport Workers
Award 1983
Provisions exist in the award for various forms of paid and
unpaid leave including family leave, bereavement leave,
maternity leave, parental leave and adoption leave.
An employee on weekly hiring shall be entitled to holidays on the
following days: (i) New Year’s Day, Good Friday, Easter Saturday, Easter
Monday, Christmas Day and Boxing Day (except in South Australia,
where Proclamation Day shall apply); and (ii) the following days, as
prescribed in the relevant States, Territories and localities: Australia Day,
Anzac Day, Queen’s Birthday and Eight Hours’ Day or Labour Day; and
one other holiday on the day fixed as follows: Northern Territory: Picnic
Day. Queensland: Exhibition Day. Victoria: Within 40 km of the GPO
Melbourne — the day to be agreed to by the employer and the employees,
and notified beforehand to the union, and in default thereof the day upon
which the Melbourne Cup is run. In any other district — one day for
which a whole or part holiday for the public service is gazetted for the
district or, in default thereof, a day agreed to by the employer and
employees concerned and notified beforehand to the union. South
Australia: the day shall be allowed on the third Monday in May (Adelaide
Cup Day). Tasmania: the day shall be allowed on Regatta Day in southern
Tasmania and on Bank Holiday in northern Tasmania. Western Australia:
the day shall be allowed on Foundation Day (State). Additional State
public holidays are granted such as Melbourne Cup Day in Victoria.(cont.)




Award provisions include paid and unpaid bereavement
leave and parental leave.
New Year’s Day, Australia Day, Good Friday, Easter Monday, Anzac
Day, Queen’s Birthday (except in Western Australia where Union Picnic
Day will be held in lieu thereof), Eight Hour Day or Labour Day,
Christmas Day, Boxing Day (except in South Australia where
Commemoration Day: (28th December) shall be observed as a holiday
throughout the State, except at Whyalla, instead of Boxing Day), or such
other day as is generally observed in a locality as a substitute for any of




A union delegate or elected workplace representative with
more than six months continuous service with approval of
the union and upon application in writing, shall be granted
up to five days leave with pay each calendar year, non-
cumulative, to attend courses conducted or approved by the
Trade Union Training Authority. Special family leave can
be taken as unpaid leave by agreement in order for an
employee to take care of an ill family member. There is a
also maternity, paternity and adoption leave, all of which
are unpaid leave.
New Year’s Day, Good Friday, Easter Saturday, Easter Monday,
Christmas Day and Boxing Day and the following days as prescribed in
the relevant States, Territories and localities: Australia Day, Anzac Day,
Queen’s Birthday and Eight Hour Day or Labour Day; and Union Picnic
Day in lieu of Melbourne Cup Day. Where in a State, Territory or locality
public holidays are declared or prescribed on days other than those set out
above shall constitute additional holidays for the purpose of this award.
Metal Industry Award
1984
Provisions in the award cover different types of paid and
unpaid leave including maternity leave, parental leave,
family leave and bereavement leave.
New Year’s Day, Australia Day, Good Friday, Easter Saturday, Easter
Monday, Anzac Day, Queen’s Birthday, Eight Hour Day or Labour Day,
Christmas Day, Boxing Day (except in South Australia where
Commemoration Day (28 December) shall be observed as a holiday
throughout the State, except at Whyalla, instead of Boxing Day) or such
other day as is generally observed in a locality as a substitute for any of
the said days respectively. Provided that, in the State of Tasmania only,
Show Day shall be a Public Holiday in lieu of Easter Saturday, which
means not more than one local show day observed on an employees(cont.)
Other leave arrangements (cont.)f Public holidays (cont.)
ordinary working day, other than a Saturday or a Sunday, in the city, town
or district in which the employee is employed; or such other day which, in
the absence of such a local show day, is agreed on by the employee and
the employer, therefore making a total of eleven paid public holidays per
year. One additional State public holiday also applies.
Superannuation Occupational health and safety
Stevedoring Industry
Award 1991
No provision for superannuation Employees directly concerned with an operation said to be unsafe have
the right to cease performing that work pending the resolution of the
issue. Where it is determined that the operation was safe, no wages shall
be paid to the employees concerned for the period that work was stopped.
An employee shall not be required to perform work which is unsafe
having regard to the terms of the Industry Safety Code.
Transport Workers
Award 1983
The nominated fund for the purpose of this clause shall be
the TWU Superannuation Fund. Contributions shall be at
the rate prescribed from time to time by the Transport
Workers (Superannuation) Consolidated Award 1987.
Any direction issued by an employer shall be consistent with the





Employees have a choice of one of several funds. An
employer shall contribute an amount on behalf of each
eligible employee into a relevant superannuation fund,
which reflects the employer’s liability.
Any direction issued by an employer shall be consistent with the
employer’s responsibilities to provide a safe and healthy working
environment. An employee required to use toxic substances shall be
informed by the employer of the health hazards involved and instructed in
the correct and necessary safeguards which must be as are defined by a
competent authority chosen by the union and the employer. Employees
required to use materials containing asbestos or to work in close proximity
to employees using such materials shall be provided with and shall use all
necessary safeguards as required by the appropriate occupational health
authority. Where an employee is prevented from(cont.)
Superannuation (cont.) Occupational health and safety (cont.)
working as a result of unsafe conditions caused by inclement weather,
he/she may be transferred to other work in his/her trade on site, until the
unsafe conditions are rectified. Where such alternative work is not
available and until the unsafe conditions are rectified, the employee shall
remain on site. He/she shall be paid for such time without reduction of
his/her inclement weather entitlement. The roles of health and safety




The superannuation fund is the Labour Union Co-operative
Retirement Fund. The employer shall make a
superannuation contribution to the fund on behalf of the
eligible employees, of an amount equivalent to 3 per cent
of the employees’ ordinary time earnings. Employees may
make additional contributions.
Part 10 refers to relevant workers’ compensation legislation.
Metal Industry Award
1984
No  award  provision  for  superannuation Any direction issued by an employer shall be consistent with the
employer’s responsibilities to provide a safe and healthy working
environment. Employer and employees concerned are to be guided by the
occupational health and safety provisions of the ACTU Code of Conduct
on 12-hour shifts. All aspects of asbestos work will meet as a minimum
standard the provision of the National Health and Medical Research





No provision for redundancy
Transport Workers
Award 1983
Employees are entitled to the following amount of
severance pay in respect of a continuous period of service:
– one year or less — nil;
– one year and up to the completion of two years — four
weeks;
– two years and up to the completion of three years — six
weeks;
– three years and up to the completion of four years —
seven weeks;




A redundant employee shall receive redundancy/severance
payments as follows:
– one year or more but less than two years — 2.4 weeks
pay plus, for all service in excess of one year, 1.75 hours
pay per completed week of service up to a maximum of 4.8
weeks;
– two years or more but less than three years — 4.8 weeks
pay plus, for all service in excess of two years, 1.6 hours
pay per completed week of service up to a maximum of
seven weeks.
– three years or more but less than four years — seven
weeks pay plus, for all service in excess of three years,h:\www\research\labmrkt\stevedor\appendixjt4.doc Kai Swoboda 30/7/99 2:29 PM Page 1 of 19
Redundancy (cont.)
0.73 hours pay per completed week of service up to a
maximum of eight weeks.
– four years or more — eight weeks pay.
‘Weeks pay’ means the ordinary time rate of pay at the




Similar provisions to the Transport Workers Award 1983
Metal Industry Award
1984
Similar provisions to the Transport Workers Award 1983
a Enterprise agreements in the container stevedoring industry specify shift arrangements within their individual rostering arrangements.
b Some shift premiums for the container stevedoring industry are also specified in enterprise agreements.
c Enterprise agreements in the container stevedoring industry also specify some penalties such as for double headers and shift extensions.
d Employees under these awards are covered by various state long service leave Acts. For example, employees in South Australia are entitled to 13 weeks after 10 years service
under the Long Service Leave Act (SA) 1997. In NSW, employees are entitled to 13 weeks after 15 years service under the Long Service Leave Act (NSW) 1955.
e Under the various state long service leave acts there is no leave loading.
f Some of the agreements have leave clauses which are read in conjunction with the award provisions on these forms of leave. For example, they may specify when leave can
be taken.
Sources: Stevedoring Industry Award 1991; Stevedoring Industry (Long Service Leave) Award 1992; National Building and Construction Industry Award 1990; Metal Industry
Award 1984; Transport Workers Award 1983; Transport Workers (Long Service Leave, ACT) Award 1961; and the Storage Services — General — Interim Award 19961
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